Military Honour, the British Army and American Indians in the Sixty Years' War

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Abstract

Prior to 1755, British-American colonial forces and American Indians (hereinafter Indians) predominantly conducted the military campaigns in the North American theatre of European conflicts. From 1755 to 1815, however, the British Army itself became heavily engaged and had to consider its use of Indians as allies or auxiliaries. Indian War customs, such as torture, mutilation and killing of prisoners and civilians, were at odds with an emerging, although uneven, consensus against these practices in Europe. Therefore, British officials often had to decide if the use of Indians was compatible with their concept of military honour.

The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the British concept of military honour hindered the effective use of Indians in the era of the Sixty Years' War (l755-1815). The author will attempt to persuade the reader that it did and it ultimately cost the British Empire its direct control of, then even its influence in, the American midwest.

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'Every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.'
- Carl von Clausewitz[1]

1. Introduction

1.1 Prologue

In 1755, Major General Edward Braddock III, son of a British Army Major General, was killed in his attempt to take the Forks of the Ohio River from the French. In 1815, Major General Edward Pakenham, brother-in-law to the Duke of Wellington, was killed in his attempt to take New Orleans, at the mouth of the Mississippi River, from the Americans. These two battles formed the opening and closing chapters of the British Army's major combat operations in North America. Both officers had their commissions purchased in youth by families with Royal connections. They had different levels of combat experience, but both had served in conventional and successful Army careers. Each officer had been sent to North America directly from Europe to take control of an unstable situation and deliver decisive victories. Both operations were in aid of decisively retaining Britain's North American colonies' geographic and commercial security as well. The forces both officers commanded were working against enemy forces that were, at least in conventional warfare terms, inferior to them. Both men had the confidence of the Monarchy and Parliament as well as the respect of the European military establishment. As was common in both eras, neither officer lacked loyalty to the King, nor courage. The risk to senior officer's lives was real as shown by both of their deaths and the deaths of many of their direct subordinates on the battlefield. Critically, each Major General had Indian components available to them that were dismissed, either through choice or inept co-ordination. The similarities between these two officers are striking. In short, these two officers pose classic examinations for this paper. However, if every situation and every British Army officer in North America from 1755 to 1815 were as similar as these two at the beginning and the ending of the era, the answer to the question of the present paper would be very straightforward. However, this was no ordinary age and the similarities mask significant variations in British Army officer behaviour within the era.

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 593

1.2 Purpose

This paper was inspired in part by an article entitled 'Early American Ways of War: A New Reconnaissance, 1600-1815'. In it, Wayne E. Lee examined the cultural factors of warfare in the American colonies, then the United States, and how contradictory they could be depending on the situation, especially against or with Indians on the frontier. Lee explained that ideology has taken the fore with most early American history, but has its limitations and an examination of military culture might help explain events further. Lee suggested that honour could explain some of the contradictions.[2] This author agrees and the purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the British Army's concept of military honour hindered its effective use of Indians as allies or auxiliaries. Specifically, this paper will examine the different behaviours and beliefs of the most prominent leaders of the British Army when confronted with the choice to use American Indians or not. The author will attempt to persuade the reader that military honour did hinder the effective use of Indian forces and ultimately cost the British Empire its direct control of and, eventually, its influence in the American midwest.

1.3 Preface

Even after two centuries of European exploration and settlement, the bountiful area between the Appalachian mountain chain in the east and the Mississippi River in the west from the Great Lakes in the north to the Gulf of Mexico in the south (hereinafter the 'midwest') was still largely controlled by American Indians (hereinafter 'Indians') in 1754.[3] However, the French and Indian War in North America, eventually part of the Seven Years' War in Europe, began a sixty year period during which Indian hegemony was extinguished. It also coincided with the only era that the British Army conducted large scale operations in North America. Prior to 1755, most European based conflicts in North America were conducted overwhelmingly by colonial militia and Indians on behalf of the Europeans as secondary theatres to larger European conflicts. However, with the expansion of European trade with North America, the control of the midwest began to take on greater importance. Although usually concerned primarily with events in Europe, the British Army became a critical part of the struggle for this area. With each stage in the era, it had to

[2] Wayne E. Lee, 'Early American Ways of War: A New Reconnaissance, 1600-1815' *The Historical Journal* - Volume 44, Number 1 (2001): 269-289.
[3] The author uses the term 'midwest' with a lower case 'm' rather than the technical geographic term 'Midwest'. See 1.6 Definitions for further explanation.

consider its use of Indians as allies, either as auxiliaries or as independent units. Although warfare customs had changed in Europe to somewhat encourage restraint, the Indians still valued their traditional customs in warfare. Some of these customs, such as mutilating dead enemies, torturing and killing prisoners, and raiding civilian settlements, were at odds with an emerging, although uneven, consensus against these practices in Europe.[4] As a European institution, the British Army, its officials, and officers often had to decide whether the use of Indians was an unacceptable compromise of their military honour.

1.4 Scope

The central question of this paper is, 'Did military honour hinder the British Army's effective use of American Indians in North American combat from 1755 to 1815?' This paper will address and answer this question through three different lenses.

First, this paper will address the history of the period in the context of which groups would control the midwest. Although from the perspective of the British army and its political leadership it makes little sense, the term 'Sixty Years' War' to refer to a long contest for control of the Midwest is an important, new conceptualisation of the conflicts around the North American Great Lakes region between 1754 and 1814. The term emerged out of a 1998 conference at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. This paper will expand the definition geographically and also chronologically by an additional few months to include the first quarter of 1815. The era has traditionally been viewed, and certainly was by British Army officers at the time, as a series of discrete wars: the Seven Years' War (known as the French and Indian War in the British North American colonies and later the U.S.A.), the American Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812. There were a series of Indian conflicts that occurred within these wars, but also sporadically in between them. Yet if one views the native occupants as a single entity, as the thirteen colonies often are, the war can also be seen as a more coherent, single conflict with sporadic cease-fires as participants entered, exited and re-entered in various alliances. Furthermore, if one views the geography as a key element of the origin of the conflicts, the concept of the Sixty

[4] Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1815* (London: Pimlico, 2003), 182-185 & Geoffrey Parker, 'Early Modern Europe' in *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World.* Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, 40-58 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 52-58

Years' War may be one of the best ways to examine the period comprehensively.[5] Therefore, whilst recognising that British attitudes to the use of Indians was necessarily conditioned by the context of the wars being fought in Europe and that control of the midwest was not the overriding concern of British Army officers in much of their decision making, this paper also recognises the 'Sixty Years' War' as a way to examine the Indian-related combat in North America from 1755 to 1815 and to limit the geographical scope of the British Army's combat in North America in the era.

To be as inclusive of British-allied Indian combat as possible, this paper will expand the geographical focus on the Great Lakes to include all of the midwest between the Appalachian Mountains chain west to the Mississippi River and from the Great Lakes south to the Gulf of Mexico.[6] This long funnel shaped slice of North America is characterised by its waters, which made it unusually fertile and which provided communication links to the outside world, either through the St Lawrence River in the north or through the ports of New Orleans, Mobile, and Pensacola on the Gulf of Mexico in the south. These communication links held the key to this massive area before the colonial road networks were established back over the Appalachian Mountains to the east coast ports.[7] Crucially, the routes going to the Gulf of Mexico were normally open year round, whereas the routes going through the St. Lawrence River were often frozen shut from November to April. Additionally, somewhat counter-intuitively, there were localities in the upper Ohio Valley, less than one-hundred miles from Lake Michigan or Lake Erie that would require long portages to get to the Great Lakes, but had unbroken riverine access to New Orleans. Therefore, areas that seem linked to the Great Lakes by proximity actually were closer to the Gulf of Mexico in some strategic and commercial calculations. Furthermore, the Indians of the Gulf south and the Great Lakes area had historical and familial connections that made a confederacy and concerted action more than just a theoretical possibility.[8] Like the

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[5] David C. Skaggs & Larry L. Nelson, Eds, *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), xvii - 20

[6] See section 1.6 definitions for a detailed geographical definition of the area.

[7] Ellen C. Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions* (Cambridge, Massachusetts : The Riverside Press,1933), pp. 84-86

[8] Alex Cameron forwarded letter to Gage, 18 June 1774, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 121 & Stuart to Haldimand, 5 July 1774, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 121 & Josiah Martin forwarded letter to Gage 21 July 1774, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 121 & Stuart to Gage dated 14 September 1774, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 123. Examples are present throughout Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993)

very different southern and northern British colonies before the American Revolutionary War, these Indian nations did not need to establish a formal union or even agree on all of the particulars of a confederacy to act in their combined self-interest. Nor, like the American states in the lead up to the War of 1812, did they always need to agree on when, how, and with whom they would go to war to be considered an aggregated historical entity.[9] Furthermore, the area has special distinction; if one accepts that the area could have had several different futures with Indian, French, Spanish, or British control or even as an independent nation(s).

The second lens is a linear, operational examination of the use of Indians by the British Army for the entire period. Although the British Army was not primarily focused on the plight of the Indians, the British Army's inability to understand how their previous use of the Indians would affect their actions in future combat will be examined. British Army officers often made decisions based on broader geo-political and European cultural considerations, but their potential Indian allies did not. This fact had a direct bearing on the reasons why the Indians were used or not. While the point of view of the British Army officers will be considered when trying to determine their frame of reference in decision making, the objective of this examination is to see the relationship of all of the events in the midwest as a natural progression, rather than discrete actions in individual wars of only British conceptualisation. It is important to see the British-Indian relationship from the Indian point of view as well. This paper seeks to understand the British Army's actions, but it must also consider why the British Army was so poor at understanding Indian motivations and aspirations. The period of 1754-1815 in North America has been covered like very few others, but mainly from a British or American point of view and with the common idea that the midwest was always going to become part of the United States of America. There have been a few books that examined the period exclusively from the Indian point of view.[10] However, none look at the period in a British Army operational sense from beginning to end. This paper will not provide a battle by battle progression of the entire period; that would require a multi-volume tome. However, it will attempt to explain each major campaign where the British Army had the opportunity to work with

[9] Dowd, *Spirited*, 24-26
[10] Dowd, *Spirited*, Colin G. Calloway, *The Shawnees and the War for America: The Penguin Library of American Indian History series* (London: Penguin Books, 2008), Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003)

Indians against a third party, be it French, Spanish, American, or another tribe(s) during this period. Several books have examined British and Indian relations, but they have not focused on honour as a determining factor, nor have they covered the entire period.[11]

The third lens is a cultural history of military honour in the British Army leadership during the period of 1754-1815. British Army leaders were part of the British political, social, and often aristocratic cultures, as well as the professional culture of 'Military Europe'.[12] These forces exerted pressures and rules upon them that contributed to their decisions, especially when it came to the application of the laws of war as Europeans understood them. 1754-1815 was a time of great political, societal, technological, commercial, and philosophical change. This paper will document those streams of history as they pertained to the overall character of British Army leaders to examine how they affected their decisions to use Indians or not.

To summarise the scope, this paper will examine British Army operations with Indians in the North American midwest between 1755 and 1815, bearing in mind that the geo-political and cultural attitudes of the British Army officers meant they rarely saw the era in the way that the Indians and the white frontiersmen did.

1.5 Out of Scope

This paper will not consider British military or diplomatic operations between 1755 and 1815 that were not controlled by or through the British Army, namely those controlled by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. British Army operations in North America that fall outside of this paper's geographical definition of the American midwest (see section 1.6 'Definitions below) will likewise not be covered, primarily because Indians were rarely available for combat outside of this geographical area.

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[11] Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policies in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815* (Toronto and Oxford: The Dundurn Press, 1993) & Colin G. Calloway, *Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987) & Timothy D. Willig, *Restoring the Chain of Friendship: British Policy and the Indians of the Great Lakes, 1783-1815.* Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) & Paul Lawrence Stevens, 'His Majesty's Savage Allies: British Policy and the Northern Indians During the Revolutionary War. The Carleton Years, 1774-1778', Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1984) & James Roger Tootle, 'Anglo-Indian Relations in the Northern Theatre of the French and Indian War, 1748-1761' (Unpublished PhD Dissertation : The Ohio State University, 1972)

[12] 'Military Europe' was coined by Christopher Duffy in *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 1715-1789* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1987), 3-34 and expanded upon by Stephen Conway in 'The British Army, "Military Europe," and the American War of Independence', *The William and Mary Quarterly,* Volume 67, Number 1 (January 2010): 69-100

1.6 Definitions

This paper addresses distinct historical groups, terms, and concepts that have often been used, but with little uniformity. Therefore, it is appropriate to define the terms that will be used to ensure consistency.

The 'British Army' is defined in its widest sense to include all military units, as well as civilians in governorships, and other political appointments, such as Indian agents, when these positions fell under the direct control of the British Army. Where they were directly involved in decisions relevant to this paper, the civilians who directed the British Army in ministerial posts are also included. However, it will not include the Royal Navy and Marines, or militia, unless their personnel or units were under the direct control of the British Army. There are also specific instances where non-British citizens are as classified as British Army officers when serving in the British Army. Examples are Colonel Henry Bouquet and Major General Frederick Haldimand who were both Swiss-born officers who had distinguished and long careers in the British Army.

The term 'Indian' is used throughout this paper as a synonym for 'American Indian' and 'Native American'. The author uses this term as the historical record is replete with this usage and most modern day American Indians do not take offense to the term. Indeed, many modern Native-Americans refer to themselves as 'Indian'. Where there are instances that may render confusion with 'Indians' of the Asian subcontinent, the author will use 'American Indians' locally in contrast. The 'middle ground' was also filled with characters of mixed parentage. This paper will refer to these individuals, where known, as 'metis' or by their known roots, such as Scots-Creek. The term 'savage' is found throughout the historical record as a descriptor of the Indians, but will be used only when it is quoted or when making a specific point about the term itself in this paper. The terms 'tribes' and 'nations' are used to describe groups of Indians with shared political, cultural, and kinship identities. The author is aware of the insufficient preciseness of these terms, but uses them as terms of convenience and to avoid confusion.

The term 'white' is sometimes used when describing those of European ancestry in racial terms when the race is the more appropriate description than the national identity. Finally, as an American, but eighteen year resident of the United Kingdom who has worked in England and Scotland, the author is well aware of the difference between England and Britain. However, in the era being examined, the term 'English' was often used rather than

'British', especially amongst the Europeans when speaking of the residents of Britain. Therefore, the term 'British' is used liberally, but not intentionally carelessly. The British residents of North America are referred to as residents of their colony, e.g. Virginians, or 'colonists' from 1755 to 1776. From 1776-1787, residents of the thirteen colonies south of the St. Lawrence River are referred to as residents of their colony or future state, but also as 'rebels', 'Whigs', 'patriots', 'loyalists' and 'Tories' depending on their allegiances. After 1787, the residents of the thirteen states are referred to by their states or as 'Americans'. The residents of frontier settlements are referred to by their state of origin or by the well-known independent regions in which they settled, such as 'Kentuckians' or 'Ohioans'.[13]

The term 'midwest' with a lower case 'm' is used rather than the more formal 'Midwest' to denote the difference between this paper's definition and the modern day U.S. Census Bureau's Regional definition.[14] The midwest is defined as the area between the eastern edge of the Appalachian mountain chain to the Mississippi River and from the Great Lakes down to the Gulf of Mexico. More specifically, the eastern edge of the Appalachian chain is defined as a line starting in modern day Quebec, Canada that travels south to the mouth of the Apalachicola River on the Gulf of Mexico. Using modern day locales, it is demarcated by a line running south from the mouth of the Chaudière River to the source of Lac Megantic in Quebec. It then proceeds west-southwest to the source of the Connecticut River in northern New Hampshire to the intersection of the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers near Troy, New York. From there, it proceeds to the source of the north fork of the Susquehanna River and follows that river south and west to the fork with the west branch at Sunbury, Pennsylvania and follows that branch to its source. At the source of the west branch of the Susquehanna, then the line runs generally south connecting the sources of the Potomac, Savannah, and Chattahoochee Rivers. Finally, it follows the Chattahoochee to the fork of the Apalachicola River and finishes at that river's mouth at Apalachicola, Florida. The western boundary is formed the Mississippi River from its source in Minnesota to its mouth near New Orleans, Louisiana. The northern line is defined by the modern day U.S.A. and Canada border. The southern boundary is the Gulf of Mexico.

[13] Thanks to Calloway, *Calumet*, xi-xiv for guidance on how to deal with many of these definitions sensitively and eloquently.

[14] Census Regions and Divisions of the United States http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf - Last accessed, 31 July 2014

Due to the central question of this paper, the terms ‘honour’ and ‘military honour’ are deserving of more comprehensive definitions. See Chapter 2 for a full discussion on the definitions of honour generically and military honour specifically.

1.7 Historiographical Context

The concept of military honour is well known. It has been an object of cultural and historical discussion for centuries. However, it has rarely been discussed in the context of the decisions made about war and strategy. The current literature does not directly address the issue of military honour as a constraint on the British Army in North America from 1755-1815. Therefore, to help isolate and evaluate the effect of honour on decision making, the related literature has been organised into three broad categories; the geo-political environment from 1755 to 1815 in North America and Europe, the martial tradition of the Indians of the midwest and their methods of warfare in the era, and the British Army officers of the era and the societies in which they operated. The intention of this section is to place this paper within the context of the current scholarship on these three categories. The remaining chapters will examine honour in detail, then analyse individual periods as case studies to determine what role military honour played on military effectiveness throughout the period. Finally, a combined analysis and conclusion will complete this paper.

To begin the historiography, the author would first like to acknowledge that six books have exerted extraordinary influence on this author and paper. The styles, content and analysis of these books allowed the author to conceive the blueprint for this paper. Each covers its content masterfully, but in important ways do not address the central question of this paper.

Paul Robinson comes as close as any author has in considering how military honour affects the conduct of war in *Military Honour and the Conduct of War*. He examined the elements of honour, but also looked at the sometimes paradoxical results of honour in the fog of war. To test his thinking, Robinson looked at seven case studies from classical Greece and Rome to the Cold War. However, when it came to the British Army, he skipped from Elizabethan England (1558-1603) to the second British Empire after 1815. Additionally, Robinson examined the effects of honour on the causes of war, motivation for fighting, recognition and rewards, death, conduct of war, the enemy, ending wars, and the women. However, he did not specifically address the effect of military honour on choosing

allies of differing customs in war.[15] The next two books examined the type of warfare that was prevalent in North America from 1755-1815. Armstrong Starkey contrasted the differences between European and Indian warfare in *European and Native American Warfare: 1675-1815*. Although Starkey covers the timeframe, he does not look comprehensively at military honour and whether it was a decisive factor in how the British Army conducted warfare with and against the Indians. Starkey also does not consistently look at the midwest as a discrete objective through the period.[16] In *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier*, John Grenier demonstrated that the Americans had a distinct style of war before Washington built the Continental Army. War on the frontier was often based on revenge, terror, and sometimes total extirpation of foes. Grenier's importance to this paper is in establishing the fact that there were other ways of fighting wars in the era. In between European and Indian warfare laid the American militia tradition and 'ranging'. Grenier covered the era, but only cursorily examined the effects of honour on the British Army's choices of allies.[17]

Colin Calloway, one of the most respected authorities on the subject of the Indians during this period, examined British Indian relations in detail in *Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815*. His chapters on the Indians as allies to the British and the British as allies to the Indians are exhaustive, but he does not make the distinction of whether British Army military honour was a deciding factor in British objectives. Finally, this extraordinary book covers only half of the period of this paper which is a fact that humbled this author in attempting it.[18] Robert S. Allen's *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815* covers an additional nine years, but is focused exclusively on determining how well the alliance worked in protecting Canada as part of the British Empire. In this attempt, Allen is superb and makes the excellent point that Canada remaining British was not a foregone conclusion and the Indians had a lot to do with securing Canada for the British. The enduring lesson from this

[15] Paul Robinson, *Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006)
[16] Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998)
[17] John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
[18] Calloway, *Calumet*

book was that the British were far more likely to use the Indians in defence where they could control them more readily.[19]

Finally, as indicated above (1.2 The Purpose), Wayne E. Lee provided the original inspiration for this paper and his work has also considered culture as a defining feature of how and why warfare is practiced. Dr. Lee recently published a new book entitled *Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865*, that comes very close to the analytical heart of what this paper aims to accomplish. Lee examines how Anglo-American armies decided on how much violence was enough to win. In this decision making process, the actors had to decide if the enemy was a like-minded 'brother' who deserved the humanity of the modern conventions of war or a 'barbarian' 'other' who did not deserve the honours of war, but warranted total destruction of their war making capability. Lee's only omission to this paper is that he chose not to examine the British Army from 1754-1815. The closest he came was a section on the Continental Army's warfare against the Indians and British in 1777-1779. However, what Lee did provide was an analytical framework for how his subjects made their decisions. Lee proposed that commanders had two ways to escalate violence in warfare, quantitatively with more resources or qualitatively with practices like torture, mutilation and attacking women and children. Lee then asserted that there were four categories for analysis: capacity, control, calculation, and culture.[20] Culture is the most pertinent to this paper and I will use some of Dr. Lee's analytical framework in my analysis throughout this paper and in my conclusion.

The author has used these six books extensively as guides to researching and writing about this period. The remaining historiography is also important to this paper, but more to specific points rather than in the fundamental way these six books apply.

1.7.1 The Geo-Political Environment from 1755 to 1815 in North America and Europe

Looking at this era from the Indian perspective, the traditionally named wars in the midwest from 1754 to 1815 make little sense. In each war, various tribes of Indians interchanged foes and allies in a quest to maintain their sovereignty over their portion of the midwest. In the confusing world of European alliances in aid of imperial ambition, all the Indians could perceive was that the Europeans, then Americans, were fighting over land

[19] Allen, *Indian Allies*
[20] Wayne E. Lee, *Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)

that they had no right to in the first instance. From the British point of view, this was not one strategic engagement over the midwest and different strategic contexts affected attitudes to the use of Indians. Equally, however, one must not lose sight of the fact that the Indians, and indeed the Americans for that matter, did not see the wars the way the British saw them either. Cases have been made for and against the midwest, even North America as a whole, as a British strategic objective.[21] However, this paper must take into consideration the traditional British and European view of the combat in North America in order to gain insight into the decisions made by the British Army. Therefore, the historiography examined in this section will look at the British view of the conflicts as well as the Indian and American views.

David Curtis Skaggs gives an overview of the era in the introduction of a collection of essays from the 1998 Bowling Green State University entitled *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814*. Skaggs argues that one should view it in the way Thucydides viewed the Peloponnesian War, not as a series of individual wars, but as an ongoing strategic encounter to determine if the Spartans or Athenians would rule Greece. If one can view the vast midwest area as an important piece of geography as it existed in the era, without the benefit of hindsight and its eventual subsumption into the U.S.A., it can be seen as a strategic encounter rather than individual wars.[22] *The Sixty Years' War* has chapters that cover many of the social, economic, military, and strategic interactions of the time. However, honour as a motive for alliance building and military action is not discussed. This is a lacuna that exists throughout the historiography and one that this paper intends to fill.

At the beginning of the era, the British were not interested in immediate development of the midwest themselves, but they were concerned about the effect of the French strengthening their hold on the midwest and encroaching on British claims. This issue is important in many ways. French involvement, and to a lesser extent Spanish involvement, in North America was constantly at the forefront of the British Army's mind. Whether France was developing the country themselves, or supporting the American rebels or selling land to the Americans to finance war in Europe was far more prominent of a consideration to the British than the ultimate ownership of the midwest. Prior to 1755, the

[21] See specific references to Clarence Alvord and Jack Sosin below.
[22] David C. Skaggs, 'The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814: An Overview', in David C. Skaggs, & Larry L. Nelson, Eds., *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 1-20

British government had treated their North American colonies with what was known as 'salutary neglect' and had avoided serious expenditure of blood and treasure while reaping substantial commercial benefits. As long as the colonists stayed close to the east coast, there was little need for more involvement. However, as the east coast became more crowded and rudimentary farm practices exhausted farm land, the demand for western land increased. Simultaneously, the French had determined that their light-footprint model of North American settlement needed upgrading and began establishing their formal authority over Canada and the midwest. One of the most important areas was deemed to be the forks of the Ohio River at present day Pittsburgh. Land companies from Pennsylvania and Virginia had long coveted this area and raised the alarm to London when the French claimed it. Important factions in the British government began to see France's moves in North America as part of an international strategy to pressure British holdings world-wide.[23]

The Seven Years' War began very badly for the British in North America from 1755 to 1758 as they lost a series of forts and claims along the eastern perimeter of the upper midwest. The Indians of this area took the time between Braddock's defeat in 1755 and Forbes' capture of Fort Duquesne in 1758 to wreak havoc on the frontier by killing or capturing three thousand British settlers in a campaign of terror. In the older histories, it was often said that the Seven Years' War was fought over Canada, but if Britain's focus was on beating the French conventional forces on the St. Lawrence, it was not the focus of the Indians on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier.[24] The conflict was not only limited to the Ohio Indians as the same issue of misunderstanding the Indians' reasons for fighting caused an unwelcome outbreak of hostilities in the Carolina backcountry. There, the Cherokee who had been encouraged by French-supported Creeks took up the hatchet against the settlers closest to them.[25] The lack of Indian allies meant the British had to focus on defeating France in areas where its conventional military forces dominated. Although

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[23] Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (London: Faber and Faber, 2000), pp. 33-41

[24] Matthew C. Ward, *Breaking The Backcountry: Seven Years War In Virginia And Pennsylvania 1754-1765* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe: The French and Indian War* (Da Capo Press, 2001), Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution, Volume X : The Triumphant Empire : New Responsibilities with the Enlarged Empire, 1763-1777* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. First Norton Paperback, 1990)

[25] John Oliphant, *Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001)

the lack of Indian allies has been examined as a weakness of the British approach, the historiography has not grappled with the issue of why the British were hesitant to encourage Indian allied warfare or develop it. Through choice or expediency the British used colonial units of backwoodsman, known as Rangers, to perform the duties for which the French used the Indians.[26]

This is not to say that a near universal Indian alliance with France was a foregone conclusion. The choice of allies in the Seven Years' War was not merely one of history or personal connections, but one where the Delaware and the Shawnee Indians of the Ohio River valley came to the conclusion, independently, that a British alliance was not in their best interests. The Delaware had been offended by Major General Edward Braddock's high-handedness over land ownership in preparation of his doomed campaign of 1755 and then being wrongly blamed for the massacre on the Monongahela. Displaying the traditional connection between the Ohio Indians and the southern Indians, a group of Shawnee warriors were seized in South Carolina in 1754 whilst on a raid against their traditional enemies, the Catawbas. They were captured and jailed on suspicion of raiding frontier farms. The South Carolina Governor, in holding Shawnee warriors in jail, opened up a blood feud from the Shawnee perspective.[27] Although these events are historically known, the historiography does not engage in why the British Army declined to pursue Indian alliances aggressively.

By 1759 British fortunes had turned. A series of victories in North America, Europe, and Asia had the French in retreat. However, other than a tenuous road connection to the forks of the Ohio, most of the British victories were in areas that midwestern Indians did not view as critical to holding their land. The fighting would wear on for another three years, but it was largely between Britain and France and France's late arriving ally, Spain. Without active French support, the Indians did not risk major attacks, so an uneasy truce held in the midwest as the peace was determined in Paris. British colonial settlers began to cautiously re-enter the Ohio area. However, these events were laying the groundwork for further problems. Between 1759 and 1763, both the settlers and the Indians thought they

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[26] John F. Ross, *War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America's First Frontier* (New York: Bantam Books Trade Paperbacks, 2011)

[27] Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its Peoples 1724-1774*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. First Bison Book Printing, 1997), 120-121, Ian K. Steele, 'Shawnee Origins of Their Seven Years' War', *Ethnohistory* 53 (4) (2006): 657-687, Daniel P. Barr, *The Boundaries between Us: Natives and Newcomers along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850* (Kent State University Press, 2006)

had won the war for that area, virtually guaranteeing further conflict. By 1763, the particulars of a peace between the European powers were concluded. France was to be excluded from mainland North America completely. France reluctantly accepted this, but began planning her revenge. The Indians of the midwest, virtually undefeated in the war, were befuddled that the British thought they had won the midwest. However, the Commander -in-Chief of British forces in America, General Sir Jeffrey Amherst, was so sure that he had won the midwest that he immediately took the action of treating the Indians as defeated enemies. Unbeknownst to Amherst, the French had implanted the idea with the Seneca of an Indian uprising against the British.[28] Amherst's malevolence towards the Indians is well documented, but the reasons for his attitude, other than a cultural superiority complex, are much less developed.

By 1763, the Indians of the midwest had started to explore, through prophets such as Neolin, the spiritual concept that they should revert to their pre-European contact way of life. Along with the prophets came warriors, such as Pontiac, who believed that the Europeans had to be pushed back for the Indians to reclaim their way of life. What followed has been called the 'first declaration of independence' in North America. Historiographically, Pontiac's War or rebellion has been seen as an addendum or epilogue to the Seven Years' War. However, it has enjoyed renewed interest in recent years, but from authors who have been critical of many of the stereotypes. Francis Jennings critically examines the relationships between the British and the Indians and concludes that from Braddock through to Amherst, the British mistakenly held the Indians in complete disdain.[29] Gregory Evans Dowd explains that while the British were busy consolidating their gains against France, they were sowing the seeds of the next conflict by ignoring the sovereignty and concerns expressed to them by the Ohio Indians.[30] David Dixon argues that the Indians entered the conflict with the idea that the British were incapable of managing the backcountry, and the American frontier settlers came out of the conflict thinking the same. These points of view and their impact on British Imperial policy would become the

[28] Richard Middleton, *Pontiac's War: Its Causes, Course, and Consequence, 1763-1765*. (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), 33-46
[29] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*
[30] Gregory E. Dowd, *War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Paperbacks, 2004)

critical issue in destabilising the area for the next fifty years.[31] The British eventually waited out the Indians' siege of British forts in the midwest, but not without coming to some uncomfortable conclusions about how the midwest could best be used and managed for imperial benefit.

The fact that the British were willing to risk another costly war to deny France the midwest displayed the British interest in keeping France's imperial ambitions at bay. The war followed similar wars in Europe over the previous century, but seldom had a European power so decisively defeated another. The vast conquests obtained by Britain were the beginning of her problems, not the end. An interesting part of the history is what British ministers of trade and colonies designed after they won the midwest, amongst other possessions, in the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The men responsible for formulating a coherent policy for the midwest changed regularly over the next ten years. King George III's boyhood tutor, John Stuart, the 3rd Earl of Bute and the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, kicked off the effort with the remarkably uncontroversial decision to keep a substantial part of the British Army in the midwest after the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The plan was to keep the remnant French population under control and keep the British colonists and Indians apart to avoid an explosive situation. However, Bute could not stand the heat of British politics and resigned. Next, the Northern Secretary, George Grenville, wanted to control colonist and Indian alike in a larger mercantilist empire, but make the colonists pay for it. When this failed, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Townshend, wanted to tame the hotheads on the coast with more British troops, but still could not raise the money for the troops or war debts. The Secretary of State for the Southern Department, William Petty, the 2nd Earl of Shelburne, decided to give the colonists some room to maneuver with two new colonies in the midwest, but he was politically outmaneuvered by Secretary of State for the Colonies, Wills Hill, Viscount Hillsborough, before he could implement his plan. With a revolution brewing, Viscount Hillsborough abandoned the Indians to the settlers and tried to stop the revolt in the east. Finally, as war clouds grew, Secretary of State for the Colonies, William Legge, 2nd Earl of Dartmouth, decided the best course of action was to incorporate the Ohio valley into Quebec in 1774. Many have seen this period as the inevitable build up to the American

[31] David Dixon, *Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac's Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005)

Revolution, but Fred Anderson has refocused the era and argues that this line of reasoning is historical hindsight and the events up to 1766 can be better seen as the consolidation period of a great imperial conquest.[32]

Anderson's view, although very influential, has still not removed the vast decades of work that make the midwest a critical part of the build-up to the American Revolution. Clarence Alvord and a generation of historians basing their work on his believed the area was an important part of the British government's plan for its empire. Although it was a spectacularly rich agricultural area, the British were far more interested in keeping European powers and American settlers out, so they could continue the real business of empire which was trade in a mercantilist network. Examining the workings of the revolving door that was the British government and hence, colonial administration, in the 1760s and early 1770s, Alvord argued that the British ministers did try to actively manage, albeit fitfully, the newly acquired midwest. Alvord's contention was that all of this constituted an active and reasonable policy given the events of the time and Whitehall always considered the midwest a crucial part of the North American and Imperial plan.[33] Somewhat foreshadowing, Anderson's argument, Jack Sosin rebutted this assertion forcefully with archival research unavailable to Alvord that British goals were made by bureaucratic ministers who dealt with problems as they arose with little strategic planning, albeit couched in mercantilist terminology.[34] Although most historians have focused on the Great Lakes area, Sosin acknowledged that the conversation needed to be extended to the south. John Alden's exploration of the actions of the Indian Superintendent for the south, John Stuart, during Pontiac's rebellion is important to this paper for its inclusion of the southern Indians as a midwest control force. Whereas Alden was focused on Stuart, J. Russell Snapp Snapp takes a more a top down view from London and how it applied in the southern midwest. Snapp argues that the transition from Indian trading to land speculation, and the

[32] Don Cook, *The Long Fuse: How England Lost the American Colonies, 1760-1785* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 21-146 & Anderson, *Crucible,* 507-734
[33] Clarence Walworth Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics : A Study of the Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in Imperialism Culminating in the American Revolution* (2 Volumes) (Cleveland, Ohio: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1917)
[34] Jack Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1961)

British opposition to it, was an important factor in encouraging the southern elite to join the American rebellion.[35]

There are fundamentally three schools of thought over the issue of how the midwest was viewed from Whitehall, although they take a broader view of American policy than just the midwest. The Imperialists saw America as part of a great building of the Empire, whether America was central to a broader strategy or merely a set of problems to be solved. The socio-economic school says the driving force was the nature of property greed within the colonies and Britain. The Namierists are named after Lewis Namier, a British academic, who wrote extensively about the political figures of the time and came to the conclusion that their only focus was personal political gain.[36] More recent arguments have contended that Britain's fixation on North America in this period caused it to stop looking for the balance in Europe that it had always sought.[37] Each of these views make clear that the midwest was on the British government's mind in some degree, but what is not discussed is why the British did not use the Indians themselves to police the midwest in this period. The British government expected colonial governments to police their own areas within a legal framework of rights and responsibilities to the Crown. Why would the British not invest their new imperial charges, the Indians, with the same capability in the midwest?

This paper cannot penetrate all of the vast literature on the American Revolution, but it must look at the parts of the war that directly speaks to the British Army's mindset and the circumstances that might affect their decision to use Indians or not. John Shy focusses on the British Army's development in North America from 1763, and examines how its use and misuse triggered events that only served to make the decisions taken in Whitehall more complex. Although Shy looked at how the British Army worked with and around the Indians, he does not examine the issue of how the Army viewed the Indians as allies.[38] Shy also provides a series of articles in *A People Numerous and Armed* that examines how visceral the battles of the Revolution were; lest one begin to imagine that the combat

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[35] John R. Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1944), Russell J. Snapp, *John Stuart and the Struggle for Empire on the Southern Frontier* (Louisiana State University Press, 1996)
[36] Edmund S. Morgan, 'The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Volume 14, Number 1 (Jan., 1957): 3-15
[37] Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire* (London: Penguin Books, 2008)
[38] John Shy, *Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution*, Second Edition. (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975)

involving Indians was uniquely vicious.[39] Armstrong Starkey also focuses on this issue in examining several nighttime bayonet massacres by British troops during the war.[40] Beyond the diplomatic and political considerations, merely fielding a force on the frontier was difficult. Don Higginbotham has described the enormous logistical, tactical and operational restraints under which the British, Indians and rebels were working. For the British Army, Indians often took on a mythical status for their ability to operate, seemingly with little effort, in a wilderness that often claimed more lives than battle.[41]

As the Revolution began in earnest and early thoughts of reconciliation receded from view, the strategic planners began to consider the use of the Indians. The broader issues of the Revolution are beyond the scope of this paper, but sources that focus on the British Army, the Indians, and the midwest are considered. The British war was larger than North America as her alliances in Europe were failing. While Britain in 1763 enjoyed an embarrassment of riches, a decade of domestic political wrangling had caused it to lose sight of the larger strategic workings against it. The decision making by the British Army officers and Whitehall for the war at large form the psychological backdrop for their decisions to use Indians or not. These examinations are critical to this paper to analyse where the timely and prudent use of Indians might have proved effective.[42] The question of which side deployed Indians first has always been contentious. One of the first authors to examine the issue was Andrew McFarland Davis in 'The Employment of Indian Auxiliaries in the American War' and his timeline is still accurate. Davis argues that the facts show that the Americans deployed the 'civilised' Stockbridge Indians first, but they were so integrated into American colonial society that to say the Americans brought in the 'savages' first makes the reasons for the argument questionable. Davis concludes that both sides worked to gain the Indian support or at least neutrality, but in the final analysis, the British were at least somewhat aware that their efforts would be more likely to affect civilians, loyalist and rebel alike, as well as military forces. [43] Jack Sosin takes a slightly more even-handed view of the ways the Indians were used by both sides in 'The Use of

[39] John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence* (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2000)
[40] Armstrong Starkey, 'Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution', *The Journal of Military History*, Volume 58, (January 1994): 7-27
[41] Don Higginbotham, *The War Of American Independence* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983)
[42] Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775-1783*. (Lincoln, Nebraska and London: University of Nebraska Press and Bison Books, 1993)
[43] Andrew MacFarlane Davis, 'The Employment of Indian Auxiliaries in the American War' *The English Historical Review*, Volume 2, Number 8 (October 1887): 709-728

Indians in the War of American Revolution: A Re-Assessment of Responsibility'. However, Sosin still blames the British General Gage for over playing the fact that the Americans first used the Stockbridge Indians at Boston and starting the escalation of the issue into a full blown frontier conflagration. Critically, Sosin points out that had his subordinates followed his commands, the British would have unleashed the Indians much earlier in the war. Only the restraint shown by Quebec Governor General Guy Carleton in the north and John Stuart in the south kept the allied Indians from falling on the frontier. [44] Carleton and Stuart's actions and character will be examined at length later in this paper. Although Davis and Sosin examine the issue chronologically in great detail, neither approaches it specifically from the angle of the British Army's view of honour in warfare.

Best known of the battles of the Revolution, but little explored in the sense of Indian involvement, is Major General John Burgoyne's Saratoga Campaign. Burgoyne made much of his use of Indians in the planning and early parts of the campaign that many historians argue sealed the fate of the British Empire in North America. However, an Indian atrocity forced Burgoyne to curtail their use at a critical juncture and arguably caused him to blunder into the heavily fortified American position near the Hudson River. A supporting campaign to Saratoga was the Mohawk valley campaign led by Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger that culminated in the British tactical win at Oriskany, but strategic failure at Ft Stanwix. The battle of Oriskany is routinely named as one of the most vicious fights of the war involving Indians on both sides. Several British allied Indian tribes lost a significant number of their leaders and were reluctant to work with the British afterwards. Burgoyne's actions and subsequent defence of them in Parliament is one of the most fruitful areas of study for this paper as the issue of Indian use is addressed at length and exposes the divisiveness of the issue in Britain.[45]

Beyond Saratoga, Indian participation in the Revolution as allies to the British is not well covered in the general histories, especially the midwest as defined by this paper. To find Indian involvement, one must look into specialised studies. In 1777, allied raids on the Cherry and Wyoming valleys led by the Mohawk Joseph Brant in concert with the British Indian agent, Sir John Johnson and Ranger leader Lieutenant Colonel John Butler raised the

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[44] Jack M. Sosin, 'The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-assessment of Responsibility.' *Canadian Historical Review*, 46 (June 1965): 101-121.
[45] John Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution* (New York: Savas Beatie, 2008)

specter of frontier warfare on long established settlements of New York that were frightfully close to Albany.[46] This critical area was a bread basket for the Continental Army and could not go unprotected, so Washington sent Major General John Sullivan into the Iroquois heartland in the modern day Finger Lakes region of New York in 1779. Of course, where the Americans saw massacres in the valleys, the Iroquois saw town destroyers in their villages.[47] The participants on both sides began to see things differently. Indians, like Joseph Brant, were known to stop atrocities and Americans began to see the 'savages' as people who lived in houses in long established villages with crops surrounding them.

Less explored, but more fruitful for this paper, is the Ohio frontier during the Revolution. From the beginning, the Americans accused the British Governor of Detroit, Henry Hamilton, of 'hair buying'. Hamilton figured prominently as the dark figure that encouraged the rebels to send George Rogers Clark to the Ohio country to interdict raids against the frontier. Hamilton is an interesting character with the British Army and a search into his background and humanity rewards with a much more complex portrait than popular history has given him.[48] By looking at the Kentucky backcountry in the years before the Revolution, the context of how a term like 'hair buyer' would carry such strong feeling on the frontier becomes clearer.[49] The American campaigns of Clark and Sullivan effectively ended the large scale British and Indian attempts to gain the northern midwest, but small scale raids became the norm and far more vicious. Raids led by Joseph Brant, John Butler and Simon Girty, as well as some with Captain Henry Bird set the Pennsylvania and Kentucky backcountry alight and constituted some of the last battles of the war in 1782.[50]

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[46] Glenn F. Williams, *Year of the Hangman: George Washington's Campaign against the Iroquois* (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 2005), William R. Nester, *The Frontier War for American Independence* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2004) Graymont (1975)

[47] Barbara Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1975), Joseph R. Fischer, *A Well-Executed Failure: The Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois, July-September 1779* (Columbia, South Carolina: Syracuse University of South Carolina Press, 2008)

[48] James James, *George Rogers Clark Papers* (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), Lowell H. Harrison, *George Rogers Clark and the War in the West* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 1976), John D. Barnhart, 'A New Evaluation of Henry Hamilton and George Rogers Clark', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Volume 37, Number 4 (March 1951): 643-652, Bernard W. Sheehan, 'The Famous Hair Buyer General- Henry Hamilton, George Rogers Clark, and the American Indian', *Indiana Magazine of History*, Volume 79, Issue 1 (1983): 1-28

[49] Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, *The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-1777* (Baltimore: Clearfield Company, Inc., 2002), Louise Phelps Kellogg, , *Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio, 1778-1779* (Westminster, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 2008), Nester, *Frontier*

[50] Nester, *Frontier*, Kellogg, *Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio, 1779-1781* (Madison, Wisconsin: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1917)

Finally, the area least covered is the southern campaign where many of the lesser known frontier battles that involved the Indians occurred.[51] The southern Indians were attended to by the British Indian Superintendent, John Stuart. Stuart was accused by the Americans of stirring up the Cherokee against the Carolina backcountry in 1776. This action shared many similarities with the Iroquois campaigns in terms of frontier raiding and retribution campaigns. Philip M. Hamer argues that Stuart had far less to do with instigating the Cherokee to combat than the northern tribes who, visiting early in the war, demanded the Cherokees join them. Stuart was blamed in American frontier circles for this early action, but had far more influence as the war progressed. East Florida Governor Tonyn and a loyalist named Thomas Brown may have had more to do with Indian raids in the south than Stuart did. Little known is the allied support of the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws in West Florida that helped the British keep the American allied Spanish at bay late in the war. [52]

After the end of the Revolution, the British maintained their posts in the upper midwest that had been ceded in the Treaty of Paris to the Americans and still had powerful trading influences in the gulf south, now owned by Spain and France again. These posts and commercial dealings were to be the source of power initially for the Indians of the midwest as British support helped keep the American settlers at bay for a while. The alliances are examined in detail in *His Majesty's Indian Allies* by Robert S. Allen who looks at the Indians as a critical part of the defence of Canada from the Revolution to the end of the War of 1812. [53] Allen digs deep into the background of the relationship, all the way back to Sir William Johnson's death and Lord Dunmore's War in 1774. In what is the best book on the topic post-Revolution, *Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815*, Colin G. Calloway argues that the British truly committed to the Indian alliance after the Revolution as a check on American expansion and to maintain the still lucrative fur trade. [54] Calloway explains how the British and the Indians changed their view of warfare over the years with the Indians seeking more work with British units and the British being less

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[51] John R. Alden, *The South in the Revolution 1763-1789*. (Louisiana State University Press and The Littleton Fund For Southern History Of The University of Texas, 1957)

[52] Philip M. Hamer, 'John Stuart's Indian Policy During the Early Months of the American Revolution' , *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Dec., 1930): 351-366., Snapp, *Stuart Empire,* Alden, *Stuart Colonial,* Alden, *South Revolution*, Richard D. Blackmon, *Dark and Bloody Ground: The American Revolution Along the Southern Frontier* (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, LLC, 2012)

[53] Allen, *Indian Allies* & Nester, *Frontier*

[54] Calloway, *Calumet*

concerned with the Indian ways of war when they worked together. For a narrower view geographically, Timothy D. Willig examines British policy in the Great Lakes alone in *Restoring the Chain of Friendship*. [55] Willig states that the quality of the relationship in the Great Lakes depended on local factors, mainly the loss of lands and the viability of the fur trade at British Indian department outposts. However, none of the books that deal directly with the British-Indian alliance address the issue directly of how honour affected the British battlefield, campaign, and war decisions.

As American and British relations normalised after the Revolution, the issues of trade, the frontier outposts, and Indian alliances came to the diplomatic fore. The British justified retaining the midwest outposts as a favour of maintaining the Indians, but concluded that it was no favour as the Americans used the British bogeyman as a reason to attack the Indians repetitively. The relationship changed again as the Anglo-French rivalry heated up again in the early 1790s when the British realised that they would need to rely heavily on Indian help to protect Canada in any future conflict. [56] Simultaneously, the Cherokee group known as the Chickamauga was still fighting with encroaching settlers along the Tennessee River in the south. The ongoing raids and retribution led to the Cherokee and parts of the other southern tribes forming a nascent confederacy with the Ohio tribes. In the Northwest, George Rogers Clark was on the march again in 1786-1787 to the Wabash River to try to settle local anarchy that the settlers claimed was being caused by the British agents in Detroit, but whether the British were trying to extend their outposts to their former extent is questionable. [57] This era brought the issue of the British posts in the upper midwest to a head and the new American Republic felt it had to address the issue of the Northwest once and for all.

The situation in the Ohio valley would not calm down until the Americans sent a series of expeditions up the Maumee River valley in modern day Ohio. The Americans sent three expeditions into the area in the early 1790s. In the Autumn of 1790, Major General Josiah Harmar sent too small of a force to deal with the Shawnee and Miami near the Indian village Kekionga and was forced back into a defensive position with severe losses in his reconnaissance element. The St. Claire expedition was next in late 1791 and was caught off

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[55] Willig, *Chain*
[56] Charles R. Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954)
[57] L.C. Helderman, 'The Northwest Expedition of George Rogers Clark, 1786-1787', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Dec., 1938): 317-334

guard near Fort Recovery, Ohio, by a force of two thousand Indian warriors led by Little Turtle. The defeat was total with Major General Arthur St. Claire losing more than nine hundred people dead, missing or wounded. In 1792, two diplomatic parties were sent by Washington to meet the Indians, but every member of both parties was killed by the suspicious Indians. Following the initial debacles, Washington appointed General 'Mad' Anthony Wayne to take the area in 1793.[58] Far from being helpful, the presence of British Indian Department Agents had the unintended effect of bringing unwanted American attention to the Indians. Having also been encouraged by the Canadian Governor-General Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, to prepare for a war that the British would inevitably join, the Indians met Wayne on the Maumee River, near the British Fort Miamis. At the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, Wayne defeated the Indians, and they retreated to Fort Miamis where the British unexpectedly closed the gate and denied them refuge. Wayne induced the Indians to peace at the Treaty of Greenville the following year, and the British influence in the area was largely broken.[59]

American expansion into the upper midwest and deep suspicion of British motives drove American Indian policy for the next fifteen years.[60] State governments and frontiersmen saw British influence behind every Indian sighting. The new federal government was trying, at least on paper, to ensure that it treated its Indian neighbours with the values established in the new nation's founding ideals. Britain's role on the American frontier became one of influence and defensive preparations, rather than open hostility. Britain believed its best chance of securing Canada was to secure the river outlets to the Gulf of Mexico. However, by the turn of the nineteenth century, Britain was thoroughly engaged with Napoleon in Europe, and the American midwest was not top of her priorities. In fact, Britain and America had established an uneasy detente from Jay's Treaty in 1794 to 1803. The Americans were also somewhat worried about Napoleon as France owned Louisiana and had influence over Spanish Florida. When Napoleon sold Louisiana to the USA in 1803, the Anglo-American rivalry began to heat up again. The Louisiana Purchase removed most Americans' fear of France, but tested patience in Britain as Napoleon was given a new financial lease on life with the proceeds. Britain began to re-establish its

[58] Wiley Sword, *President Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest*, 1790-1795 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993)
[59] Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962)
[60]Reginald Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992)

influence in the midwest and used a variety of methods to do so, including diplomatic and commercial dealings with the Indians in the midwest.[61] As the USA became more confident in its new acquisition, it returned aggressively to maritime commerce with Europe, including France. This issue and the lure of American prosperity for war-weary British sailors would become two of the issues that would once again bring Britain and America to war.

Neutral trading rights and impressment of sailors caused an affront to the honour of some in the new nation. The positions in the commercial northeast and east coast seaports were far more conducive to peace than the 'War Hawks' of the south and midwest led by Kentuckian Henry Clay.[62] Although the tension slowly built over the years after the Chesapeake affair in 1807, by 1812 the USA had decided to challenge Britain and renew the midwest as a geopolitical objective of Britain and the USA in the War of 1812.[63] The Americans wanted Canada and the British wanted to keep effective control through their trading relationship with the Indians. Neither got their ultimate objective, but the Americans won from Britain a formal acknowledgement of the status quo ante that meant the Americans now had full rights to the midwest and control over the Indians. Many authors have made light of the western qualms about the British and Indians, but Julius Pratt argues that the western aims of the War Hawks really were due to the frontier's fear of the British and Indian alliance. The official record, pamphlets and newspaper accounts of the time are full of western citizens, soldiers, and politicians stating their concerns. If we are to claim it was not a cause of the war, we must discount this substantial record according to Pratt.[64]

Simultaneously, the years between 1794 and 1811 saw the continued march of American settlers into the midwest. The areas left in Indian control were the western Great Lakes to the Mississippi River held mainly by Shawnees and the wilderness middle of the Mississippi Territory held by the Creek Indians which is modern day Mississippi and Alabama. The Shawnee leader Tecumseh had a Creek mother and, after getting the northern tribes to agree to a pan-Indian confederacy, travelled south to recruit the southern

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[61] J. Leitch Wright, Jr., *Britain and the American Frontier 1783-1815* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1975)
[62] Horsman, *Causes*
[63] Charles Gates, 'The West in American Diplomacy, 1812-1815', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Volume 26, Number 4 (March, 1940): 499-510
[64] Julius Pratt, 'Western Aims in the War of 1812', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Volume 12, Number 1 (June, 1925): 36-50

tribes to the Confederacy in 1811. Tecumseh managed to convince only one half of the Creeks to rise up against the Americans. To add to the insult, his brother, the Shawnee Prophet, had kicked of the war in the north at Tippecanoe against Tecumseh's express wishes.[65] The Battle of Tippecanoe of 1811, which began the confederate Indian war that would be subsumed in the War of 1812, as well as the Creek War of 1813-1814, is often not mentioned in conventional histories. By including these Indian battles and the Gulf of Mexico campaign that concluded with the Battle of New Orleans, the midwest's importance in the overall war becomes more obvious. J. Leitch Wright believed that Britain still had hopes for holding New Orleans after the war to help secure Canada.[66]

A glaring weakness of many histories of the War of 1812 is that there is very little consideration of the comparative issues with the Napoleonic struggle, especially the Peninsular War. Jeremy Black attempts to bridge this gap with *The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon*.[67] Black draws on the tactics and operations of each war to show how they differed and how much more important the European combat was to Britain's strategic goals. These comparisons go a long way in explaining the British reliance on the Indians as allies in the midwest compared to previous wars. As the War of 1812 began, Britain faced the possibility of losing Canada if it did not ally with the Indians, and Whitehall knew it. The use of Indians in the northern campaigns of 1812-1813 by Major General Isaac Brock and Colonel Henry Procter provide an interesting look into two different officer's view of the same Indians.[68] Brock had a strong affinity with the Indians, especially Tecumseh, and immediately took the opportunity to promise the Indians a homeland in the Great Lakes if they joined the British cause. Unfortunately for the Indians, Brock was killed at Queenston Heights early in the war. Procter, who has been much maligned, was left to carry on the Indian war as best he could. Significantly, an Indian atrocity against wounded prisoners occurred under Procter's command at Frenchtown that became a rallying cry for Kentuckians' revenge. Taken into the union in 1792, the majority of Kentuckians were War Hawks, and their men swelled the ranks of the American forces in the northern theatre. Kentuckians served in the northern and southern midwest throughout the war, and a

[65] John K. Mahon, *The War of 1812* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, Da Capo Press, Inc. re-print, 1972)
[66] Wright, Jr., *Britain American Frontier*
[67] Jeremy Black, *The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon* (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2009)
[68] Sandy Antal, *A Wampum Denied: Procter's War of 1812* (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University Press, 1998)

Kentuckian, Colonel Richard M. Johnson, was feted as the killer of Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames in Canada.[69]

Although Kentuckians did serve in the Gulf of Mexico campaign, most of the southern campaign troops came from Tennessee and were led by the future President, Major General Andrew Jackson. Except for the Battle of New Orleans, this campaign is little known and often left out of the War of 1812 histories. The Creek War where Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and friendly Creeks aligned with the USA to defeat the Tecumseh aligned faction of Creeks over two years secured millions of acres of Creek land for the USA. Shortly thereafter, the British arrived on the gulf coast to recruit Creeks for the upcoming British assault on New Orleans and Mobile. However, Jackson and his Indian allies defeated the British at New Orleans, securing the valuable gulf outlets for midwest agricultural produce. With the extinguishing of the Shawnee and Creek resistance to American settlement, the Indians' war for the American midwest was over.[70]

Throughout their participation in North America, the British Army faced a number of serious constraints on their ability to project British strategic power into the development of the midwest in terms favourable to them. Manpower limitations, wilderness communications, and European commitments all favoured the use of Indians as allies. However, the Indians practiced a type of warfare that was at odds with the best British practices, so they were often not deployed early enough or supported well enough to materially help the British objectives. This paper seeks to determine if the British Army's sense of internal or external honour hindered the Indians' effective use.

1.7.2 The Martial Culture of Indians and North American Methods of Warfare

The second part of the historiography is a survey of the methods of warfare employed by the Indians and, at times, by the British Army. As Skaggs and Nelson mention, the modern trend of the study of the Indian midwest can be traced back to a seminal work edited by Helen Hornbeck Tanner entitled *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*.[71] This work is a classic in unifying geography, cartography, ethnology, and history into a single volume that provides an overview of how the Indians viewed the midwest. The *Atlas* provides an

[69] James Wallace Hammack, Jr., *Kentucky and the Second American Revolution* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009)
[70] Frank Lawrence Owsley, Jr., *Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle for New Orleans 1812-1815* (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 2000)
[71] Skaggs and Nelson, *Sixty*, xvii & Helen Hornbeck Tanner, *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*. (Published for the Newberry Library Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987)

antidote to most European historical depictions of the area as an unsettled wilderness by provided a chronology of the Indian settlement of the area. Another book that came before Tanner, but is still widely quoted is the classic *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio* by Randolph C. Downes that set the standard for telling Indian history from the Indian point of view.[72] Downes explains how the Indians managed to hold back loss of their homelands during much of the period by playing the whites off of each other.

In contrast to the traditional histories of the era and area is the relatively new field of Ethnohistory. In older histories, European actors were followed minutely, but the Indians were often mere foils built from racial prejudices and stereotypes, both good and bad. Ethnohistories and other studies that used ethnohistories to build a fuller view of all parties proliferated from the 1960s to the present day. They provided a much needed tonic to the traditional view and over time outgrew their earlier cloying depictions of Indians as completely naive and faultless in the conflicts. An example of this growth in the context of this paper is the sensitive issue of scalping. During the early days of Ethnohistory, a myth took hold that the Indians only began scalping when the Europeans introduced scalp bounties. James Axtell took great pains to dismantle the myth with ethnic, archaeological, forensic, and artistic studies in 'The Unkindest Cut, Or Who Invented Scalping' in *The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America*.[73] In subsequent books, Axtell provides further detail that Indians were not just the pawns or unwilling dupes of the colonising Europeans.[74] Axtell depicts the Indian shrewdness and subtlety to show how they retained their culture and values for two and a half centuries after first contact. Furthering Axtell's work is Richard White's *The Middle Ground* which disputed the traditional view that Indians and Whites were always at odds.[75] White explains that the Great Lakes region was often a place of cooperation and conciliation. Although initially incomprehensible to each other, Indians and Whites over time concocted ways to understand each other. Values were often compromised by both sides to establish a working

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[72] Randolf C. Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989)
[73] James Axtell, *The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of colonial North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)
[74] James Axtell, *The Invasion Within: The Contest of cultures in Colonial North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) & James Axtell, *Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
[75] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

world from which each could profit. This view of Indians and Whites living together, albeit with some difficulty, has continued through recent ethnohistories.

Although most explorations of Indian and White interaction in the midwest are from the Great Lakes and Ohio valley, Kathryn E. Holland Braund examines the trade in deerskins between the British and the Creek Indians in the Gulf of Mexico south.[76] In much the same way that the Iroquois controlled the Ohio interior through their connections with the British on the coast, so did the Creeks control the trade with the interior tribes of Choctaw, Chickasaw, and to a lesser degree, the Cherokee. This alignment would later be the basis for conflicting alliances amongst the tribes as it was in the north, but with contrary results due to local constraints. Braund, along with Gregory Waselkov, edited and annotated the papers of one of the most exacting observers of the early southern wilderness and its Indians on the eve of the American Revolutionary War, William Bartram.[77] Bartram, a Quaker natural philosopher, went to great pains to be objective in treatment of the natural surroundings, Indians, and the whites he encountered in the area. Braund and Waselkov add value in assessing the veracity with other accounts and archives from the era.

Colin G. Calloway, one of the foremost scholars of Indians and their contact with Europeans, continues the trend of challenging Indian and White stereotypes. In *New Worlds for All*, Calloway counters many of the stereotypes in pointing out that communication and transportation networks existed long before the Europeans arrived, but they quickly became shared.[78] Calloway also exposes the obvious in that horticulturist midwestern Indians who fought the ever moving European settlers would have found it odd that *they* were considered the nomads. Calloway also makes some interesting observations in the ways Scottish Highlanders and Indians were and were not alike. This comparative study is especially pertinent to this paper as both groups experienced the British Army as foes and employers in the eighteenth century with many of the attending issues of honour and atrocities present. In *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America*, Calloway makes the point that the first declaration of independence in North America came

[76] Kathryn E. Holland Braund, *Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1996)
[77] Kathryn E. Holland Braund & Gregory A. Walsekov, Eds., *William Bartram on the Southern Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995)
[78] Colin Calloway, *New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998)

from the Indians of the Great Lakes with Pontiac's rebellion.[79] The end of the Seven Years' War and the transfer of so much land from the French to the British without even consulting the Indians who lived on the land made 1763 a critical juncture for all three parties involved. Moving from Pontiac's rebellion to the American Revolutionary War, Calloway describes how the different tribes and villages of Indians experienced the war. [80] When the primary goal was to preserve their culture, land, and life, it is not surprising to find that the revolution split Indians as well as Britons. Each group or geographical area had to choose a side or try to stay out of the way as best they could, much like the colonists. In what might be the only published history that traces the British Army and Indian relationship in a unified form, Calloway provides a short history of the Shawnees in *The Shawnees and the War for America*.[81] This small volume is an excellent introduction into how all of the wars from 1755 to 1815 could be seen from a viewpoint other than the European. The Shawnees were originally a southern tribe that moved into the Ohio valley with European expansion. They and the Delaware, who had also moved west to disentangle from the Whites, formed the basis for the coming Indian confederation attempts to stop the westward spread of settlement. Tecumseh, a Shawnee with a Creek mother, would form the ultimate expression of this attempt in the War of 1812 with a pan-Indian confederacy.

Alfred Cave delves into the world of Indian unity and spirituality in 'The Delaware Prophet Neolin: A Reappraisal'.[82] Cave explains that there are two views of this phenomenon. One is that the Indians adopted many Judeo-Christian elements of sin and redemption into their revival sermons. The other is that it was a ground swell realisation of what they had lost and their contact with Whites merely gave it the appearance of western religion. The various attempts at Indian unity are explored in *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815* by Gregory Evans Dowd.[83] Examining four tribes, two northern and two southern, Dowd describes a distributed spiritual awakening in the 1760s as the threat to their lands was becoming acute. Prophets were often key players in these revivals and often became the impetus for a return to native

[79] Colin Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
[80] Colin Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge University Press, 2006)
[81] Colin Calloway, *The Shawnees and the War for America: The Penguin Library of American Indian History series* (London: Penguin Books, 2008)
[82] Alfred A. Cave, 'The Delaware Prophet Neolin: a Reappraisal', *Ethnohistory*, Volume 46, Number 2 (Spring 1999): 265-290
[83] Dowd, *Spirited*

self-reliance and an assertion of the divine right to the land they occupied. Dowd provides no easy answers to the questions posed and insists the Indian spiritual awakening was not just atavism, because it often incorporated modern, even western ideals. Cave's conclusion is that religion was also part of the 'middle ground', but in the end it was too elemental in its appeal to the Indians to have been completely foreign. Dowd makes clear in that he is trying to explain an Indian phenomenon; he is not telling the story from the Indian point of view. In contrast, in *Facing East from Indian Country*, Daniel Richter examines the period's history from a completely Indian point of view.[84] Richter takes a decidedly Sixty Years' War perspective by looking at the radical change that visited the midwest Indians after centuries of white contact, but Indian control of this vital geography.

Not all contact between Europeans and Indians produced war. Some Indians, and the Iroquois specifically, practiced diplomacy as high art to keep the major European powers balanced against each other. Timothy J. Shannon argues that the Iroquois withstood European expansion due to their tool of choice, diplomacy over fighting when it could be avoided.[85] Through their deft use of diplomacy, they were able to get what they wanted more often than not. No discussion of Iroquois diplomacy would be complete without Sir William Johnson, the British Indian Superintendent of the north. Fintan O'Toole traces Johnson's family from Ireland and Johnson's quick rise under his uncle's patronage (British Admiral Sir Peter Warren) in New York.[86] By the Seven Years' War Johnson is commanding British troops along with his beloved Mohawk and other Indians. Johnson turned a close relationship with the Indians into a very lucrative and influential post for him and his associates, such has his nephew Guy Johnson who succeeded him and the Mohawk Joseph Brant who was to lead Indians in battle throughout the period. Brant's life can tell much of the British-Indian alliance story from both the Indian and British perspective and Isabel Thompson Kelsay does so with *Joseph Brant*.[87] Brant was educated in England and a frequent visitor. More than any other Indian leader, he understood the pressures on both sides.

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[84] Richter, *Facing East*
[85] Timothy J. Shannon, *Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier: The Penguin Library of American Indian History* (New York: Penguin Books, 2008)
[86] Fintan O'Toole, *White Savage: William Johnson and the Invention of America* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005)
[87] Isabel Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant, 1743-1807, Man of Two Worlds* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986)

John Sugden is the biographer of two other important Indian leaders of the epoch, Tecumseh and Blue Jacket, both Shawnees. Sugden removes the myth of Tecumseh that has made him the most famous Indian of the eastern woodlands and places him in the context of his people and time that explains his force and popularity.[88] In *Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees*, Sugden brings this little known warrior to life.[89] Blue Jacket was a contemporary of Brant, but much more grounded in the Ohio country with little direct contact with the British Army. Blue Jacket was a true Indian of his age. A chief that liked rum too much and held petty grudges over years, he was also a warrior amongst warriors and understood very early on that his people could never move far enough for the settlers to be happy.

One topic that pervades the study of the warfare in North America from 1755-1815 is the inescapable fact that the style of warfare in Europe was largely not practiced in North America due to cultural, manpower, technological, and terrain constraints. This fact has been acknowledged from the earliest histories. However, a treasure trove of recent scholarship on the subject has redefined which style prevailed and which parties practiced which style when it was required. Thomas Carlyle stated that the 'rifle made all men tall', but John Mahon in 'Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794' stated that American folklore tried to portray the lone rifleman as differentiator in the woodlands, but in reality it was closely knit units that could fire and maneuver who mastered the art of North American warfare.[90] Mahon goes on to say that those who mastered woodland warfare and could tie tactics to a strong set of strategic goals eventually won the conflicts. In 'The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal', Don Higginbotham examines the ways that North American warfare affected social norms and civil-military relationships.[91] Higginbotham asks some difficult questions that have yet to be answered, such as, why did early Republic writers like Franklin and Paine stress that republicanism was peaceful when all around them was evidence that it was not? Matthew Ward shows the difficulty in getting British Army regulars to adapt to the Indian way of warfare in tactics as

[88] John Sugden, *Tecumseh: A Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., A John Macrae / Owl Book, 1999)
[89] John Sugden, *Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003)
[90] Carlyle quoted in Bowman, *Honor History*, 81-82 & John K. Mahon, 'Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 45(2) (1958): 254--275.
[91] Don Higginbotham, 'The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 44 (2) (1987): 230--273.

well as supplying them in the wilderness in 'The European Method of Warring is Not Practiced Here: The Failure of British Military Policy in the Ohio Valley, 1755-1759'.[92]

Armstrong Starkey, in the same vein as Richard White, argues that the development of warfare was as much about cultural exchange as it was cultural conflict.[93] Starkey says that Indians and Europeans fought as allies as much as enemies and the experience transferred to both groups to form a new style of North American warfare. In *Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast*, Guy Chet argues, in a geographically constrained way, that in the Northeast, the European way of war actually won out and the major battles there were more European than native.[94] However, John Grenier takes a broader geographical view and comes to a different conclusion.[95] According to Grenier, not only did Americans learn the Indian style of warfare, but learned to practice it with extravagant violence against civilians and their infrastructure. Finally, Peter Silver says that Indian warfare made disparate immigrant groups on the frontier join together, but it also made them accuse each other over old world differences when convenient.[96] The fear mongering resulted in a savage racism against the Indians and any group that dared befriend them. It was into this complex situation that the British Army stepped in 1755 with mixed results.

1.7.3 The British Army and Eighteenth-Century British Society

The third and final section of the historiography provides a look into the British culture that supported the British Army. The British Army changed dramatically from 1755 to 1815. The force that had traditionally fought on England's borders and Western Europe prior to 1755 began to be used widely in support of the first British Empire. The way it was recruited, trained, supplied, and moved had to adapt to the changing missions and geography of a world-wide empire. No conditions were more challenging than those of North America where a lack of infrastructure and a pre-modern form of warfare was the

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[92] Matthew C. Ward, '"The European Method of Warring is Not Practiced Here": The Failure of British Military Policy in the Ohio Valley, 1755-1759', *War in History*, Volume 4 (3) (1997): 247-263.
[93] Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998)
[94] Guy Chet, *Conquering The American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast* (University of Massachusetts Press, 2003)
[95] Grenier, *First Way*
[96] Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007)

norm. In addition to the tactical and operational challenges were the changing mores of a society that was also going through radical change at the beginning of the Industrial Age.

Prior to looking at the British Army in North America, it is critical to understand the background of it as entered into this critical period. The term 'Military Europe', coined by Christopher Duffy and expanded upon by Stephen Conway, is an excellent descriptor of how the British Army viewed itself during this period. Military Europe assumed that serious nation-states would have large standing armies that embraced the idea that there were proper physical, ethical and political constraints on warfare that made it more civilised. Although national patriotism was present, members of Military Europe also held an occupational solidarity and the officers were members of an occupational fraternity. There were national variations of course. The British (or the English as Military Europe knew them) were known for their contempt of foreigners. They showed a remarkable condescension for the French and Germans as well as the Americans and the Indians. As soldiers they were known for their unflinching bravery, but not particularly well versed in the military arts. They certainly were not viewed as intellectuals. However, more important than the differences between national armies were what they shared in common. When asked if he identified more closely with an Indian, an American, or a European officer, a British Army officer would almost inevitably chose the reverse order of precedence. [97]

Sir John Fortescue chronicled the British Army's actions from the Norman conquest to World War I in *The History of the British Army*.[98] Although slightly outdated in style and national temperament compared to modern histories, his work covering the years 1715 to 1815 still form the basis of most modern campaign histories. However, notably absent is any deep discussion of Indians which makes its usefulness to this paper limited, except as an institutional record of the British Army and the context in which they were operating. A modern day historian of the British Army, Richard Holmes, gives a wide ranging view of the average soldier's life in *Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket*.[99] Holmes leaves high command to others and focusses on the weapons, recruitment, medical treatment, and camp followers of the British Army in the field in Europe, North America and Asia.

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[97] Duffy, *Reason*, 3-34 and Conway, *Military Europe*, 69-100
[98] John Fortescue, *The History of the British Army, Volumes II-X* (Naval and Military Press, 2004)
[99] Richard Holmes, *Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001)

Moving to North America exclusively, Stephen Brumwell examines the common soldier in *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763*.[100] Brumwell shows how the soldiers adapted to irregular warfare in the completely foreign wilderness of North America. Specifically pertinent to this paper is the chapter on the British Army's confrontation with the type of fighting conducting by militia, Rangers, and Indians. Brumwell makes clear that it was not an easy, or complete conversion to North American warfare, but their persistence allowed them to win the crucial campaigns from 1757-1760. Michael McConnell splits the difference between Holmes and Brumwell by talking about the everyday lives of the British Soldier in North America between 1758 and 1775 in *Army & Empire: British Soldiers on the American Frontier*.[101] Having finally forced the French out of the midwest, the British Army settled down to the harshness of frontier life. McConnell covers health, society, and military work that began the British Army's history of life on the edges of empire. Life in the British Army in North America was often, to borrow a descriptive phrase, nasty, brutish, and short from recruitment through death often due to excruciating disease and horrific wounds. However, the British soldier was not an automaton. In 'rebellion of the Regulars: Working Soldiers and the Mutiny of 1763-1764', Peter Way describes how the Indians were not the only ones disgusted with British penny pinching after the Seven Years' War.[102] The British Army's attempt to dock two-thirds of the average soldier's pay for his upkeep was the primary driver of the mutiny, but Way argues that the reasoning must be followed further to find similarities with their civilian counterparts of the age. Conditions of release from duty, re-assignment, and the treatment of camp followers were some of the many complaints filed as the British Army tried to rein in the heavy spending previously needed to win the war. In short, Way argues that the British soldier would put up with a lot, but was no push-over.

One of the historical inaccuracies that have been leveled wholesale at the British Army is that it was too rigid in its application of formalised European battlefield maneuvers in the wilderness. From the very beginning of the French and Indian War, the British officers and men adapted to their missions. As early as 1947, Franklin Thayer Nichols wrote in 'The

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[100] Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
[101] Michael N. McConnell, *Army and Empire: British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 1758-1775* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008)
[102] Peter Way, 'Rebellion of the Regulars: Working Soldiers and the Mutiny of 1763-1764', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 57 (4), (2000): 761--792.

Organisation of Braddock's Army', that Braddock had trained his soldiers in light infantry techniques, drastically lowered the load they carried, and had covering forces to the fore and both flanks during his march to the forks of the Ohio.[103] In *Braddock's March*, Thomas E. Crocker argues that Braddock did realise that he needed Indian scouts, but was let down by his naiveté of colonial governors' promises and the need to bend to the niceties of Indian diplomacy.[104] Furthermore, in Braddock's campaign were officers named Gage, Gates, Lee, and Washington, as well as support men like Boone, Croghan, and Morgan. These men may not have been experts at Indian warfare in 1755, but their intelligence shown later in life meant they would not have taken the situation in 1755 lightly. 'Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760' by Peter E. Russell is an often cited work, because it dissolved a two century old historical belief that the British Army had never dealt with irregular warfare and could not adjust.[105] Russell details how the British Army adapted to irregular warfare in Flanders and the Jacobite rebellion in 1745. The Duke of Cumberland used a Ranger unit designed to fight in the American colony of Georgia to disrupt Jacobite patrols. Officers that became senior leaders later in the Seven Years' War such as Jeffery Amherst, James Abercromby, Lord Howe, and John Forbes had seen grenadiers acting as skirmishers and reconnaissance parties working the flanks of large formations in Europe. The experience in Scotland and Flanders was translated into North America by many such serving officers and Highland regiments sent to North America in the late 1750s.

In 'The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763', Daniel J. Beattie details the advances in logistics that the British Army used to conduct large scale operations over areas where they had never been conducted by European armies.[106] Standardisation and planning enabled consistent logistics routes which in turn enabled more consistent campaign planning along the Mohawk and Hudson valleys in New York. Another of the well-known adaptations was the use of special units of woodsmen called Rangers to conduct patrols, reconnaissance, and shield larger units on the move. The

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[103] Franklin Thayer Nichols, 'The Organisation of Braddock's Army', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Volume 4, Number 2 (April 1947): 125-147.
[104] Thomas E. Crocker, *Braddock's March: How the Man Sent to Seize a Continent Changed American History* (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 2009)
[105] Peter E. Russell, 'Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 35(4) (1978): 629--652.
[106] Beattie, Daniel J. 'The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763' in *Adapting to Conditions: War and society in the eighteenth Century.* Maartin Ultee, Ed. (The University of Alabama Press, 1986), 56-83

Annotated and Illustrated Journals of Major Robert Rogers is a good introduction to their service throughout the 1750s and 1760s, including his attempt to create a training regimen for would be Rangers at the behest of Lord Loudon with Thomas Gage as the leader of a separate regiment of Rangers.[107] Rogers was a good combat leader, but also a world class publicist, so his journals have to be mined carefully, but Timothy J. Todish does a good job with the annotation to put the exploits in context. Rangers continued to be used throughout the period and into the Revolution, especially in the New York frontier regions. As with much of the literature on the topic, most of the aforementioned books neglect the southern portion of the midwest and it is left to a specialist work to close the gap. In *Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754-1776*, James M. Johnson examines how the mixture of militia, Rangers, and the British regulars together managed the southern frontier against the Cherokee and Creek Indians.[108] Johnson gives a pragmatic view of the value of citizen soldiers and believes that have been too much maligned.

Adaptation of the officers to North American warfare was critical, but the operational capabilities of the army as a whole were also important. Matthew H. Spring examines how the British Army adapted operations when required in the Revolution in *With Zeal and with Bayonets Only*.[109] Spring argues that the British Army was remarkably adaptable in integrating new skills into their tactics, but more importantly, converting those tactics into coherent operational plans. Spring concludes that although the British Army were the better in the field, the rebel resiliency in reforming after defeats meant that British operational victories could never reach a strategic victory. The idea that rebellions, insurgencies, and other forms of asymmetric warfare were always inevitably lost by the imperial forces is quite common, but as G. J. Bryant shows in 'Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India' points out, the British adapted quite well to the cultural, political, and military conditions in India that were presented to them.[110] Many of the same conditions were present in America as were in India, but the British were able to exploit

[107] Robert Rogers, Todish, T. J. & Zaboly, G., Eds., *The Annotated and Illustrated Journals of Major Robert Rogers*. (Purple Mountain Press, 2002)
[108] James M. Johnson, *Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754-1776* (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2000)
[109] Matthew H. Spring, *With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008)
[110] G. J. Bryant, 'Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India'. *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Apr., 2004): 431-469

their strengths better in India. This raises the question of the capability and the prejudices of the British Army leadership in America.

The leadership of the British Army and the British political establishment would ultimately determine the use of Indians in North America. However, these two groups were not mutually exclusive. Fifty-nine army officers were elected as Members of Parliament in 1761, but only nine had served in the American colonies during the Seven Years' war. In 1766, there were fifty-four. Their status and political orientation were critical to their decision-making. Even some of the officers who were not Members of Parliament held senior civil positions in the various colonial governments.[111] From 1755 to the end of the American Revolution in 1783, this military/political honour group was still a relatively small group that shared an idea of honour that cut across European boundaries and appealed to an aristocratic group that was not skilled in the military science of large armies, but in personal prowess and courage on horseback. The individual soldiers were expected to be of low moral standing. The best that could be expected was that appeals to the higher authorities of God and King would keep the rabble from committing too many atrocities. Prior to the French Revolution, if one were to ask the average British Army officer whether he shared an honour code with a French Army officer or one of his British private soldiers, the answer would almost always have been with the French officer.

In *George Washington's Generals and Opponents*, historians give detailed critiques on the performance of each of the major American British officers in the Revolution.[112] John Shy delivers a devastating assessment of Thomas Gage in 'Weak Link of Empire'.[113] Although Gage had experience in wilderness and Indian warfare, Shy enumerates Gage's several blunders of analysis such as thinking that Boston was the only problem and force would win the day once the political will was present. Shy paints a picture of a man who progressed despite his experience and was in over his head. Carleton is examined by Paul H. Smith in 'Soldier-Statesman'.[114] Carleton's main drawback in relation to this paper was that he did not use the Indians available to him early in the war to ease the pressure on Boston. Carleton was against their use in the offense, but did not declare it openly.

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[111] Sir Lewis Namier, *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), 256-269 & Mackesy, *War for America* 9-10

[112] George A. Billias, *George Washington's Generals and Opponents: Their Exploits and Leadership, Volumes I & II* (Da Capo Press, 1994)

[113] John Shy, 'Thomas Gage: Weak Link of Empire 'in Billias, *Opponents Volume II*, 3-38

[114] Paul H. Smith, 'Soldier-Statesman' in Billias, *Opponents Volume II*, 103-141

Therefore, he sowed confusion between Whitehall and the senior leadership in America. In 'Ambitious General', George Billias describes the overweening 'Gentleman Johnny' Burgoyne as showing the cultural prejudice present in so many British officers in their opinion of the American fighting force.[115] Burgoyne's inability to control his Indian force after much effort and his inability to appreciate the difficulty of attacking through the New York frontier doomed his expedition. Burgoyne gets high marks for strategic planning, but low ones for execution.

Of course the British Army, especially its officers and politicians, did not live nor act in a vacuum. British society was also changing rapidly during this time. The advent of the Industrial Revolution at roughly the same time as the victory over France in America in the Seven Years' War ushered in a new feeling of British-ness. The British nation was crafting a new national identity at the beginning of the Imperial period.[116] The British Army, especially its officers, was becoming an accepted part of society. Even the lowly soldiers were on their way to a heightened status in this period. The British Army was beginning to identify with the nation and the nation with the Army. The seemingly natural Hanoverian military bearing and the Royal connection to the Army in the 1750s helped the process along. Additionally, island Britons were lucky to have had natural protection from their enemies, so as to obviate the need for masses of troops on their doorstep which was what often set standing armies against their populations.[117] However, this growing acceptance by society of the Army and its missions came with a catch for the Army. The British people wanted a say as well in the conduct of wars through popular opinion. The British population was becoming worldlier with the growth of its new Empire and the British people had opinions on military issues and honour, such as the use of Indians. However, this growth in British patriotism was not linear. Contrary to H.V. Bowen and Linda Colley, Stephen Conway argues that the American Revolutionary War was very divisive politically, culturally, and economically.[118]

By the 1770s, the new British pride in its power and sophistication was almost stillborn due to British society's newly acquired opinions of the Indians and North American

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[115] George A. Billias, 'John Burgoyne: Ambitious General' in Billias, *Opponents Volume II*, 142-192
[116] Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009.)
[117] H.V. Bowen, *War and British Society, 1688-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
[118] Stephen Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3-6

warfare in general. The British public might not have had a perfect view of North America, but it had enough information to hold strong opinions. The American Revolutionary War was very divisive politically, culturally, and economically both in the colonies and back in Britain.[119] The use of Indians against colonists was one of the great rifts in British society. The newfound pride in the Empire was one thing when it was used to rid North America of the French and the Jesuits. It was quite another when Indians allied with the British Army were mercilessly attacking cousins on the frontier. Much in the way a British officer might have felt closer honour ties to a French officer than a British private, many Britons felt a closer tie to the familial ties in rebel Americans than in a military alliance with the Indians.[120] After the Saratoga defeat, one newspaper declared the British public's honour to be sullied by the use of Indians. [121] The conduct of the British Army officer corps and the politicians were also torn between trying to ease the American cousins back into the fold with European style tactics and norms or cracking the whip on thankless rebels in the way the Irish rebellions had been dealt with. With the settlement of the American issue in 1783 and a grudging reconciliation in 1794, the Americans and the British relationship improved. The same could not be said for the British and French relationship that was going from bad to worse with the French Revolution. France and its army took on a new complexion with the advent of the *levèe en masse*. Ideological issues began to take centre stage in the European rivalries. Along with the traditional values came newer ideas of justice, equality, and personal liberty, but with radical violence. These concepts might not have taken root in Britain as they had in France, but the identification of the individual with a higher purpose and a national cause was unmistakable. The growing British unity that came with the victory in the Seven Years' War and onset of the wars with Revolutionary France have somewhat masked the irregular nature of its progress.[122]

Wartime events in North America came to be viewed in Britain through a rapidly expanding press and literary establishment. The volume of soldier's journals and captivity narratives exploded in the 1750s and 1760s giving the average Briton a slice of excitement and horror at the brutality that was experienced on the frontier of the American colonies.

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[119] Ibid., 346-355
[120] Troy Bickham, *Savages within the Empire: Representations of American Indians in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 2005), 253-264
[121] Troy Bickham, *Making Headlines: The American Revolution as Seen through the British Press*. DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), 217
[122] Stephen Conway, 'To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 43(3) (1986): 381-407.

Along with the base titillation of the narratives of torture and scalping came a real desire to understand the Indian better.[123] The British certainly saw the Indian as the 'other' to use a modern academic classification. Britons came to know the Indians through warfare, missionary activity, and trade.[124] The Indians were often seen through the British lenses of each of these domains, but were never considered equal, nor did they enjoy the full benefits and protections of the British systems of commerce, law, and customs. Although the Indians represented a small fraction of the indigenous peoples within the first British Empire, they garnered a disproportionate amount of interest.[125] The Indians were often used as examples in philosophical works, art, the press, and religious reasoning. A decade of war in close proximity to the Indians and the well-publicised accounts projected the Indians into sharp relief to the Empire's view of its mission in the world. Some of the impressions of Indians were personal as some travelled to Britain as slaves, traders, diplomats, visiting royalty, and students. How the Indians were viewed in Britain often depended on why they came.[126] They often caused excitement and enthusiasm in theatres, churches and Royal courts, but if they were looking to negotiate with British ministers and plead their cases, they were often treated less well. Another area where the British had contact with the Indians was the missionary movement. The missionaries' influence among the Indians and the Christians in Britain allowed another view of the Indian to emerge. This view brought a sense of moral obligation to improve the plight of the Indians. At first, this obligation was used as a justification for sidelining the Jesuit effort in North America during the Seven Years' War. Later it was used to justify helping the midwestern Indians retain their territory from the acquisitive frontier settlers.[127] The work of the missionaries encouraged a sympathetic view in some that led to the Indians' Romanticisation.

Indians entered the British consciousness through art as well. Paintings, sculpture, and graphic art were used to convey the role that the Indians held within the Empire. Many of the most famous, such as Benjamin West's paintings of Wolfe's death, were near propaganda, but less well-known and realistic representations were also popular in more

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[123] Colley, *Captives,* 137-238
[124] Martin Daunton, & Rick Halpern, Eds. *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999)
[125] Bickham, *Savages,* 1-17
[126] Alden T. Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 233-254
[127] Laura M. Stevens, *The Poor Indians: British Missionaries, Native Americans, and Colonial Sensibility* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)

specific cultural and economic settings. The Indians were originally portrayed as exotic, then as allies, and finally as in decline. The depictions of the Indians were not wholly unrepresentative views of inferior people, but they could never be totally accurate either, because the artists were of a completely different world.[128] Overall, the British conclusion in 1760s was that the Indian was a cruel and uncivil creature that had to be treated with respect in war and pitied for its poor development, but was not of the British standard of humanity in warfare.

The Indian was not only a source of inspiration for the graphic arts, but also the literary. The literary depiction of Indians in the era was transformed from captivity narratives early on to a forlorn realization that a distinct period of human historical development was passing away forever. The idea of the Indian became especially important to the Romantic movement. Tim Fulford argues that Romanticism might not have taken the course it did without the Indian and the view of the Indian over the period changed from grand narrative to focused detail. The detail allowed a more nuanced view of the Indian and in many cases encouraged sympathy for them in their plight against the land voracious frontiersmen. [129]

1.8 Introduction Summary

This introduction provides the purpose, scope, definitions and the positioning of this paper into the wider historiographical context. Although providing context to such a wide-ranging period and setting can seem overwhelming, it is critical before one can begin the process of analysing how a cultural element (honour) affects strategic decisions (use of Indian allies) in an unconventional operational environment (North American petite guerre). In theory, one should be able to apply each of the components of the setting to a given British Army leader's situation and make a determination. In practice, the setting and era discussed above makes this process very difficult. However, the benefit of doing so is a far more nuanced understanding of why the British Army performed as it did during this period. The rest of this paper will attempt to accomplish this objective.

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[128] Stephanie Pratt, *American Indians in British Art 1700-1840* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005)

[129] Tim Fulford, *Romantic Indians: Native Americans, British Literature, & Transatlantic Culture 1756-1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

SAY, what is Honour?--'Tis the finest sense
Of 'justice' which the human mind can frame,
Intent each lurking frailty to disclaim,
And guard the way of life from all offence
Suffered or done. When lawless violence
Invades a Realm, so pressed that in the scale
Of perilous war her weightiest armies fail,
Honour is hopeful elevation,--whence
Glory, and triumph. Yet with politic skill
Endangered States may yield to terms unjust;
Stoop their proud heads, but not unto the dust--
A Foe's most favourite purpose to fulfil:
Happy occasions oft by self-mistrust
Are forfeited; but infamy doth kill.

-- William Wordsworth[130]

2. Honour, Society and the British View of the Indians

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether military honour caused the British Army leadership to ineffectively use a key resource during its prolonged engagement in North America. In order to make that determination, one has to have a firm concept of three issues relating to honour: first, a firm definition of what honour means; second, an understanding of how the definition might have changed over a period of great cultural, political, and social upheaval in Europe and North America from 1754 to 1815; finally, one must look at how the various societies viewed honour comparatively. This chapter will examine these issues.

The Oxford English Dictionary's definition of 'honour' is varied, but the most pertinent variation is 'code' or 'law' of honour which is 'the set of rules and customs which regulate the conduct of some particular class of person according to a conventional standard of honour'.[131] In this paper, it is the code held by the 'class' of people who directed the British Army from 1754 to 1815.

Honour was a term that pervaded much of public life in the early modern era. It was an aristocratic tradition that became a large part of the European military tradition, although its form shifted through the ages to mean different things to different classes of people. In the first half of the eighteenth century, to British Army officers specifically, honour meant

[130] William Wordsworth, *The Complete Poetical Works of William Wordsworth: Students Cambridge Edition* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press for Houghton Mifflin Company, 1907), 385
[131] "honour | honor, n.". OED Online. (September 2013)

being a gentleman, being loyal to one's commander and king, being a member of a self-regulating group above and beyond official rules and laws, and proving courage by seeking glory.[132] However, these concepts of honour were changing by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Therefore, these definitions require careful handling to meaningfully relate the British Army to the society in which it operated. Therefore, the author will discuss the contemporaneous societal, contextual, and evolving meanings of honour in Britain.

Although authors use different terminology, there is general agreement on Paul Robinson's bifurcation of the two common types of honour, external and internal.[133] External honour is likened to reputation, fame, glory, right to respect, or 'good name'. It is the concern of how others rate the individual against the code of honour. Internal honour is similar to personal integrity, conscientiousness, extended benevolence, self-discipline, or probity. It has more to do with conscience and how the individual rates himself against a code of honour, private or public. External and internal honours can, and often do, co-exist. It is often the case that internal honour is the pre-cursor of external honour. However, the opposite case may be harder to prove.[134] As we will examine, external honour was often what needed 'defending', but internal honour was increasingly valued, especially during the latter part of this period. In theory, internal honour could be nourished and grown by a single individual working against an entirely internal view of the world. Yet if a solitary individual were to perform to a set of values known only to him or her and the code was not known to anyone else, it is doubtful whether that concept would be known as honour. It is analogous to a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it. Many religious people might claim that they are working to a unique set of values known only to them and their maker, but it still requires an external standard (provided by a deity or karma, for example) to recognise the performance against the set of values.

Therefore, if the individual wants to be honourable, they must demonstrate that they adhere to values that are known, documented or not, by like-minded individuals or entities. The common name for the set of honour values is an 'honour code' and the name of the

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[132] A.N. Gilbert, 'Law and Honour among Eighteenth-Century British Army Officers', *The Historical Journal* 19 (1) (1976), 75 and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 215 -225

[133] Paul Robinson, *Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 2-3 and Frank Henderson Stewart, *Honor* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 30-33

[134] James Bowman, *Honor: A History* (New York: Encounter Books, 2007), 2-11

like-minded individuals is an 'honour group'. The seeker of honour is normally part of the honour group as well and will also pass judgment on others' action within the group. These groups may be as small as one when a person is relying on internal honour alone. However, it is more often a group of people ranging from a small set of local individuals to nations or even all of humanity. The honour group strives to keep the code sacred by enforcing adherence. The enforcement may range from sanction to simple ostracism, to ex-communication, or even physical elimination. Honour groups can often be found around existing social units whether commercial, religious, or military. They can form around ideological concepts as well, such as political, cultural, or philosophical movements.

Honour groups often form around organizations that exist for other purposes as they do for this paper around the military. The honour code is often adopted by the group as a way of helping the organisation stay together in good times and bad. A family may have a code that values the continuance of the bloodline and the members that further the bloodline are held in high esteem. Institutional religious groups value the adherence to the religious doctrine and its dissemination. In addition to organisational values, largely dispersed groups of people can value ideological concepts. Nations have bestowed honours on individuals who go to great lengths to uphold 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness', for example or "-liberty, equality, and fraternity'. These ideological honour groups pose special consideration for military units as they often pit one nation's ideological narrative against others and layer them on top of a warrior code. This area is ripe for conflict as basic human values, that are the code for the entire human race's honour group, can be tossed aside in the attempt to gain honour with one's own nation, tribe, or unit. Great self-sacrifices have been endured for these ideological honour codes, but terrible depravities have also been committed in their name. An individual can also belong to several honour groups simultaneously such as family, church, charity, company, and country. In the best circumstances, the codes are similar and overlapping, but at times there may be conflict. An individual may be taught not to cheat in school, church and home, but then asked to cut corners at work to serve the organisation's best interest.[135]

Traditionally, the groups are oriented towards end goals that are moral or ethical to society as a whole, but not necessarily. The old adage that there is no honour among thieves

[135] Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Begin* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 175-204

is only correct if one applies a code that does not value the art of larceny or deception. The nature of the activity dictates the values in some cases. Commitment to the honour group through all tribulations is an example of a value that could be virtuous or heinous depending on the nature of the group. Readily identifiable examples of honour groups that are not virtuous groups by their nature are criminal gangs and terrorist groups.[136] Within these paradoxes lies the nub of why honour is such a difficult concept on which to cast concrete assertions. For clarity on honour judgments, not only must there be agreement within an honour group on the code, overlapping codes must also be in alignment, and confronting cultures and societies must also align. Obviously, this situation is rare, but the hope for it may have been present among some British Army officers from 1754 to 1815, because there had been an aligning of the overlapping military values and the laws of war going on in Europe during the Enlightenment. Unfortunately, the natives of North America had not been participating fully in the alignment. Many of the colonials in North America with European heritage, especially on the frontier, had not been participating for the last one-hundred years either.

Finally, there is a possibility of disconnection if the honour seeker and the honour group diverge in their view of the code. If society rates warrior values highly against the society's code of honour, then those values have an external value to the warrior's reputation. Conversely, if the warrior accepts the society's honour code, then adherence to it can become internalised and the source of his integrity. However, there may be times when the external and internal conflict. The internalised warrior traits can become dissociated from the societal norms and may take precedence over what a society currently values when warriors have been deeply inculcated by the warrior code of honour. Similarly, the pursuit of glory has led warriors to subsume their internal honour many times over the centuries to gain external honour.

Great changes in the development of military honour occurred in Europe from the Middle Ages to the early nineteenth century that affected warfare and the British Army. This chapter has so far examined the definition and nature of military honour, but since it is a cultural, philosophical, and legal concept; it is prudent to examine how the concept developed and see how it affected the late eighteenth century British Army's view of honour.

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[136] Bowman, *Honor History*, 4-5 and Stewart, *Honor*, 54

In Europe, war had been a constant concern of the Christian church, philosophers, noblemen and warriors for hundreds of years prior to 1754. Of course, philosophers, noblemen and warriors all over the world had been developing an honour code for millennia, but for early modern Europe, the Christian church was a defining element in the discussion. The Chivalric code provided the basis for limiting warfare and reducing violence against certain classes of people from the Middle Ages onward, but it also carried the positive attributes of the warrior code. Even though Enlightenment thinking provided most of the written basis for the modern era's view of the laws of war, the Chivalric code drove much of the cultural behavior of military professionals before during and after the Enlightenment.

In the Middle Ages, several of the traditional concepts of honour began to be transferred from noblemen to the knights who also fought on their behalf. Glory became an animating feature of knights. Prowess, often associated with martial skill on horseback, but also on foot, formed the core of the warrior's honour, but his reputation and his public face was also integral to his honour. The keeping of one's word took on a mythical quality where the more outlandish the vow, the more honour it accrued. Guile could be acceptable under the right circumstances, but breaking one's word was condemned as dishonourable. Giving one's opponent (only those opponents deemed worthy, of course) the chance to be victorious under the most extreme circumstances became the basis of gallant fair-play. As with all of the concepts mentioned in this chapter, they were not universally deployed and held by all in warfare, but the Chivalric code did form the beginning of a generally accepted framework for honourable conduct in combat. Many of these positive martial values have stood the test of time and still form the basis of the modern concept of military honour.[137]

Alongside the extension of positive martial values to the knighthood came an extension of what we might today call human rights in warfare, mainly through the Christian church, but also through legal scholarship and philosophy. From the tenth century onwards, the Christian church attempted to limit the damage of war to the Christian faithful amongst the nations of Europe. The emergence of church decrees against warriors who indiscriminately killed non-combatant Christians during wars formed the basis of a societal norm on war time activities. The threat of losing one's status as a warrior in good standing was a

[137] Robinson, *Military Honour*, 74-75

powerful incentive to take note of the changing view of non-combatants. The Peace and Truce of God movements began to formally lay out who could be lawfully attacked in war and when. Another departure from traditional codes of honour encouraged by the Christian church was the exaltation of and the extending of formal courtesies to women.[138] The idea of repercussions for killing people indiscriminately or brutalising particular groups of people in war seems as obvious as the consequences of criminal homicide to the modern observer. However, prior to these movements, the Christian church remained primarily concerned with the right to declare war or *jus ad bellum*, rather than *jus in bello*, or the justifiable conduct of war.[139]

Although important in establishing the basis for how non-combatants were treated in war and eventually evolving into a comprehensive set of laws, it would be an error to conclude that most of the Chivalric code derived from religious doctrine. The majority of the code came from the combatants themselves. The eleventh century saw a slow build-up of the code starting with the extension to knights of the vague notions of the honour of noblemen. This was important in establishing the idea that one could extend the honour group. However, the combination of the honour extension to knights and the church decrees of non-combatant protection did not extend to the other combatants. The common soldier was not viewed as the equivalent of a noble or a knight. If a peasant were found fighting, the Chivalric code was not applicable. The knights were held accountable if they killed another knight who could have been taken prisoner instead, but this did not extend to peasants who could not command a ransom.[140] Also, contrary to church pleadings, it also did not slow the short-of-death brutality on the non-combatant population. Plundering and pillaging of towns and regions that could be of service to the enemy was still seen as fair-play.[141] These value distinctions are important, because they defined the next age of development of the Chivalric code.[142]

The primary difference between the knights and the noblemen was the fact that the knights fought as a profession and were much more concerned with the practical actions in

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[138] Bowman, *Honor History*, 49-50
[139] Richard Tuck, *The Rights of Peace and War: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 16-77
[140] Robert C. Stacey, 'The Age of Chivalry' in *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World.* Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, 27-39. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 27-29
[141] Robinson, *Military Honour*, 74
[142] Martines, *Furies: War in Europe 1450-1700.* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 177-195

war. Therefore, much of the code was similar to contract common law. Special courts were convened in several different jurisdictions in Europe where disputes were adjudicated and a body of law was established that enshrined the Chivalric code. Legal representatives, arguing on behalf of the knights, began to develop what was acceptable behaviour on the battlefield built upon custom and the application of common law principles to new or aberrant situations. There were attempts to document the code, but much like the courts martial in the British Army of the late eighteenth century; much of it was left to the idea of "conduct unbecoming of" a knight.[143] Who brought the charges, the parties involved, and the circumstances often mattered more than the principle itself. Therefore, the Chivalric code's practices grew more practical and humane fitfully and unevenly.[144] In the literary world the best and the worst are explored and the circumstances are laid out more clearly, Sir Thomas Malory's *Morte Darthur,* for example, provided what is probably the most famous written version of the Chivalric code in the form of the oath of the knights of the Round Table,

> never to do outrageousity [sic] nor murder, and always to flee treason; also by no mean to be cruel, but to give mercy unto him that asketh mercy, upon pain of forfeiture of their worship and lordship of King Arthur for evermore; and always to do ladies, damosels, [sic] and gentlewomen succor, upon pain of death. Also that no man take no battles in a wrongful quarrel for no law, ne for no world's goods.[145]

Of course, circumstances matter more in real life than in stories and the circumstances were often ambiguous, because the type of war mattered also. The two primary types of war were public and private war. Whilst the Chivalric code was developing, so too was the emerging idea that war could only be legitimately conducted by sovereigns against other sovereigns. However, private war between nobles who were subject to a higher sovereign still occurred and often their legitimacy normally hinged on the age-old concepts of 'might makes right' and 'winner takes all'. Since war's legitimacy was often based on the credibility of men who were sovereign by declaration of royal bloodlines, war's legal

[143] Gilbert, 'Law and Honour', 75-87
[144] Stacey, 'Age of Chivalry', 30-31
[145] Felicia Ackerman, '"Never to Do Outrageousity nor Murder": The World of Malory's Morte Darthur in French, Shannon E. *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 115-138

theorists continued along more fruitful lines, such as the applicable conduct of war in certain circumstances.

In *guerre mortelle*, war (often private war) meant the death of the losing side. When the red flag was flown (literally), the Chivalric code meant little. Because of this fact, knights tried to avoid this type of war. Legal theorists and military courts found very little purchase in a field where both sides had committed to total destruction of the other. Theorists, the Christian church, and Chivalric courts found much more fertile ground in *bellum hostile*, or public war between Christian sovereigns. Knights were far more likely to be involved in this type of war as there was a possibility of profit and glory. Peasants were still not considered equal and were subject to plunder and pillage, but restraint and rules were more likely to be followed.[146]

Within *bellum hostile* several important concepts developed from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, such as prisoner parole, the rules of siege warfare, and rules of covert war. The concept of parole meant an honourable prisoner could be released on his word. His promise during this age was to pay a ransom or remain contractually in the captor's service in return for his freedom. When released, he was accorded the rights of a non-combatant as long as he fulfilled his side of the bargain. Sieges were especially dangerous and rules developed to lower the death toll on both sides. Attackers were subject to great losses in throwing themselves against a heavily defended fortress or town and defenders were subjected to terrible depredations if their fortress eventually fell.[147] Everyone benefited from rules that acknowledged the probable outcome and which allowed both sides to save face.[148] The theory of 'conditional respite' is a good example of how attacking warriors would allow their besieged opponents to save face in seeking help, but allowing them to surrender if the situation was acknowledged to be hopeless without loss of honour. Guile was also allowed in siege warfare and was not considered dishonourable.[149] Finally, covert war was a private war between parties that both served the same sovereign. The rules of this type of war were based on the idea that people could be killed in a dispute without

[146] Stacey, 'Age of Chivalry', 33
[147] Martines, *Furies*, 103-141
[148] Stacey, 'Age of Chivalry', 34-37
[149] Robinson, *Military Honour*, 73

the sovereign's authority, but the normal business of war, such as plundering and ransom was prohibited.[150]

From the lens of today's formal declarations of the Laws of war, these beginnings may seem almost worthless, but from these humble origins we can trace a long, shallow arc of the idea of restraint in European warfare against other Europeans. Variations of restraint within the conduct of war were debated amongst theologians and philosophers with some degree of success from the Middle Ages to the early modern era. However, the main justifications for restraint among warriors came from the practical development of the Chivalric code. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, refinements of the rules of siege warfare, parole, exchange of prisoners and plundering progressed. Where there were exceptions, it was normally due to specific circumstances, such as rebellions and wars with non-Christians. Geoffrey Best has numbered four reasons why this was the case. First, armies were now being raised and supported by the state, so the state sought more formal control over the actions of the participants. Second, there was a steady reduction of war between Catholics and Protestants as the confessional conflicts began to settle into formal geographical boundaries that were respected for the most part. Third, there was a general realisation among sovereigns, the Christian church, and legal theorists that wars at the end of the Middle Ages had come perilously close to total destruction of the established order. Fourth, a rise in the notion of reciprocity drove restraint out of fear that what was doled out could just as easily be received. From the mid sixteenth century to the mid seventeenth, England went through a long period of relative peace where martial skills of aristocrats were in decline. When the English Civil War commenced, the Royalists were at a distinct disadvantage. In England, this became a transitional period between the traditional Chivalric view of honour and a more pragmatic approach.[151] With the notable exception of wars of rebellion, the warrior class had largely agreed that mutual restraint was beneficial for all involved. By the English Civil War in the 1640s, British officers were predominantly practicing a version of military honour that would be recognizable in the 1750s.[152]

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[150] Stacey, 'Age of Chivalry', 38-39
[151] Bowman, *Honor History*, 81
[152] Parker, Geoffrey. 'Early Modern Europe' in *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World.* Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, 40-58 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994)

Although the Chivalric code developed along common law lines and philosophical inquiry, late seventeenth and early eighteenth century inter-national relations thinking began to look toward a more formal declaration of the laws of war and acceptable practices. This followed a more general trend of favouring scientific and legal principles for more consistent and predictable outcomes. Beginning with the Enlightenment, scientific principles drove the way war was conducted, but the idea of honour was still derived from the Chivalric code and newly consolidated views of humanity in warfare. Going to battle often meant following certain principles that would ensure victory and loyalty to a monarch and courage in the face of extreme danger was demanded, even encouraged. The officers who led the armies were aristocratic, but the men who populated them were sometimes referred to as 'the scum of the earth'.[153] From 1748 to 1789, there was an explosion of military literature that emphasised standard principles for conducting warfare. These ideas on warfare can be crystalised in the concept of siege warfare where a victory was assured from procedure that was based on discipline, mathematical calculations, and engineering skill. Contemporaneously, in 1758, Emmerich de Vattel wrote the most prominent Enlightenment volume on the laws of war, *The Law of Nations*, wherein the treatment of prisoners on the battlefield and civilians was expected to greatly improve.[154] Bruce Buchan argues that the Enlightenment ideals on warfare actually came in two forms. First, war became more civilised and less beastly. The wars that were fought in Europe during the Enlightenment generally were more humane and honourable to the honour group that valued those ideals. There was also a second form that emphasised operational efficiency and was more concerned with the rational and technical. Crucially, to this paper, Buchan stated that these ideals fit the petite guerre type of warfare much less well. Petite Guerre was well known in Europe as it was in North America, but Buchan argued that European leaders tried to provide rules for its use that would make it more technical and more humane.[155]

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[153] Philip Henry, 5th Earl of Stanhope. *Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, 1831-1851*. (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1888)14 and Martines, *Furies*, p. 24

[154] John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture: From Ancient Greece to Modern America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Westview Press, 2004), 123-144 and Emerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations: Or, The Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct of Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns* (Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson and Co., 1883)

[155] Bruce Buchan. 'Pandours, Partisans, and Petite Guerre: Two Dimensions of Enlightenment Discourse on War'. *Intellectual History Review* (2012): 1-19

Along with the more formalised nature of legal and philosophical writing, Alexander Welsh argues that there was a 'leveling down of Enlightenment fiction' during this period. Beginning in the seventeenth century, fiction began to shift away from the idea that honour was the sole preserve of the aristocratic classes. Authors such as Daniel Defoe, Henry Fielding, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, and Madame de Lafayette wrote of normal people who struggle with issues of honour. Their protagonists struggled with issues of honour not always based on external views of their conduct, but used their consciences to explore, often with internal dialogues, what was right based on reason and the comparative situations of different classes of people.[156] As argued below, this trend accelerated during the Romantic movement, but that era needed the preceding Enlightenment to lend reason to the movement away from aristocratic-only honour.

Armstrong Starkey argues that there indeed were Enlightenment values in warfare that were often discussed, but that it must be acknowledged that they were very unevenly deployed. The key was in necessity. If the warrior attempted to follow the Enlightenment values, he could partake in the honour of the group that wanted to promote those values. However, necessity could drive even honourable officers to do what was necessary to win, especially in the face of an enemy that was not deploying Enlightenment ideals to warfare. Starkey also makes a distinction between political leaders who often used reasons of state to justify their reasons for breaking the code. Army officers often relied on their own army culture to provide them with their answers.[157] This relates to a point A.N Gilbert made that 'conduct unbecoming of an officer' was a purposefully vague charge in the eighteenth century British Army, as it needed to constantly monitor the pulse of the army officer culture to understand how and when it must be applied.[158] To summarise, honour had always had a code, but in the Enlightenment, warfare was also developing formal operational and ethical codes, but ones that were flexible in their execution when needed.

From the 1760s to 1790s, a 'counter-Enlightenment' movement that would eventually be known as the Romantic movement began to infiltrate some of the Enlightenment ideals. Enlightenment rationality was fine for the sciences proponents argued, but the complexity of the human experience could not be reduced to a series of scientific principles. Human

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[156] Alexander Welsh, *What is Honour? A Question of Moral Imperatives* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 97-113
[157] Starkey, *European and Native*, 1-8
[158] Gilbert, 'Law and Honour', 76

reason and emotion were justifiable concepts and were at play in all human interaction. Warfare was just one of the more complicated human interactions. This new line of reasoning demanded not only a set of principles for armies to comply with, but also a more personal morality in war. Two well-known philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, provided the moral and intellectual basis for warriors to act with honour to themselves, not only their honour groups.

Kant promoted honour to his students in lectures where he discussed that it was better to die than live in servitude. This was a marked change in the definition of honour. Traditionally, service and loyalty to one's master were elements of honour. Kant promoted internal honour, but as a duty to one's self foremost. Kant was less critical of those who sought external honour for doing the right thing as he felt this was natural in human beings. To Kant, the key was to do the honourable thing in order to be the best person one could be. The worst thing that an individual could be was in servitude and uncritical of one's own actions due to the servitude.[159]

Jean-Jacques Rousseau worked to remove external acknowledgment as a prerequisite for honour. He felt that virtue in the individual was all the more enviable when it did not seek the approval of others. Contrary to Hobbes' nasty state of nature, Rousseau believed that the state of nature was a better place where individuals thought of their highest thoughts and were not distracted by what others did or thought. This solitary view comes as close as any to the perfection of internal honour. Rousseau promoted the idea that, through proper education and cultivation, all men, even men in a state of nature, could know honour and it was not confined to wealthy or privileged groups.[160]

This concept of inner and independent worth and the rationality of all humans was being developed across Europe with Adam Smith, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson being the most widely read in Britain. These ideas were in wide circulation by the turn of the nineteenth century. The Napoleonic Wars provided a perfect, if tragic, backdrop for people from all walks of life to test them in their own private circumstances. Whether manning the

[159] Richard Tuck, *The Rights of Peace and War: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 207-225 and Welsh, *What is Honour*, 138-150
[160] Welsh, *What is Honour*, 131-137 and Tuck, *Rights of Peace and War*, 197-207

barricades in Paris or fighting at Trafalgar or marching in the Iberian Peninsula, the concept of personal honour was no longer a nobleman's privilege.[161]

As Marilyn Butler has stated, one need not prove that societies are influenced by philosophers in strict causal fashion with their writing going through a certain gestation period and then enjoying wide circulation, because they did not operate in a vacuum. These thinkers were most likely writing what they had been discussing with others. Therefore, the ideas were in circulation even if limited and their development merely formalised them and made them available for a broader audience.[162] Most of the men were also lecturers at universities or tutors to the aristocracy, so their ideas and the challenges to their ideas would have been public. It was through this 'Republic of Letters' and public discourse that these ideas began to spread and change honour in warfare. The British Army and its governmental masters could not have helped being influenced by some of these concepts. Some of the ideas enjoyed near simultaneous uptake through personal connections. Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) that used Indians as examples of early development is a good example. Hume, Smith, and Henry Home, Lord Kames helped Ferguson secure the position of tutoring the Earl of Bute's sons. The Earl of Bute was the tutor of a young King George III.[163]

The age of Romanticism transformed British views of the Indians from the state- of-nature philosophical analysis in the era of the Seven Years' War to ruthless underdog in the Revolutionary period to a final state of romanticised decline at the turn of the nineteenth century.[164] The ideal of the Indian became especially important to the Romantic Movement as a way to contrast modern man's life with the simple life of the uncivilised native. Romanticism might not have taken the course it did without the idea of the aborigine and the view of the Indian over the period changed from grand narrative to focused detail. Of course, Romanticism was not only focused on the Indian. Much has been written about the Romantics and the Napoleonic era. Many in the British Army were changing their ideas about honour and including duty to one's individual humanity and integrity along with duty

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[161] Troy Bickham, *Savages within the Empire: Representations of American Indians in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 2005), 172-209 and Welsh, *What is Honour*, 168-182

[162] Marylin Butler, *Romantics, Rebels & Reactionaries: English Literature and its Background 1760-1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 2-24

[163] Bickham, *Savages*, 174-175

[164] Tim Fulford, *Romantic Indians: Native Americans, British Literature, & Transatlantic Culture 1756-1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 41-59

to King and country.[165] This long, bloody period in the Napoleonic Wars left an indelible mark on the British Army and their views of honour would have carried over to their participation on the midwestern frontier and in the War of 1812.

The rest of Europe, civil and military, was also experiencing the adaptation of Enlightenment thought to the beginning of the Romantic Movement at the turn of the nineteenth century. Philosophers were describing how individuals could act with honour without the need for their superiors to tell them how and what to believe. Poetry was being written that described the routine and daily honour of lives well lived in little villages and cities. Rather than lives of quiet desperation, there could be lives of quiet dignity and honour. Novels were beginning to be popular as well across Europe. Stories involving self-made men doing what was right in the face of great adversity were describing a path to everyday enlightenment for the aspiring middle classes. By the time of the War of 1812, these concepts were in wide circulation in Europe. [166] With these developments, the laws of war and the changing concept of honour were gaining acceptance through the scholarly progression of Enlightenment ideals. However, with the rapid expansion of printed material in the 1750-1760s, the individual concept of honour was also taking root in a more popular fashion. Honour was now a trait to which the common man could aspire through his God given talents and determination.[167] As N.A.M. Rodger explained, the rising status of British naval officers, '[t]his implied a new underlying ideal, one in which duty was beginning to infiltrate the concept of honour'.[168] Status still mattered, but what always mattered most was a military that could win the existential struggles that faced Britain. An elite class was emerging that could mix with the nobles, but had the working skills and values of the rising middle class.[169] Although many of the new ideals were associated with radicalism, they also sowed the seeds of a newer, stronger nationalism. This could be seen on both sides of the English Channel, but for different reasons. The culture was moving away from the Enlightenment ideals of scientific rationalism managed by a noble elite and more towards

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[165] J.R. Watson *Romanticism and War: A Study of British Romantic Period Writers and the Napoleonic Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 8-14
[166] Watson, *Romanticism*, 108-122
[167] Gunther Rothenburg, 'The Age of Napoleon' in *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World.* Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, 86-97 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 81
[168] N.A.M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (London: Penguin Group, 2004), 513
[169] Nicholas A.M. Rodger, 'Honour and Duty at Sea, 1600-1815', *Historical Research*, Volume 75, Number 190, (November 2002): 425-447, 428 & 447

the Romantic notions that the individual had thoughts, natural rights, and responsibilities that were just as valid. Mark Girouard contends that this era produced a renaissance of Chivalry in England that ran for most of the nineteenth century and touched virtually every facet of English life.[170] These notions could be summed up by author Kenelm Henry Digby in *The Broad Stone of Honour*,

> ...it is to you I speak who are gentlemen of England; I exhort you to remember, that if you are ambitious, honour, and not the passing splendour of the day, must be the object of that ambition; that if you will endeavour to arrive at distinction, the prize must be, not riches, but virtue. [171]

Well known authors of prose and poetry were becoming the first entertainers on a world-wide scale. Books of fiction, history, philosophy, poetry and natural science were best sellers. Britain was at the forefront of this printed revolution. Not only were its authors leading the British public to read and consider their lives, but many of these authors were serving in the British Army and Royal Navy. These were men of substance who were respected for who they were and for what they wrote. An anecdote that displays this phenomenon is the strong connection between Major Arent DePeyster and Robert Burns. DePeyster's love of poetry was well known and he was one of the most prominent British commanders in North America from the 1750s to the 1780s where he spent much of his time with allied Indians in the Great Lakes at Michilimackinac and Detroit. He and Burns were great friends in Dumfries on DePeyster's return from Canada in 1785. He and Burns talked at great length about war and the development of character. In 1813 DePeyster published a book that detailed many of his connections with the Indians and included verse about his service in Canada and the midwest.[172]

Samuel Taylor Coleridge and his friend and co-writer, William Wordsworth frequently discussed honour in their correspondence and prose. Wordsworth's poem of 1809, 'Say What is Honour?' begins with 'Say what is Honour -- Tis the finest sense Of justice which

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[170] Mark Giroaurd, *The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), 16-28

[171] Kenhelm Henry Digby, *The Broad Stone of Honour: or, Rules for the Gentlemen of England* (London: C. & J. Rivington, Printed by R. Gilbert, London, 1823), 577-579

[172] Arent Schuyler DePeyster & John Watts (ed.), *Miscellanies, by an officer* (Dumfries, Scotland: Monro, 1813 & New York : A. E. Chasmar, 1888)

the human mind can frame'.[173] Poetry held a special place in British Army officers' gatherings in North America. With little to do, but drill, gamble and drink in the wilderness, many sought the soul lifting nature of these favoured poets. Coleridge had a direct connection to the war-fighters and a personal understanding of military honour. He was the personal secretary to Admiral Alexander Ball, Governor of Malta, while Nelson was serving as the epitome of courage and honour in the Royal Navy. At Aboukir Bay in 1798, Ball was a Captain in Nelson's Fleet. Through Admiral Ball, the 'band of brothers' was more than an abstract concept to Coleridge. As Ball's private secretary, Coleridge understood the hard decisions that had to be made in war and wrote about it eloquently.[174] In his *Biographia Literaria*, Coleridge writes,

> It would be a sort of irreligion, and scarcely less than a libel on human nature to believe, that there is any established and reputable profession or employment, in which a man may not continue to act with honesty and honour; and doubtless there is likewise none, which may not at times present temptations to the contrary. [175]

Through authors like Coleridge and Wordsworth, literary expressions of honour were popular at the time of the Napoleonic wars. By the time of the War of 1812, in Britain especially, honour had attained a status that was separable from nobility of birth or social status. Linda Colley claims these romantic notions led to an 'ostentatious cult of heroism' where the blue bloods now sought the association of red-blooded heroes.[176]

But it was Sir Walter Scott who did the most to separate honour from noble birth and privilege. He wrote best-selling novels that extolled the virtue of honour by merit. Scott's heroes were independent men who knew they were not aristocrats, but carried themselves with dignity and integrity no matter what their profession. This appealed to men of the new military officer class who expected to advance due to their record of success and adherence to high principles in service to one's king or country.[177] Not only did these men get the job done, they performed it to a high moral code as well. These men did not seek grandiosity or

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[173] Adam Nicolson, *Men of Honour: Trafalgar and the Making of the English Hero.* (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), 115- 116

[174] Linzy, TJ, 'Did Military Honour Hinder the Royal Navy's Effective Use of North American Indians in the Gulf of Mexico Campaign in the War of 1812?' (Masters' diss., King's College London, 2009)

[175] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria* Volume I (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1907), 159

[176] Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 167-197

[177] Girouard, *Camelot*, 30-38

drama. They sought to be proud of their actions no matter who might inspect them. Scott's novels also provided the seed of what would become 'muscular Christianity' later in the nineteenth century. Scott's heroes, who often displayed racial tolerance, were the type that would later join Wilberforce in eradicating the British slave trade.[178] Scott was also not shrinking violet himself. He served as a quartermaster with a volunteer cavalry unit in Edinburgh during the French invasion crisis in1797.[179] Interestingly, Sir Walter Scott met and befriended Captain John Norton, a Mohawk of Cherokee and Scottish descent. Although distances were great, this period in the Atlantic world displayed an incredible amount of cross-pollination of ideas and friendships.[180]

These well-informed philosophical and thought provoking works were widely read and discussed throughout Britain and Europe. Butler states that from 1790 was a period of remarkable sociability in Britain where gatherings were common. The coffee house culture in London, where serious topics were debated regularly, is the stereotypical venue. Literary and philosophical societies were spreading with the fast growing population in Britain. Ideas were being traded in an incredibly vibrant market place and military officers were very much a part of the movement. It seemed as if the whole world was trying to throw off the shackles of unquestioned restraint and focus their personal efforts towards higher emotions. Authors like Adam Smith and Sir Walter Scott merely provided the intellectual backing to such thoughts.[181]

The British Army story from the early 1790s to the War of 1812 is predominantly about the wars with Revolutionary France, but one more concept that was unique to America must be considered. After the American Revolution, the size of the British Army in North America was radically lowered. What was left in America was in frontier forts of the upper midwest and Upper Canada (mostly modern day Ontario). In this arena, the British Army acted as support elements for the fur trade and the British Indian department. It was an army of old men and young men who wished to be in Europe earning their honour. However, one enduring belief in the ranks of British Army officers throughout this period was the supremacy of the British Army over the North American colonists and later the Americans. An element of external honour is pride in one's associations. It was an idea

[178] Bowman, *Honor History*, 75-80 and Butler, *Romantics, Rebels*, 22
[179] Girouard, *Camelot*, 32
[180] Fulford, *Romantic Indians*, 223
[181] Butler, *Romantics, Rebels*, 23-27

that doing things the right way meant that your group was better. As the British Army absorbed these ideas of humanity in warfare, discipline, and duty, it was hard to look at militias and draftees as being equal to them. This situation reached its zenith in the War of 1812. British officers routinely underestimated their opposition regardless of the composition of their own force.[182] Normally, when they had a full complement of well-equipped regulars, they were correct in their assessments of the American troops, but the condescension often led them to conduct operations at extreme disadvantage. One of the disadvantages, that was often self-imposed, was not using Indians in the most effective manner at all times. Therefore, external honour drove a superiority complex and became one of the elements of the calculations on whether to use Indians or not.

Romanticism was known in the USA, but American Romantic authors like Washington Irving, James Fenimore Cooper, and Nathaniel Hawthorne had yet to write their masterpieces by the turn of the century. As probably the most fervent students of the principles of the Enlightenment, Revolutionary America took longer to move onto to other concepts of formalised honour. There was a strong belief in individual freedom, independence and responsibility, but the older concepts of glory and fame lasted much longer on the frontier than in the salons of Europe. For most of its early history, Americans' 'First Way of War' was more Indian than European. John Grenier has argued that Americans of the time, especially those on the frontier with the Indians, were far closer to the Indians in the practice of warfare than with the Europeans.[183] For a frontiersman, his honour groups normally consisted of like-minded individuals in his family, his church, and his heavily fortified community. Much like the Indian, the frontiersman did not care much for the opinion of those outside their tight honour groups.[184] Many of them, like the family of the young Andrew Jackson in the Carolina backcountry, had recently moved there from places like Scotland and Ireland. They had risked life and limb to make a new start in a harsh country. They were not about to part with it easily. Protecting their communities from the Indians allowed for virtually any tactic available, if the situation warranted it. Quite often the distance from civilisation was the yardstick for how to act. The British were squeamish about using Indians in ways that the Indians preferred, but frontier Americans

[182] C.J. Bartlett, 'Gentlemen Versus Democrats: Cultural Prejudice and Military Strategy in Britain in the War of 1812', *War in History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (1994): 140-159.
[183] Grenier, *First Way,* 221-225
[184] Ibid., 204-220

were not, even if they demonised the British for doing what they were doing.[185] For most of the American combatants from 1754 to 1815, who were overwhelmingly militiamen, the honour group that exerted the most pressure on them resided in their own communities, rather than in professional military units or east coast cities and towns. Protecting their communities from the Indians came first and European derived codes of practice came a distant second on the frontier. However, the rhetoric and propaganda often belied this fact.[186]

Although it is difficult to examine all of the Indians in the midwest as a whole, it is safe to say that military prowess was valued as an external honour in Indian societies. Courage in battle and boldness in action were hallmarks of the Indian warrior. Great ritual and ceremony attended warfare, so that the code of honour was well known and any slight to the individual's honour would need answering. The Indians also had very spiritual communities which took internal honour seriously as they felt connected to a natural world and had many commitments to it. To most natives of the midwest, taking scalps was an ancient way to exhibit one's external honour through military prowess.[187] It also symbolised taking the defeated foe's peace in the afterlife which was a point of internal honour. However, taking prisoners was a much more valued way of proving prowess. The act of bringing a prisoner back to the home village proved that the warrior's success was undisputed and complete. It also gave the village a participatory role in war. The village could choose to 'adopt' the prisoner to 'raise up' a lost love one as this was a way of replenishing a declining population. The village could also choose ritualised torture as a way to test the adversary's strength, but also as a way for the village to express their collective grief from the combat.[188] These activities were at odds with the coalescing, if unevenly practiced, view of prisoner treatment in Europe. The captivity narratives that proliferated in the press and other publications in the 1750-1760s provided the British public and officials with a satisfaction that they were superior in this regard. During the Seven Years' War, French prisoners had been kept in Britain and the public had taken to

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[185] Andrew MacFarlane Davis, 'The Employment of Indian Auxiliaries in the American War' *The English Historical Review*, Volume 2, Number 8 (October 1887): 709-728, 713

[186] Grenier, *First Way*, 204-220

[187] Axtell, James. *The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of colonial North America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.See Chapters 2 and 8 for detailed discussions on the moral questions and history of scalping.

[188] Wayne E. Lee 'Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500–1800' *The Journal of Military History* - Volume 71, Number 3, (July 2007): 730

creating charitable societies to provide relief from their plight. Britons held themselves out not only as the newest and greatest world empire, but also the most humane. The Europeans normally condemned the Indian practices in general, but often condoned them locally when they were necessary to win. Quite often the justification was that the enemy was inferior or in rebellion which excluded them from the restraints due respectable enemies.[189]

When the British Army made contact with Indian warriors, they inevitably found that Indians took honour in warfare very seriously as well. It formed the basis for authority and rank within the Indian society.[190] This was a good fit with the British Army as far as placing importance on winning the battles where they were in alliance with the Indians. The problem came from the ritualised activities of scalping and torture of the dead and captured. To the Indian, scalping was proof of a confirmed kill and was the source of the warrior's external display of bravery and disregard for his own safety in combat. Scalping was not the highest goal, however. Again bringing prisoners back to the village was a far greater display of martial prowess and was highly valued in Indian society. Presentation of a prisoner also allowed the villagers, including women and children, to partake in the ritualised torture that displayed a village's outpouring of violent grief. Alternatively, the prisoner could be chosen to 'raise up' a lost relative and join the family as an adopted member.[191] Regardless of the final disposition of a live prisoner, it did not comply with what the Europeans viewed as humane or civilised.

In Europe, these tactics were not unknown, but were slowly being weeded out with the emerging consensus on the law of warfare. Although the Indian practices were subject to laws of war in the British Army's view, it is important not to equate military honour and the law of war. Honour holds many positive values that are thrust onto the member of the honour group, as well as restrictions. Values such as bravery, initiative and winning serve alongside values of humanity, magnanimity, and avoiding civilian casualties where possible. The laws of war are largely prohibitions on certain actions in the conduct of war.[192] However, many of these values often made no sense to the Indians. The Indians truly struggled with European concepts like the parole of prisoners. They considered it

[189] Colley, *Captives*, 173-186
[190] Robbie Ethridge, *Creek Country: The Creek Indians and their World* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of north Carolina Press, 2003), 103-104
[191] Lee, 'Peace Chiefs', 730
[192] Michael Howard, 'Constraints on Warfare' in *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World.* Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, 1-11. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 1-5

nonsense to let a man free on his word that he would not fight again. The European nations and their colonists who lived and fought in North America made very few attempts to understand the Indian way of life either. As with laws on property rights, western concepts did not reconcile themselves with the culture of the Indian. Therefore, Indians, Britons and Americans could often observe and respect the warrior spirit found in each society. In fact the historical record is filled with warriors thinking highly of some of the frontiersmen's war making ability and vice-versa. The British were less complimentary of either, but did show a grudging respect for ranging tactics that they never seemed to master. However, the societal constraints that were developing at different paces in Europe and the American midwest were just too difficult to reconcile on the battlefield.

Because of the life or death nature of combat and the cohesion it bred, military honour groups were often very strong. Soldiers were known to go to great lengths to uphold the code of honour, but also to have committed atrocities in its name. However, a soldier may have had several honour groups to which he belonged, often as hierarchies. A soldier may have had an international code of the laws of war, a national code, a service code, a small unit code, and a personal group code. Crucial to this paper is the fact that there almost certainly would have been other codes competing or complementing the military code, such as familial, cultural, or religious codes. The interplay of each of these codes could have formed situations that were not easy to fathom in person or in history. This paper will examine these overlapping and sometimes conflicting codes amongst men who were trying to simultaneously maintain their codes of faith, family, king, and military units while fighting in a hostile terrain and often surrounded by enemies who did not follow their codes.

The complex situations in which British Army officers found themselves in North America put some of these officers in devilishly difficult circumstances. If an officer had been told not to allow the Indians under his control to commit atrocities, but then was not given enough regular troops to control the Indians, was the officer responsible for the nearly inevitable resulting atrocities? Did the agent or officer who was expected to work with the Indians exclusively for years on end in frontier warfare have his first obligation to king or tribal chief? Were atrocities acceptable when only committed against men in uniform? Did an officer have a responsibility to stop an Indian atrocity if he knew the Indians would turn on him next? The answers to these vexing situations were almost

always personal. The British Army provided neither training, nor drill manuals to deal with the vast ethical permutations present on the North American battlefields. The national and familial honour groups back home in England could not possibly provide the answer to the officer in the field. The British Army officer in North America had to construct his own code from the various codes he was subject to and try to defend his actions based on context and circumstance. Those who were able to construct a way to balance these codes, live with their consciences, and deliver victory were rare. What is harder to determine is who, and how many, among the British decision makers developed a higher sense of personal honour or had responsibilities to other honour groups outside of the military. The earlier discussion of the Namierists becomes relevant again in this context.[193] Since twenty-three of the British Generals in 1780 were also serving Members of Parliament, their motives on the Revolutionary battlefield have to be compared and contrasted to their political motives back in London as well.[194]

These multiple codes are especially hard to reconcile when one would have considered the European based laws of war to be supreme. Must a soldier have preserved the life of a prisoner if it put his or his honour group's survival at risk? If a nation, tribe, or frontier community was in a war of annihilation, must they follow the laws of war even if it would have ensured defeat? The laws of war had developed since the Middle Ages along aristocratic, legal, religious, and Chivalric lines. Concepts such as when it was justified to start a war and what an army could do in war led to further restraints. Distinctions were made as to whom these protections were available. Inferior and rebellious groups often were not given the same treatment as they were viewed as undeserving. Overall, these innovations led the parties to understand the advantageous of reciprocity and mutual restraint, but obviously with some serious exceptions.[195] Prior to 1754, the British Army had fought almost exclusively in Europe and was a product of the Enlightenment and all of the customs of European warfare. Britain's home-grown talents, such as Marlborough, as well as its Hanoverian monarchy were part and parcel of the European military tradition. As such, the British had largely accepted the move to a more humane way of conducting warfare. A significant exception to this general trend was the Duke of Cumberland's terror

[193] Edmund S. Morgan, 'The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising', *The William and Mary Quarterly,* Third Series, Volume 14, Number 1 (Jan., 1957): 3-15, 4
[194] Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775-1783* (Lincoln, Nebraska and London: University of Nebraska Press and Bison Books, 1993), 9-10
[195] Howard, *Constraints*, 40-58

campaign in Scotland after the Battle of Culloden in 1746, but this was considered a rebellion which was often considered a different species of warfare. Obviously, there are some parallels with the North American situation from 1755-1815.[196]

For the British Army, in English colloquial terms, the law of war was quite often the equivalent of what was 'done' or 'not done', but not necessarily the same as military honour. The 'law of war' was the attempt to internationalise the various codes in like-minded honour groups, such as the European military officer class.[197] However, Europeans with Christian and western European values did not put much effort into reconciling themselves with the culture of the Indian. This was by no means unique, as the laws often did not apply when campaigning in eastern Europe either. Hence, the positive martial values were shared by the Indians, French, Americans, and British, but the constraints each applied were too specific to their societies for each to fully understand the others. In the Revolutionary era, British Army officers tried to follow their codes, which included their home society's changing view of war and honour, but were often faced with trying to uphold the code whilst fulfilling the demand to win as well. The Americans often cited the Enlightenment ideals, but on the frontier, principles often succumbed to survival and revenge. The Indians not only were in a battle for survival, but also in a struggle to maintain codes of honour that they felt were linked to the land itself.

In conclusion, military honour was a shifting concept from 1754 to 1815 in Europe and in North America. Each society's views on honour had grown from its own particular circumstances. The difficulty was in choosing allies that could help win battles, campaigns and wars without sacrificing the values held dear to the respective societies. The British Army had the unenviable task of executing the political imperatives of a government an ocean away with very few resources and limited options to help them. This purpose of this paper is to examine whether the decisions made about Indians and military honour adversely affected the British cause in conquering and retaining the American midwest.

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[196] Armstrong Starkey, 'War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British in America, 1755-1781', *War in Society*, Volume 8 Number 1 (May 1990): 1-28, 4 and Grenier, *First Way*, 107-108

[197] Howard, *Constraints*, 1-5

3. The British Army's Introduction to Frontier Warfare

Although this paper's purpose is not to be a full history of the causes for the British Army to become involved in warfare in North America, the events that led up to the war contained important components that will shed light on how the British Army's opinions about using Indians as auxiliaries or allies were formed. Therefore, a short summary of the major events in the area will set out the contours of the dilemma that faced British Army officers.

From the late seventeenth century to the midpoint of the eighteenth, Britain, France, and to a lesser degree, Spain fought proxy wars in North America. These wars were parts of the larger wars in Europe with European biased objectives, but the North American components of each grew in importance as the imperial powers' land claims began to conflict. France and Britain, especially, were at odds over the large area between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountain chain. From a European perspective, France had held the area with a light footprint model of a few traders in the area supported by colonial governors in Canada who fostered strong relations with the Indian tribes in the area. The Indians of the Ohio region were not heavily inconvenienced by the French model and were thankful for the European trade goods that they received for their fur trade. However, the reality was that the area was not as strongly French as the British seaboard colonies were British. As Richard White very influentially argued, the French traders and officials crafted a 'Middle Ground' with the Indians. The disparate groups of Indians managed a mutually beneficial way of living with the French, mainly because the French were not entering the midwest in great numbers, nor did they demand large tracts of land for farming or speculation.[198] Therefore, the Indians of the midwest were not as threatened by the French as they were by the westward pushing British. However, by the early 1750s, British colonial traders and property consortiums were beginning to stake claims on a broad front from Lake Ontario to the Gulf of Mexico, but especially around the area where the confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers formed the Ohio River, better known as the 'Forks of the Ohio'.[199] Seemingly, this would have pushed the Indians into closer alliance with the French and the British would be seen off. However, a key theme of this

[198] White, *Middle Ground,* 50-93
[199] Ibid., 186-222

thesis is that the various groups of Indians in the midwest had agendas of their own. Some of those Indians began to trade with the British over the objections of the French. With European strategic requirements in mind more than local ones, the French decided to change their view of the midwest.

The French, who had had nearly exclusive trading rights in this area until the 1740s, became increasingly more possessive as the British colonies of Pennsylvania and Virginia began taking action on claims that their Royal charters and warrants, at least theoretically, gave them land rights that stretched to the Pacific Ocean. However, what they were most interested in immediately were the lands that lay in the Ohio and Mississippi River drainage basin. Not only were these lands spectacularly rich agriculturally, but they provided year round riverine access to sea ports. As the British interests probed the area, the French decided to begin enforcing their claims more actively. In 1749, the Governor of New France, Roland-Michel, the marquis de La Galissonière sent Pierre-Joseph de Cèleron de Blainville to lead a unit of Canadians and allied Indians to the Forks of the Ohio to investigate the scope of the British interest. What they found was not encouraging for the French. An Irish trader named George Croghan had made significant headway in developing trading links with Indians around a town called Pickawillany on the Great Miami River. Croghan had been so successful that the Indians were openly dismissive of the French force. Cèleron began burying lead plates around the area to declare France's ownership of the area and reported back to the Governor of New France, now the marquis de La Jonquière.[200]

La Jonquière did little to stop the British over the next two years, but his successor took decisive, if brutal, action in 1752 by sending French-Indian Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade of the Troupes de la Marines to convince the Indians of Pickawillany that their future interests would be best served in returning to their previous allegiance to the French Crown. Langlade destroyed Pickawillany and killed or captured the six Pennsylvania traders present. The Miami chief, Memeskia (also known as 'Old Briton'), was used to set an example. He was killed and ritually eaten by Langlade's force. The residents of Pickawillany reconsidered their position and pledged allegiance to the French.[201]

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[200] Howard H. Peckham, *The Colonial Wars: 1689-1762* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 120-138

[201] David A. Clary, *George Washington's First War: His Early Military Adventures* (New York: Simon & Shuster Paperbacks, 2011), 1-3 & Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 49-50

Langlade's raid warrants further attention in this paper as it exhibited some of the horror that accompanied frontier warfare. Frontier warfare was not always in support of a strategic goal. Sometimes, it was mere retribution. At other times, orgies of violence were meant to send a message. However, even when the goal was strategic, the methods bore the hallmarks of personal vengeance. The tactics used were often similar to what European armies called *la petite guerre*, or partisan warfare. While this type of warfare was often carried out by nefarious characters in Europe, the atrocities that occurred were not necessarily a political or cultural statement. On the North American frontier, where a constant and coordinated defence of outlying settlements or villages was nearly impossible, the assembly of a force to attack an enemy was an extreme hardship and social disruption on colonial and Indian communities alike. Therefore, the goal was often to make the strategic action or retribution so ghastly as to make the receiving community reconsider their position or refrain from taking further action. When one side would not submit to the will of another, extreme measures, even extirpation, were employed.[202] The eighteenth-century may have ushered in a new era of attempted martial restraint in Europe, but the warfare was distinctly seventeenth-century in nature in North America. John Shy states,

> From about 1650 to 1750, when European states were moving toward forms of military organization, techniques of fighting, goals of foreign policy, and a generally accepted code of military and diplomatic behavior that eliminated or mitigated the worst effects of warfare on society, the English colonists in North America found themselves re-enacting on a small scale the horrors of Irish pacification and the Thirty Years' War.[203]

Langlade's expedition was quickly backed up by New France's new governor Ange Duquesne de Mennville, the Marquis Duquesne. Duquesne put in place a plan to build a series of forts in the Ohio area, culminating with a fort at the Forks of the Ohio over the next 3 years.[204] It was these actions that set in motion the Virginia Lieutenant Governor, Robert Dinwiddie. Virginia land owners were not satisfied with just trading with the Ohio

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[202] Shy 'The American Military Experience: History and Learning', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1971): 205-228, 212-215
[203] Ibid., 212-213
[204] René Chartrand, *The Forts of New France in Northeast America 1600 – 1763* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 44-48

Indians. As large and bountiful as North America was, the Virginians had managed to tire much of the Virginia tidewater soil over the preceding one-hundred and thirty years with intensive tobacco farming. The lands over the Appalachians held great promise for speculators and the younger sons of plantation owners. The future President of the United States, George Washington, was one such younger son and Dinwiddie had a mission for the young Washington.

In 1753, Dinwiddie sent Washington to the Ohio region with a message to the French Commanders there to leave the area immediately. Washington accomplished the mission with the help of a local trader named Christopher Gist and an influential Mingo Indian sachem named Tanaghrisson, also known by the British as the 'Half-King'. Washington and Tanaghrisson moved from French post to post looking for a senior French officer who would accept Dinwiddie's correspondence. Finally finding Commandant Legardeur, a veteran French officer with extensive North American experience, at Fort Le Boeuf, near present day Waterford, Pennsylvania, Washington delivered Dinwiddie's ultimatum. Although polite, Legardeur told Washington that he would not evacuate the French forces under his control in the region. However, he did promise to send the correspondence to Duquesne for an official reply. Legardeur tried to separate Washington and Tanaghrisson with promises of trade goods and safe conduct, but Washington managed to convince the Mingo to accompany him back into British controlled territory. Washington would be the first in a long line of British officials who would need to seek Indian help for their missions, only to find that the Indians had designs for outcomes that were not entirely in line with British designs.[205]

Tanaghrisson was a Seneca from the British-aligned Iroquois confederation that lived in the Ohio area. He was known as the 'Half-King' of the area, because the Iroquois League claimed suzerainty over the Ohio River area and its inhabitants due to conquest in late 17th century. The claim was questionable, but the British had accepted it as it made negotiations easier and, until recently, the British had had no serious interest in the area. Therefore, Tanaghrisson had a vested interest in helping the British oust the French who were becoming more onerous with their occupation of the area. He was generally favorable toward Washington and the British, but was known by and courted by the French as well. Any actions taken by Tanaghrisson have to be viewed as first serving Tanaghrisson, the

[205] Clary, *First War,* 62-64

Ohio Indians and the Iroquois, rather than the French or British. As many Ohio Indian leaders over the next sixty years would do, and as the Iroquois had successfully done for decades, Tanaghrisson was trying to balance the French and British interests against each other to obtain the best result for the Indians of the Ohio.[206] In this particular instance, Tanaghrisson was leaning toward helping Washington and the Virginians, as the French were showing strong signs of putting down deep roots in the Ohio.

Washington reported back to Dinwiddie in early 1754. Dinwiddie, probably expecting such an answer, had begun preparing the Virginia House of Burgesses to fund an expedition to use any means necessary to remove the French from the Ohio Country. Washington would lead a meager force of less than two-hundred Virginia volunteers and a few of Tanaghrisson's Mingo Indians as allies. Wanting to make the first claim on the Forks of the Ohio, Dinwiddie dispatched a small force of militia, mainly carpenters, to build a stockade in February 1754. Ever eager to thwart the French, Tanaghrisson was on hand to lay the first log of the stockade. Washington was to follow immediately with his force to occupy the fort. Washington began his move in the March of 1754, but on April 17th, Commandant Legardeur's successor, Captain Claude-Pierre Pecaudy, seigneur de Contrecoeur, arrived at the Forks with a force of nearly one-thousand. Contrecoeur demanded immediate surrender and Ensign Ward, the Virginian in command of the company of carpenters, decided to surrender the fort. Contrecoeur immediately renamed it in honour of Marquis Duquesne. Ward was allowed to go back to Virginia. Along the way, he met Tanaghrisson who asked Ward to deliver an impassioned request to Washington for immediate support to retake the Forks.

Washington, beset with desertions, a lack of supplies, and having to hack a road out of the wilderness was pressing on when Ward arrived with word of his surrender and Tanaghrisson's request for help. Fearing that he would have no Indian allies when he most needed them, Washington sent a reply ahead to Tanaghrisson telling him to hold fast and Washington's force would soon join him. Meanwhile, with intelligence that Washington's force was approaching the Forks, but with no formal hostilities declared, Contrecoeur sent a force under Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville to warn Washington off from French territory. On his way to join Washington, Tanaghrisson and a small group of seven Mingoes found Jumonville's small force. Tanaghrisson sent word to Washington that he

[206] McConnell, *Country Between*, 69-89, Shannon, *Iroquois Diplomacy*, 128-150

had found the French force. Washington took nearly half his force on a night march in a steady rain to meet up with Tanaghrisson which he did just before daylight. Tanaghrisson informed him where the French camp was and the combined force moved to it.

When Washington's force found Jumonville's force, the French were just rising from sleep. The details of the fight have been debated since they occurred, but whether the French fired first or not, the Virginian force launched a devastating volley that killed several and wounded more. Jumonville was wounded, but managed to call for a cease-fire. Washington complied and the French were brought before Washington. Jumonville told Washington that he came in peace and was to deliver a message that Washington's force should withdraw from French soil. At this point, Tanaghrisson stepped forward and tomahawked Jumonville in the head and exposed his brains with his hands. Washington was shocked, but immediately protected the remaining prisoners. Tanaghrisson and his small force left, having accomplished the goal of starting a war for the Forks. Washington, expecting a much larger French force to follow, gathered his force and pulled back to his base in the Great Meadow where he had begun erecting a small palisade that he named Fort Necessity. There, he was attacked by a larger and more professional force led by Jumonville's older brother. Eventually, Washington surrendered and was presented a note, written in French, that he did not fully understand. Unwittingly, Washington signed the note that admitted that his force had "assassinated" the younger Jumonville. In another first, Washington became the first of many British officers of the period to have to explain the atrocities committed by their Indian allies. Along with Dinwiddie and Tanaghrisson, Washington had reversed the course of European conflicts that began in Europe and spread to North America. Washington and Dinwiddie began a torrid pace of correspondence to explain away their errors. Washington knew that his honour and reputation as a gentleman were at stake and his many letters to friends and family show this. He took preparing for the inevitable questions to come very seriously.[207] Dinwiddie was not overly concerned about Washington's honour, but he did decide early on that it would support his cause to adopt the version of the story that Washington was projecting. Eventually, officials in London would come to the same conclusion. London would soon decide that the French threat was so serious that only a British Army officer and British Army Regiments would suffice to fix the problem they now faced.

[207] Clary, *First War,* 68-90

Meanwhile, Dinwiddie was tireless in his goals. In addition to his work on the Ohio front, where he conflicted nearly as much with the colonial Pennsylvanians as he did with the French, he was also engaged in trying to draw the Cherokee along the South Carolina border away from a self-saving dalliance with the French. In this endeavour, he was in competition with South Carolina Governor James Glen who was also trying to secure the peace along his border as well as the option for more land for South Carolina settlers and traders. Both Dinwiddie and Glen had promised to build a British fort in the Overhill area of the Cherokee nation to help them ward off Indian attacks from their traditional Indian enemies and the French. From the north, the Cherokee were continually attacked by the Iroquois and Shawnees. From the southwest, the Creek Indians, who were much closer to the French at Fort Toulouse (near present day Montgomery, Alabama), had been at war with the Cherokees several times in recent years. The pressure felt from all sides drove the Cherokee to look for any help they could find, but they too were looking out for their own interests first. This fact would play a key role in limiting the British Army operations that were soon to start over the Appalachians.[208]

When the British government decided to take action in North America, it sent general Edward Braddock to lead the activities along with two Irish British Army regiments. At Alexandria, Virginia in April 1755, Braddock gathered several colonial governors including Dinwiddie, but crucially not South Carolina Governor Glen that were exposed to the French and Indian frontier. Additionally, William Johnson, the recently appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the northern colonies, was summoned. Braddock commanded that four major operations would be attempted simultaneously in the campaign season of 1755. Johnson was to take a force of militia and Indians from the Iroquois nation, that he had so painstakingly assembled as allies, to attack up the Lake St. Sacrament (later renamed Lake George) corridor to eventually take the French Fort St. Frederic on Lake Champlain (the British referred to this fort as 'Crown Point'). This operation was meant to protect the critical New York colonial capital of Albany from a French thrust and provide a base for a future thrust upon Montreal. The remaining three operations were designed to take back the Forks of the Ohio and prevent the French from resupplying the Forks again. Second-in-Command and Governor of Massachusetts, William Shirley, would lead the force to take

[208] Oliphant, *Anglo-Cherokee*, 1-30, Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Volume VI: The Years of Defeat, 1754-1757* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 77-78

Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario in an attempt to disrupt French supply lines into the midwest. Braddock, himself would lead the force to take Fort Duquesne. Finally, Colonel Robert Monckton would lead a force to take the French forts in Nova Scotia. Monckton's expedition, although the only one of the four that would be ultimately successful, falls outside of the purview of this paper due to its geographical location.

Each force was to make an attempt to recruit Indian allies to assist in defeating the French and their Indian allies. To the specific question of this paper, there did not seem to be any serious question of whether to use Indians or not from the British Army, the colonial establishment, or the British political establishment. The only question was ***how*** they would be used. Out of the three operations examined by this paper, only Johnson had any direct experience of war-making with the Indians as allies. He was also the only one that had any pre-existing trust with them as well, due to his long service to the Mohawks as a friend, business partner and blood relative. Neither Shirley nor Johnson had any qualms with using Indians as allies. Shirley also had a history of issuing scalp bounties on New England Indians in times of frontier crises.[209] However, Shirley's and Johnson's bickering and mismanagement of their Indian allies during these operations would ensure that the northeastern Indians would also be reticent to support the English cause in the future. To the great aggravation of Johnson, Shirley began a bidding war for the Indians of the Northeast and casted aspersions on Johnson motives and equality as a commander to himself. He forced Johnson to use much of his considerable relationship capital with the Iroquois to get them to join him at the base of Lake St. Sacrament. The result was great confusion and, to some degree, reluctance amongst the Indians to join the British at all. Unfortunately, the confusion and reluctance from the northeastern tribes would only get worse for the British. [210]

Shirley's force was to fortify Fort Oswego on the south side of Lake Ontario as a forward supply base, before taking Fort Niagara further west. Having very little military experience, Shirley left far too much to chance in his taking and supplying Fort Oswego. The result was a shambolic movement and occupation of Oswego that took so long that Niagara could not be taken before the winter began. The allied Indians of the Oswego operation were not managed in their activities, or their expectations. What resulted, was a

[209] Grenier, *First Way,* 61-62
[210] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune,* 161-163 & Tootle, *Anglo-Indian,* 258-261

group of Indians that took as much as they could gain from Shirley's force, but also became convinced of the unlikelihood of a British success in the a Lake Ontario area. Therefore, they gleaned valuable information about Fort Oswego and the British force sent there and provided the information to the French in return for favours.[211]

William Johnson, on the other hand, did have firm control over his Indian allies, most of which were Mohawk who esteemed Johnson greatly. However, Johnson asked his traditional allies to act in a new way. Although he had sent raiding and scalping parties in King George's War (1744-1748), Johnson now needed his allies to stay close and fight with him in a much more formal military manner. In one of the most important statements that are pertinent to this paper, Johnson stated to one of his Indian recruiters that 'they are not to go a scalping as in the late war [1744-1748], but to go with me wherever I go'.[212] This manner of control would become a defining feature of British attempts to control their Indian allies. Why Johnson would change his way of conducting war at this point in his career is interesting. Frustratingly, Johnson's correspondence does not elaborate on the topic directly. However, Johnson was a man who had constantly sought stature in the British Empire. He may have been trying to bridge the gap between his two cultural groups. His uncle, Admiral Peter Warren, was a well-known Royal Navy officer and helped Johnson in his setting up his new life in New York from Ireland. Johnson had arrived in New York to manage Warren's land holdings. He built a size-able business of his own by the 1740s, although he still held no societal rank outside of the Mohawk Valley. In this phase of his life, Johnson was largely invisible to the British establishment. However, with the Albany Conference in 1754, Johnson's stock had risen quickly. Johnson was designated as one of two official Indian Superintendents in the colonies. This may well have had an uplifting effect for Johnson. Johnson may have felt that he needed to act more European in his military dealings now that he held an official position by appointment of the King. Furthermore, for the first time, he was acting as a direct report to a British Army career officer. It is likely that Braddock would have spent time at Alexandria telling his colonial subordinates how the British Army did things. Whatever the reason, Johnson seems to have undergone a change, if only in practical terms, about how warfare was to be conducted with Indian allies. And it was not wholly spent on British superiors either. Johnson's reputation

[211] Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The Years of Defeat,* 140-161
[212] Johnson to Stoddert, 23 May 1755, William Johnson, James Sullivan, Preparer. *The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 1* (Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 1921), 534-535

would gain European exposure in his battle at Fort William Henry with the well-connected French Commander Baron von Dieskau who had served as a trusted aide to the Marechal de Saxe in Europe.[213]

Johnson decided to use his Indians and his old ally Hendrick, an elderly and highly respected Mohawk chief, in a much more conventional fashion at the base of Lake George at Fort William Henry on 8 September 1755. A large force of French regulars, Canadians and Indian allies led by Gen. Baron von Dieskau approached Forts Edward and William Henry at the southern end of Lake Saint Sacrement. The British thought Dieskau would most likely invest Fort Edward. Johnson deployed his small number of Mohawks and militia led by Colonel Ephraim Williams on a scouting mission along the road. The Mohawks were led by Hendrick. The historical record is ambiguous, but it seems that Hendrick had some reservations, either about the scouting mission or a previous plan to split his forces. Some historians have recorded that Hendrick stated, probably apocryphally, that his small force was 'too few to fight and too many to be killed'.[214] The narrative provided by the Indian agent Daniel Claus makes no mention of this in the context of the scouting mission. Claus does mention, however, that Hendrick had objected to an earlier plan to split his forces along the lake and along the road, so the statement might have been in reference to that mission. Hendrick favoured the plan to move along the road to Fort Edward to attempt a surprise on the French forces that were presumed to be investing Fort Edward. Unbeknownst to Hendrick and Johnson, the French allied Indians had also balked at the initial French plan of investing Fort Edward for fear of large casualties.[215]

Whether the 'too few... too many' quote is genuine is disputed, however, the principle is not. The Indians on both sides were very concerned about large casualties due to their small population size. Indian tactics rarely used full frontal assaults and normally avoided most encounters where they were unsure of the outcome. Investing forts and economy of force missions were typical European maneuvers that required discipline and a precise response. Seen from the European military viewpoint, casualties could be high, but the strategic situation demanded the sacrifice from military forces that were units first and individuals second. For European societies and armies with more than enough employable

[213] O'Toole, *White Savage*, 66-67
[214] Peckham, *Colonial Wars*, 149, Dean R. Snow, 'Searching for Hendrick: Correction of a Historic Conflation.' *New York History*, (Summer 2007): 229-253 p.250
[215] Daniel Claus, *Daniel Claus' Narrative of his Relations with Sir William Johnson and Experiences in the Lake George Fight* (New York: Society of Colonial Wars in the State of New York, 1904), 12-13

men, but little economic opportunity, high tactical losses were acceptable. Winning strategic victories that secured favourable terms for expanding mercantilist markets made sense. However, for the Indians, these were just the sort of engagements that were to be avoided, because losing warriors that were also the main economic actors in their communities was devastating. These communities had been racked by European diseases over the last two centuries and there was little room to spare healthy males.

In the 'Bloody Morning Scout', as the action has been called, Hendrick and several of his warriors were killed in an ambush set along the road by Baron von Dieskau's combined force. After ambushing Johnson's patrol, Dieskau harried the survivors back to Fort William Henry. Alerted by the battle down the road, Johnson had the entire fort throw up whatever works they could to receive the French attack. The barricades held, which demoralised the French Indian allies. Dieskau threw his regular grenadiers at the works and, after terrible losses, the French attack failed altogether. Dieskau and many of his force were captured.[216] Although Fort William Henry held, the heavy Mohawk losses and the spectacle of seeing the French forces cut up at the barricades, turned the Mohawks against supporting Johnson and the English as fully as they had before. This was not the kind of warfare they had experienced with Johnson before and they were not keen on experiencing more of it.

The capture and handling of Baron von Dieskau by Johnson's force is another interesting point of discussion. After being captured and under Johnson's force's care, Dieskau was assaulted by three unnamed Mohawks intent on taking him in retribution for their senior losses. Johnson, who was also wounded, stopped them and put Dieskau under a protective custody to ensure his safety.[217] Surprisingly, Johnson, the Mohawk confidant and leader, exercised European gentlemen-of-war norms on a German born aristocrat. It seems through these actions that Johnson's conversion was complete. Johnson and Dieskau struck up a friendship. Dieskau would write about Johnson's care in glowing terms. Dieskau states that the Mohawks were furious with Johnson at this curtailment of the Indian version of the honours of war.[218]

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[216] Ibid., 13-17

[217] William Johnson, James Sullivan, Preparer. *The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 2*. Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 1922), 40-41

[218] Baron von Dieskau to Count d'Argensen, Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan, Ed, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York; Procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq. Volume X* (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1858), 422-423,

The main thrust of the 1755 campaigning season was the Braddock led push to the Forks of the Ohio against the newly established Fort Duquesne. After gathering his two Irish Regiments and colonials, Braddock decided that he would take Indians as allies if he could recruit them on his terms, but did not feel large numbers were absolutely necessary. It seemed that he valued them more as auxiliaries or guides, but not as allied fighting forces. Furthermore, Braddock did not want the Indian families that showed up with the warriors. Braddock feared the ill-discipline that a large body of Indians and their dependents would cause on their movement to the Forks. When told to remove their dependents, the warriors, fearing for their families' exposure to French retaliation, left with their families. If Braddock was overly concerned with this turn of events, the record does not show it. Eight warriors, including the new Mingo 'Half-King' Scarouday (following Tanaghrisson's recent death) and his son joined Braddock, probably, because the Mingoes had the most to lose with French ownership of the Ohio region.[219] Scarouday would later explain that Braddock was highly dismissive of the Indians when they tried to advise him. George Croghan, the Irish trader who helped recruit the Indians, was equally critical of Braddock and the British Army officer's dismissal of the Indians from Fort Cumberland. Croghan went so far as to say that a mere fifty Indians rather than the eight taken would have made the difference between a minor altercation and catastrophic defeat.[220]

Braddock's handling of the Indian recruitment has been debated by historians, but it is clear that Braddock did not think Indian allies were a prerequisite to launching his operation. While making the attempt to recruit some Indians, he managed to offend most of the Ohio Indians. Those that did attend his meetings were told that once the Ohio Valley had been rid of French influence the King would do with it what he pleased. This displayed a profound, if unsurprising, lack of understanding of the Indian geographical and diplomatic sensitivities. Braddock not only lost them to his service, but actively drove them to the French service.[221] The Indians around the Forks of the Ohio included many Mingoes, Delawares, Miamis, and Shawnees that had direct experience of being pushed further and further west by the expanding British colonies over the last one-hundred years. There is

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[219] David L. Preston, '"Make Indians of Our White Men": British Soldiers and Indian Warriors From Braddock's to Forbes's Campaigns, 1755-1758' *Pennsylvania History*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (SUMMER 2007): 280-306, 280-306

[220] Tootle, 'Anglo-Indian', 255-256

[221] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune,* 151-156, & Croghan to Johnson, undated, William Johnson, James Sullivan, Preparer. *The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 2*. (Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 1922), 40-41

some evidence to support the idea that they knew the Ohio Valley would be the place that they had to defend in order to stem the tide of the white settlers. Braddock's brash statements only confirmed to the Ohio Indians that helping the British was the fast track to dispossession. French encouragement and a history of light contact with the French in the area made them a better bet for Indian autonomy in the region.[222]

Braddock did have one more hope as a source of Indian allies. Governor Dinwiddie had promised Braddock a substantial force of Cherokee warriors. As mentioned above, Governor Dinwiddie had been attempting to encourage Cherokee warriors to join the Virginia cause in the Ohio. His machinations in the Cherokee Overhill villages, that had so upset Governor Glen of South Carolina, were meant to deliver four-hundred Cherokee warriors. However, the unfulfilled Dinwiddie promise of a fort in the Overhill to support the Cherokee made them less than enthusiastic. Glen had also sown doubts in their minds about Dinwiddie's intentions.[223] The Cherokee and other southern Indians would factor heavily as British allies later in the conflict with the Forbes expedition in 1758. Tragically, their experience as British allies there led directly to conflict with the southern colonies and, ultimately, the British Army in 1759-1760.

Therefore, on the eve of the British strategic plan to oust the French from the midwest, Braddock's two northern commanders were fighting over the Iroquois. Two southern governors were fighting over the Cherokee. Braddock, himself, was busy offending the Delaware, Shawnee and Mingoes who had come to help him. It is unsurprising that many historians have assumed that the British did not really want the Indians as allies, especially as part of the Fort Duquesne campaign. However, this fact alone is not enough to make any conclusions about the reasons for not using the Indians, for these same squabbles existed over provisions, staffing and most other military issues as well.

Braddock's part of the strategic campaign plan and its catastrophic failure are so well known that it has become part of American founding lore on why redcoats could never subdue North America. The image of redcoats, marching and fighting in ranks, being mowed down by more nimble North American woodsmen, white or red, used to be known to every American of school age. However, recent scholarship has brought most of the hoary legend into question. Braddock neither dismissed Indian tactics wholesale, nor was

[222] Downes, *Council Fires*, 77-81, Calloway, *Shawnees*, 25-26
[223] John Oliphant, *Anglo-Cherokee*, 1-30

he totally unfamiliar with irregular warfare. The topic of 'petite guerre' was widely discussed in European military literature. Irregulars had been used extensively in the previously twenty-five years, including the influential battle of Fontenoy. Many British, German, Swiss and French officers that would fight in North America had had direct experience of it.[224] Braddock used his few Indians effectively as scouts and guides. For most of the march, he conscientiously used his grenadiers as flanking screens. He used his best and most nimble troops in the van and moved in a self-supporting fashion until he reached the Monongahela River, not far from Fort Duquesne. Unfortunately, over confidence and haste destroyed his admirable approach when he had the goal in sight. Dropping his flank guard and moving the van too far in advance of the main body gave a smaller French and Indian force the break they needed. The results were devastating. Nine-hundred British troops were killed or wounded, including Braddock. Interestingly, the French force included a Troupes de la Marines officer, Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade that conducted the force at Pickawillany in 1752 and would figure prominently in French and British efforts to effectively use Indians as allies over the next twenty-five years.[225]

The losses in General Braddock's expedition were so shocking and so large that any armchair tactician with a theory has been encouraged to surmise the reason for the failure. Not long after the battle, sides formed where one group blamed cowardly soldiers and another group blamed bad leadership. The simplistic concepts about the battle were that the soldiers were using European tactics in the North American wilderness. The leadership was wrong in using these tactics and/or the private soldiers were wrong for not using the European tactics to their fullest effect. Recent scholarship has shown that obviously General Braddock did try to adapt to conditions by having flanking parties and the advance party to warn the main body of danger. The problem seems to have come from frustration at the slow pace of cutting through the wilderness. Security seems to have broken down at the moment when it was needed most. However, as one author has put it, the fact that there was a two and a half hour battle should put to rest any discussion of cowardice amongst the troops. No matter the reason for the defeat, there is no question that the British Army experienced one of the worst defeats of its history before or after at the hands of a small

[224] Grenier, *First Way,* Starkey, 'War and Culture', Russell, *Redcoats*
[225] Paul Trap, 'MOUET DE LANGLADE, CHARLES-MICHEL,' in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 4, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed July 30, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/mouet_de_langlade_charles_michel_4E.html.

French force that was supplemented with a large Indian force, most probably with some of the Indians that were spurned by Braddock. This defeat would encourage the Indians to hope that they could to defend their home in the Ohio Valley and much of the next one half-century would confirm this impression. The French and British were focused on each other, but the Indians had a strong say on the matter as well.[226]

Once tactics, planning, poor leadership and cowardice are set aside from consideration, the question of too few Indian allies comes back to the fore. Returning to the recruitment of Indians at the beginning of the campaign, the arrival of Gen. Braddock at the Alexandria conference of military and political leaders is crucial. Braddock's dressing down of anyone standing in his way of doing things the British Army way set a command climate that left it clear that the British way of war would be used. This meant that Indians that were recruited as allies or auxiliaries would have to perform under the standards of the King's army. For Johnson and Shirley, they could still recruit traditional allies, but they would have to change their tactics. This is best exemplified by the statement by William Johnson to his Mohawk brothers that it would not be possible to fight in their traditional manner when fighting with the English. However, the Braddock part of the campaign was led by Braddock himself who had no experience in recruitment, nor the diplomatic sensitivities of Indians. The Indians were just like the colonials in his view; lazy and insubordinate. It is important to separate the tactics and the atrocities that often followed the tactics upon submission of an enemy, alive or dead. Officers like Braddock did not dislike the tactics so much as they abhorred the lack of discipline that they thought it engendered. It seems fair to extrapolate that Braddock and his commanders did not mind using Indians as auxiliaries, but not as true allies who could take on independent missions. Whether they were not wanted due to considerations of them soiling the British Army officer's honour is undetermined. However, it is clear that Braddock did not feel them necessary to accomplish his mission.

The aforementioned situation can explain the good order and discipline part of the equation, but leaves the question of controlling the Indians in the heat of battle from committing atrocities while under the control of the King's chosen commander. To explore this subtlety, one must consider how others in the era were viewed and their motivations. The Enlightenment had encouraged a developing, but uneven, consensus in Europe against

[226] Crocker, *Braddock's March*, 247-256

uncivilized behavior on the battlefield. There were certainly examples of atrocious behaviour still to be found in Europe. The British Army's action against the Jacobites in 1745 was but one, but it was notable for its decreasing trend.[227] In the colonies, the conversation about limiting the effects of war was also underway, but the conclusions were not as wide-spread yet. Nor was it a question of the enlightened class versus the frontier. The Quakers of backwoods Pennsylvania were dedicated to non-violence, especially against non-combatants. Countless settlers and traders worked to forge harmony with their Indian neighbours. However, others, possibly the majority, were far more accepting of violence on the frontier. Whether violence was the inherent nature of the frontiersman is still a subject of debate, but it is clear that great violence was not unknown to either side of the cultural divide. [228] Governor Shirley was no stranger to encouraging scalping, the sensational action that significantly defined the Indian atrocity. As Governor of Massachusetts, he had instituted scalping bounties. One of these bounties is one of the most quoted of all in the colonial record where Shirley offered New Englanders a £100 bounty on Indian scalps at the beginning of King George's War in 1744.[229] Another colonial bounty stated, 'For every Scalp of such Female Indian or Male Indian under the Age of Twelve Years, that shall be killed and brought in as Evidence of their being killed as aforesaid, Twenty Pounds.'[230] The number and variety of these bounties across the colonies are used by authors who are making the case that the American colonists were as ruthless and prone to atrocity as their Indian neighbors.

The key question of using Indians as auxiliaries or allies was not confined to strategic considerations. It was in the popular mind at the time and was not an academic discussion. In a little known book entitled '*Proposals to Prevent Scalping, Etc.: Humbly Offered to the Consideration of a Council of War*' published in New York in 1755 by an anonymous author, the case is made that the laws of war should be observed on the frontier of North America as they were in Europe.[231] There is significant reference to the practices of

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[227] Starkey, 'War and Culture', 1-28, John Shy, 'The American Military Experience: History and Learning', *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1971), 205-228, 212-215

[228] Donna Merwick. 'Violence as a Trait of Colonial North American Culture', *Australasian Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (July, 1988): 40-5, 40-49

[229] Grenier, *First Way,* 61

[230] *Boston Evening-Post*, 10 November 1755, in David A. Copeland, *Debating the Issues in Colonial Newspapers: Primary Documents on Events of the Period*. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing, Inc., 2000), 55

[231] *Proposals To Prevent Scalping, &c. Humbly offered to the Considerations Of A Council of War,* NL, E.A. Ayer Manuscript Collection, AS 183, Evans no. 7551

irregular troops in Europe and how they are handled and then this comparison, 'The Indians are only in the Nature of *Hussars* or *Croats*, but if they act contrary to the Laws of War, or of Nature and Nations, their Principals, or those that employ them, are accountable. The Case is the same, supposing them Auxiliaries or Allies'.[232]

The anonymous author was not for shrinking away from lesser reprisals (eye gouging, hand amputation, castration) in order to discourage worse depredations. However, in dealing with old men, women, and children, 'Proposals' reads much like a modern day tract on the Laws of War in Afghanistan. It was mainly the Indian customs of killing innocents in the back settlements, killing the fighting wounded and taking their scalps that is the focus of his concern. The author was also not oblivious to the counter-arguments in support of the use of Indians stating, 'It will be said, that unless the Indians have Leave to fight their own Way, *that is*, to scalp and murder, they will not fight at all; be it so, let them stand Neuter to both Sides.'[233]

It is not clear to what war council this tract is directed toward, or if it was directed to any one of many war councils that would soon be forming to prosecute the war. It mentions the defeat of Braddock at the Monongahela in July of 1755, but it is not clear if it was directed toward the other campaigns of that season or not. The fact that it was published in book form probably indicates that the author was of means, but it is unclear how many of the tracts were published or distributed. What is clear is that at least one thoughtful author attempted to influence a council of war on the decision process of using Indians as auxiliaries or allies. Anonymous concludes,

> I beg leave to conclude, with observing what is indeed obvious to every Individual, that unless this, or something of the Kind, in relation to Scalping, be not put in Execution, with a Spirit and Resolution, those wicked alarms will be an eternal Barr and Discouragement to the settling of this Country.[234]

However, this consciousness of the Indian war customs was also not confined those who were against their use, as a letter writer to the Boston Gazette or the Weekly advertiser states, 'If the Indians are neglected, and nothing more done to secure them in our Interest

[232] Ibid.
[233] Ibid.
[234] Ibid.

than has been, Time will shew the great Disparity between us (be we ever so regular) and the Indians in the Woods; for we are an unequal Match to them in the Wilderness.' [235]

Colonial officials were concerned about how to deal with this issue as well. An old friend of William Johnson's was Goldsbrow Banyar who was the secretary to New York Governor James De Lancey. He wrote to Johnson in July 1755,

> We should deal exactly with them as they do by us, destroy and scalp as they do: They set their Indians to scalping of our poor defenceless Inhabitants, in this the necessity pleads an Excuse for following so inhuman an Example, as the shortest way too perhaps to put an End to such Barbarities.[236]

In summary, the British Army officers and colonial administrators were of divided opinion on the usefulness of Indians as a significant fighting force in the British order of battle. The American public also seemed divided on the issue. The British Army certainly attempted to recruit Indians to their cause, but the restrictions on their methods of warfare were impeding their usefulness. The restrictions on the Indians to fight the British way were also driving unacceptable casualties with the few allies they did manage to recruit. The cause of these restrictions was not exclusively due to fears of atrocities, but more likely due to the fear of a breakdown of discipline in general. Therefore, at the end of 1755, Britain was facing defeat on most fronts and had soured its relations with the few Indians that had considered a British alliance. The French, especially French regulars stationed in North America, had far better outcomes with their use of Indian allies, but they had far longer experience in their use. However, this situation would also change as the French began to use more European style forces and tactics. Both European powers would have to come to grips with the appropriate use of Indian allies and the European sense of honour over the next four years.

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[235] *Boston Gazette*, or *Weekly Advertiser*, 28 January 1755
[236] Goldsbrow Banyar to William Johnson, 26 July 1755, Johnson, *Papers Volume 1*, 772

'Nothing has ever been made until the soldier has made safe the field where the building shall be built, and the soldier is the scaffolding until it has been built: and the soldier gets no reward but honour.'
-- Eric Linklater [237]

4. Rangers and Indians

After the miserable year of 1755, the British and the American colonists were virtually defenceless. The only thing stopping France from delivering the coup de grace was a lack of troops. Had Baron von Dieskau preserved his French regular force, rather than thrown it on Johnson's defences at Fort William Henry, the French would have been in a very strong position indeed. British fears of Albany being the front lines might have come true. At the end of 1755, the British had no plan and a colonial governor with little military experience as Commander-in-Chief. France was sending an experienced General from France to Canada named Louis-Joseph Montcalm. For the type of war that was being fought, the British were at a distinct disadvantage to the French in Indian allies, militia, regulars and leadership that understood what was required. This state of affairs would not bode well for the British over the next three years. However, all was not well in the French and Indian camps either. The French were torn between rival factions over the use of Indians. By 1758, the French advantage in Indian alliances would be much degraded.

Johnson's Northern Indian Department estimated that the French held a three to one advantage in Indian recruitment.[238] After the initial destruction of Braddock's force at the Monongahela and other setbacks from 1755-1756, the British Army had to make some very difficult decisions about the use of Indians and Indian tactics in the war with France in North America. Although initially dismissive of Indian tactics, skill and cultural norms, the British Army eventually began to appreciate some of the Indian's tactics and woodcraft. A slow realisation sunk in that if they were to fight the Indians, the Troupes de la Marines, and the French Canadian militia on their own soil, the British Army would have to adapt to the conditions, if not to the Indian cultural norms. The British Army experimented with irregular tactics, formations and alliances to meet the challenges posed by the North American eastern woodlands. This adaptation is crucial to the analysis sought by this thesis as it decouples Indian tactics from Indian cultural norms. Whereas Braddock felt no Indian

[237] Linklater, Eric. *Crisis In Heaven: A Elysian Comedy* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1944), 100
[238] Grenier, *First Way,* 122-123

force could withstand the discipline of British regulars using European tactics, other British Army officers began to entertain the thought that their tactics needed modifying. In other words, no longer were British officers so dismissive of the tactics that had been used against them to great effect, but they were still wary of the brutal way those tactics were deployed. The British Army was familiar with the irregular warfare in Europe. The Pandours and the Croats of the European armies were a common feature of developing the battlefield and conducting reconnaissance.[239] The fact that these irregular fighters were often spoken of in unflattering terms shows that they received some of the same condescension that the British Army used towards the Indians. However, the fact that the British Army similarly viewed Croats and the Indians does not mean that the tactics or the methods were the same. The European armies learned tactics that were similar in theory, but the open terrain of Europe was nothing like the wilderness of North America. British irregular and light infantry tactics would develop with a distinctive backwoods flavour.[240]

By early 1756, the British Army was more open to allying with the Indians. However, their earlier missteps by Braddock, Johnson and Shirley had soured many Indians on a British alliance. Each of these commanders had misused Indian allies, but in different ways. Braddock had largely dismissed their usefulness, beyond scouting, and insulted them with his imperious manner. Johnson and Shirley had fought over them and Johnson had misemployed them in the 'Bloody Morning Scout'. [241] Therefore, partly by choice and partly by necessity, the British Army began to deploy a dual track strategy of wooing select groups of Indians into an alliance and fostering units of colonial woodsmen known as Rangers.

In this absence of a British regular force on the frontier, the Indians took the initiative. The colonies had been relying on Braddock's campaign to secure the backcountry. After his defeat, it took the colonies time to summon their defences and Indian allies. The backcountry of Pennsylvania and Virginia was devastated. Some of these raids were directed and led by the French, but many others were carried out by the Indians

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[239] Grenier, *First Way,* 87-144, Russell, *Redcoats* 630-641
[240] Starkey, *European and Native,* 37-56, Brumwell, *Redcoats*, 227-236
[241] Speech of Hendrick, the Indian Sachem, 4 September 1755, Edmund Bailey, O'Callaghan, Ed. *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York; Procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq. Volume VI* (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1855), 998-999

independently for their own objectives and benefit.[242] However, there were some British successes on the frontier. There was also more Anglo-Indian cooperation during this period than has been generally acknowledged, largely through the alliance of the Cherokee and the Catawba from the southern backcountry. These Indian allies of the British were seeking security themselves from the French allied Indians in the south as well as the north. Although the Cherokee alliance would not last throughout the war, it may have been the only thing that prevented outright catastrophe on the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontier. [243] The re-introduction of Ranger companies, often with the incentive of scalp bounties, help alleviate some of the wide-scale panic and evacuation of the backcountry. For men like Dinwiddie, it had been a very short two years from wanting to expand the backcountry to keeping it from being depopulated of settlers altogether. Whether the Rangers worked independently or with Indian allies, the tactics were much the same. Indian style warfare was to be the norm on the frontier in 1756 and 1757. This cooperation and understanding of mutual needs formed the basis of the eventual success of the Forbes expedition in 1758. It also was a preview of the lengths to which the British Army was willing to go.[244]

The Indian way of war was not a settled issue for the French either. As so often happened away from Imperial capitols, it depended on who was in charge. New France Governor-General Vaudreuil and his Troupes de la Marines officer brother, Francois-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil (Rigaud), were enthusiastic advocates of using the French Indian allies and their modes of warfare. Being from the Troupes de Marines, the French regulars that were Canadian residents, Vaudreuil had no problem with the use of Indians in their traditional manner. In fact, the use of Indians and Canadian militia in conjunction with the Troupes de la Marines had been a successful strategy in the defence of New France throughout the previous colonial wars. Vaudreuil knew first-hand the devastation and confusion that frontier raids would cause. When the frontiers were being evacuated and general panic ensuing, it was hard for the northern colonial governments to mount offensive operations. It also served to keep the Indians happy by providing goods for services

[242] Matthew C. Ward, 'Fighting the "Old Women": Indian Strategy on the Virginia and Pennsylvania Frontier, 1754- 1758' *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Jul., 1995): 297- 320, 297-307
[243] Preston, 'Make Indians', 280-282
[244] Grenier, *First Way,* 125-126

rendered and opportunities for looting, taking captives and scalps. For Vaudreuil and Rigaud, the frontier operations were the perfect operations.[245]

However, in the summer of 1756, Louis-Joseph de Montcalm arrived in Montreal. Montcalm was a thoroughly European officer. He feared the loss of discipline in operational matters and in the aftermath of a battle. Like many of his British counterparts, he had a strong belief in European regulars and the discipline they held in the most difficult situations, such as Dieskau's grenadiers' gallant, but suicidal rush at Lake George in 1755. For Montcalm, no amount of woodcraft and flexibility was worth trading for the discipline of well-trained regulars. Moreover, he felt the emphasis on the frontiers was a diversion. Montcalm wanted to inflict heavy losses on the British forces in the field. To do this, he needed a force that he could keep in the field and drive the war to a strategic conclusion with the decisive defeat of the British regulars that were bound to follow up Braddock's loss. However, as with most military operations in North America, principle gave in to political pressure and pragmatic concerns. Montcalm simply did not have enough French regulars to quickly conduct the operations needed over such a huge geographic area. Therefore, Montcalm acceded to Vaudreuil's demands to use a combination of Indians, militia, Troupes de la Marines and regulars. To keep the irregulars under control, he planned to use them on the march and to secure his movements, but would only trust the sieges to his regulars.[246]

The objective of the French in 1756 was to isolate and capture the British operations on Lake Ontario in order to secure the supply lines to the interior. Vaudreuil had begun the process in the spring by cutting the British supply line to Fort Oswego that Shirley had secured in late 1755. On 27 March 1756, a small French force of Troupes de la Marines and Indians had infiltrated the New York backcountry and showed up unannounced at the Great Carrying Place, the portage from the Mohawk River to Wood Creek, along the present day Erie Canal between Rome, New York and Lake Oneida. This portage was being maintained to support Oswego and it was only barely accomplishing that task. After surprising a British supply train, the French force, led by Lieutenant Chaussegros de Léry, moved on to Fort Bull near the Mohawk River end of the portage and laid siege to it. Only a few of de Léry's Indians took part in the siege while the rest set ambushes for any would-be rescue

[245] Anderson, *Crucible*, 150-151, Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 214-216
[246] Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 197-206

party. The defenders reportedly sent a volley into a truce party sent by de Léry and held out long enough to enrage the Indians. After it fell, a bloodbath ensued when the Indians sacked the fort and killed the remaining defenders. The expected rescue party from Fort William on Wood Creek was ambushed by the remaining Indians. Along with the panic created by the small force seemingly appearing from thin air so close to Albany, Oswego had lost its already tenuous supply route. It would not stand a chance in the upcoming siege by Montcalm. This attack by de Léry's force was the type of action that Vaudreuil felt would win the war for the French. It was also the very kind of indiscipline that Montcalm feared.[247]

After the success against Braddock on the Monongahela, the Indians of the upper midwest, or *pays d'en haut* as the French called it, went back home with their booty, prisoners, and scalps. The word quickly circulated that the French were to be executing many more of these types of actions. The opportunities seemed endless. Indians from far distant lands began arriving in French camps. The Indians from the Ohio knew that the French were the lesser of two evils at the moment and supported the French to help remove the aggressive British settlers in their area. The Indians from further afield had little to do with the French, beyond trading, and even less to do with the British whose threat to their land would only come later. Their goal was material and martial glory. New to the scene, Montcalm, much like Braddock, did not have much time for these allies, other than for scouting and guiding. However, the Canadian militia and the Troupes de la Marines that served under him appreciated the Indians and actively encouraged the Vaudreuil way of war. The first test for Montcalm being able to handle the Indians according to his European sense of duty and honour would take place at Oswego.

After de Lery's cutting off of Oswego's supply line at Fort Bull, the next move for the French would be to take the fort located on the southeast corner of Lake Ontario. Montcalm was now in charge of forces in the field, but operating with forces recruited and developed by Vaudreuil and still having to operate with the strategy that Vaudreuil favoured. Montcalm was not keen on attacking Oswego as his first order of business. Montcalm preferred to amass enough French regulars to defeat the British in the field along the Lakes Champlain and George corridor. Montcalm felt this would threaten the British colonies enough to force them to sue for peace. However, Vaudreuil and his brother Rigaud cajoled

[247] Starkey, *European and Native,* 1-3

him into attacking Oswego to remove the threat to the French supply lines into the *pays d'en haut*, as the William Shirley objective had intended. An additional objective was to draw British forces away from the lakes corridor. This secondary objective was enough for Montcalm to accept the situation and he resigned himself to being able to conduct operations to his standard if not strategy.[248] With a force of 1,500 Canadian militia, 1,300 French Regulars, 137 Troupes de la Marines and 260 Indians, Montcalm began maneuvering against Oswego in early August 1756. The Indians had alarmed the post with some audacious daylight raids, so it was no surprise to the British commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mercer, that the French began the siege of Oswego on 11 August 1756. Due to poor siting and even poorer 'improvements' directed by Shirley, who had been relieved of his American command and was not present, Montcalm was able to prepare his investment at close range, but out of direct sight of the fort. Once the bombardment began, Mercer had to begin evacuating the outlying posts. These captured posts gave Montcalm increasingly superior firing position through the 12th and 13th of August. On the 13th, a round decapitated Mercer. British command passed to Lieutenant Colonel Littlehales who was so unnerved that he surrendered almost immediately. Oswego and a secure line of communication to the *pays d'en haut* were French at little cost.[249]

However, the situation was not perfect for Montcalm, the honour bound European officer that he was. The swift capitulation by Littlehales did not impress him and he felt the honours of war should not be extended to the British for such a light defence of their position. Montcalm had to take possessions over 1,600 soldiers and civilians. New France was already having a hard time feeding itself and an influx of French troops, so this large, unproductive and captive force would need housing and feeding. The poverty of New France extended to the Indians who were not paid, but attended the French requests in order to secure martial glory and plunder. Montcalm was faced with a threat to his honour. The British captives were his responsibility, but his Indian allies wanted satisfaction. He evacuated the captives to nearby fort under French guard, but the surrender scene degenerated almost immediately as the Indians rushed the main fort, killed and scalped the wounded that had been left, and began the plundering. Afterwards, the Indians, not satisfied with what they had taken so far rushed the French guarding the British captives. More

[248] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 295
[249] Steele, *Warpaths, 199-200* & Anderson, *Crucible, 150-157*

killings and captive taking of soldiers and civilians occurred. Montcalm was mortified, but could do little to stop the massacre. He had to satisfy himself by ransoming most of the Indian prisoners at a dear cost to the French Crown. By mid-August, all of Montcalm's fears of North American warfare had come true. He found himself winning against the British, but not on terms he felt honourable.[250]

Furthermore, Oswego had fallen so quickly that the British did not have time to react and send re-enforcements from the lakes corridor. The British commander along the Mohawk valley, General Daniel Webb, evacuated Fort Bull and assumed an entirely defensive posture. The French now felt that they needed to move the majority of their forces to the lakes corridor to counter any British attacks towards Quebec and Montreal. Unbeknownst to the French, the new British commander in North America, John Campbell, the 4th Earl of Loudon, also stopped offensive operations up the lakes corridor and began re-enforcing Fort William Henry and the base of Lake George.

The news spread of the Oswego massacre, much to Montcalm's chagrin. The Indians had their view re-enforced that it paid to support the French in this war. Of course, the news spread to the British as well. Montcalm would come to be known as an officer who deployed Indians and allowed them to use their traditional forms of warfare. The draw of the *pays d'en haut* Indians by the routs of the Monongahela, the Ohio frontier raids, and Fort Bull was complicated by Montcalm's treatment of his Indian allies at Oswego in their desire for captives, plunder and scalps, although his ransoming of the British captives provided some consolation. Although the French had a decisive advantage in Indian allies at this point, the issues surrounding their use were the same for Montcalm as they were for British commanders. The Oswego campaign tarnished Montcalm's honour, but the events in the lakes corridor a year later would forever stain it.[251]

In the winter and spring of 1756-57, hundreds of Indians from as far as 1,500 miles away began to arrive in Montreal to serve the French. The logistical constraints alone in bivouacking and feeding the Indians and their dependents forced the French to begin their campaign against the British defence on Lake George. The western Indians began joining the more local Indians who had been scouting and raiding for Montcalm around Fort St. Frederic (known to the British as Crown Point) and Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) since the

[250] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 295-296
[251] Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the Massacre* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 156-157 & Anderson, *Crucible*, 152-156

autumn of 1756. It is from this time that the most detailed descriptions of the European-French view of the Indians can be found. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville was appointed as an aide-de-camp to Montcalm in 1756 and regularly wrote about the Indians in French service. Bougainville joined Montcalm in decrying these "mosquitoes" that he felt lounged around French camps 'getting drunk' and consuming enormous amounts of supplies. Bougainville wanted a "specified number" used in a rotation for very specific scouting and guiding tasks, but not in a great, uncontrollable number. Finally, he described them as 'a necessary evil' adding that 'pride is the only wealth of every Indian.'[252]

Reading Bougainville's journals, one is struck by how close Montcalm's and Bougainville's views of the Indians were to Edward Braddock's and his aides-de-camp. However, French success had brought far more into their camps than could be managed. The British, on the other hand, struggled to recruit even their most steadfast allies, Johnson's Mohawks, back into their service. The loss of Hendrick and many others in 1755 and the losses that followed discouraged the participation of the Iroquois. The fall of Oswego convinced the rest of the Iroquois that the British were disinterested, ignorant or both to Iroquois security concerns. Sir William Johnson, who had been given his baronetcy for his action at Lake George in 1755 in fighting off Dieskau, not only struggled to recruit Iroquois, but also had to actively attempt to keep the western Iroquois from joining the French cause. Rigaud had threatened the Seneca (the western-most Iroquois) with sacking by Canadian Indians if they supported the British. Due to the loss of Oswego near the Seneca settlements, they were justifiably fearful of this. The fear of the Seneca, who had strong ties to the Ohio Indians, changing sides later proved to be well-founded when British agents found British scalps in Seneca villages. When confronted, the Seneca openly joined the French. Johnson, surely humbled by his inability to gather the Iroquois to the British side, began to recruit and deploy backwoodsmen as scouts and raiders for the defence of the Lake George area. These 'Rangers' were a historical legacy of the New England colonies in their attempts to deal with the New England Indians since the late seventeenth century. Their success in ranging out of Fort William Henry in 1756-57 was spotty at best, but they were really the only eyes and ears Lord Loudon and Johnson had in the corridor. The only Indians to be relied upon were the 'domesticated' Indians, such as those from Stockbridge,

[252] Louis Antoine de Bougainville, Hamilton, Richard P, Ed. *Adventures in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756-1760* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 59-60

who were Rangers in all but name. How the British used Rangers in comparison to how they deployed Indians is discussed later in this chapter.[253]

The well-documented lack of Indian support and the lackluster support of the few who did help the British began to create cynics among the British officers. Men like Thomas Gage and Jeffrey Amherst who would later lead British Forces in North America were watching closely and forming opinions about the Indians. Events of 1756-57, such as the Seneca defection and lack of Mohawk volunteers led to many British officers calling the Indians fickle, indolent and treacherous. Amherst seemed to have been especially affected, eventually referring to them as 'perfidious savages' and stating that they could 'by no means be relied on' among other things.[254] These opinions and experiences would greatly affect their future decisions on the Indians' use and trustworthiness. Therefore, it is important to understand that the decision to use Indians or not was not always a question of a fear of atrocity. Many times, British (and French) commanders feared using Indians due to the British perception of their unreliability. There was an art to using the Indians effectively without letting them get out of control. At other times, the Indians were employed, not because the British officers felt they were useful or reliable, but merely to keep them from actively supporting the French or away from the lure of frontier raiding. Lord Loudon was certainly not averse to using Indians if he could recruit them. Indeed he complained to London about the lack Indian allies of value. In the second half of 1756, he declared, '[f]rom the Indians, you see we have no support', 'really in effect we have no Indians', 'those at present are not useful', and they were 'no more than neutral'.[255] These lessons were just as important to the British Army as learning frontier tactics.

In light of the French use of the Indians on the frontier, and at Fort Bull and Oswego, the situation was so fraught for the British commanders that they seemed more than agreeable to using the Indians. The record certainly does not show the same dismissiveness that Braddock had shown in 1755. In the type of warfare being waged, the British leadership now knew that the Indians were more than a match for British regulars, American militia, Rangers, or anyone else the British could deploy. As an illustration that

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[253] Stanley McCrory Pargellis, Ed. *Military Affairs in North America 1748 - 1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (New York & London: D. Appleton-Century Company Incorporated, 1936), 224-225 & 269, Grenier, *First Way,* 123-124

[254] Edith Mays, Ed. *Amherst Papers 1756-1763: The Southern Sector* (Westminster, Maryland : Heritage Books, Inc., 2006), 64 & 150

[255] Grenier, *First Way,* 123-124

Lord Loudon knew his limitations without Indians to reconnoitre west of Fort Bull and south of Ticonderoga in late 1756, he wrote to the Duke Cumberland that,

> I can give you no certain accounts of the road to Ticonderoga as it has never been reconnoitred properly, but by all accounts I have been able to get, it is not to be done with Troops whilst the Enemy are so superior in Irregulars, for in reality we have none but our Rangers.[256]

The Duke also seemed to be ready to use Indians, even though he felt that, in a short space of time, the Rangers and volunteers would be able to perform just as well.[257] In this Lord Loudon seemed to have a better understanding than did the Duke of Cumberland on the current usefulness of Indians. Lord Loudon recognised their ability to work with little support and to exercise superior skills in woodcraft, intelligence gathering and a lifetime of local knowledge of the geography that no Ranger or British soldier could replicate in a few short months. However, Loudon did not accord the Indians super-human status. In fact, he felt that the Rangers would one day be able to match the Indians, but it would require time to 'breed them up'. On this point, Loudon was quite prophetic about how the American frontiersman would eventually be the equal of the Indian in many cases. However, like Gage and Amherst, Lord Loudon also was developing a low opinion of the Indians' reliability in general calling them, 'a loose-made indolent sett of People' [sic] and saying they had not the 'least degree of faith or honesty'.[258] Nevertheless, regardless of what he thought of the Indians as human beings, he still had a need for them in the short term.

As Lord Loudon lamented his lack of Indians and Bougainville and Montcalm lamented the curse of too many of them, the British began using the Rangers at their disposal. One Robert Rogers from the New Hampshire frontier would become the most famous. During the winter of 1757, ranging patrols were sent out regularly north of Fort William Henry. Many returned empty handed or were chased back to William Henry by the French Troupes de la Marines and Indians. Rogers made a name for himself by being more methodical with his Rangers. He developed patrolling techniques and procedures that are still used by modern armies of the twenty-first century.[259] This reconnaissance war along

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[256] Loudon to Cumberland, 2 October 1756, Pargellis, *Cumberland*, 237
[257] Pargellis, *Cumberland*, 251-255
[258] Ibid., 269
[259] Grenier, *First Way,* 134

the lakes corridor could be brutal in many ways. In one encounter, Rogers initially took prisoners from a small French sleigh party in an ambush. However, more French arrived and the sleigh party revealed itself as much larger than Rogers' force. The Rangers had to fight for their lives to escape. Involved in this French party was Charles Langlade who continued to surface on the frontier, usually whenever particularly nasty fighting was required. Heavily outnumbered, Rogers' force killed its prisoners and began a running fight to get away from the larger force. From the British point of view, killing prisoners was unacceptable, but for a Ranger force being captured ensured your death rather than the prisoner's. Although Loudon was not happy with the situation, Roger's returning Rangers were given bounties for the prisoners they could not bring back alive.[260] The British were starting to realise that the price of good intelligence on the frontier was to accede to some the ways of the frontier. However, Lord Loudon revealed that he was still worried about the tactics of the frontier by saying, 'I am afraid, I shall be blamed for the Ranging Companies, but as really in Effect we have no Indians, it is impossible for an Army to Act in this country, without Rangers...'[261]

Lord Loudon acknowledged that he could not help but use Rangers or suffer the consequence of being operationally blind to French plans. However, he did draw the line at sending them to raid civilian settlements as the French and Indians were doing along the Ohio frontier. Rangers were not only operating around the lakes corridor, but also along the Appalachian frontier. In fact, the Rangers commissioned by the House of Burgesses and Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie in Virginia in response to the Indians falling on the frontier had been issued a scalp bounty on Indians over the age of twelve. This resulted in the sacking of several Indian towns over the Appalachians by Virginian Rangers. These types of bounties were not unknown in the colonies and they were offered in one form or another by Lord Loudon, Dinwiddie, Shirley, Johnson, Amherst and Braddock. Eventually, however, Loudon and the British Army tried to steer clear of them when they could from 1755-1757. If they were required to get the desired result, leaders like Amherst and Loudon tried to restrict them to adult, male Indians.[262]

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[260] Steele, *Betrayals*, 74-75, Grenier, *First Way,* 124-130
[261] Pargellis, *Cumberland*, 269
[262] Peter Way, 'The Cutting Edge of Culture: British Soldiers encounter Native Americans in the French and Indian War' in Daunton & Halpern, *Empire*, 123-148, Grenier, *First Way,* 124-130

As 1757 advanced, Vaudreuil was anxious to take advantage of French momentum and British disarray in the lakes corridor. A March attempt on Fort William Henry by Rigaud ultimately failed, but did cause some damage to transportation and outbuildings. Lord Loudon and Johnson took the news that Fort William Henry was able to withstand French assaults as heartening. Montcalm saw Rigaud's failure to take William Henry as proof that siege warfare would require the discipline of French regulars. The French allied Indians were still very active for the French throughout the summer. They ambushed a large British water-born reconnaissance force in whaleboats at the northern end of Lake George in July 1757, which provided invaluable intelligence for the upcoming French expedition from 150 prisoners taken. The British Rangers were active, but were overwhelmed by the sheer number of Indians that the French fielded in the area. By July 1757, the French had approximately 2,000 Indians swarming around the area. The new British Army commander at Fort William Henry, Lieutenant Colonel George Monro, was virtually blind to French movements. However, it would not take long for him to find out what the French plans were. Montcalm launched a huge force of 8,000 down Lake George with impressive precision and control over French and Indians alike. By the end of July, the French forces were in place and by 3 August, the siege of Fort William Henry had begun. By the 9th, it was over and Montcalm extended the honours of war to Monro for a valiant defence of an appropriate length.[263]

However, Montcalm was already struggling with his *pays d'en haut* Indian allies who had participated in the whaleboat ambush and had the 150 prisoners that they wanted to take home. This did not include the three who were killed and eaten in Indian camps prior to the Fort William Henry assault.[264] Not only were much of their activities out of his control, Montcalm risked losing large chunks of his force as each group decided they had enough in the way of glory, scalps or prisoners. All of Montcalm's fears were coming true, but the worst was yet to come. Montcalm, the consummate European officer, tried mightily to control his forces after the surrender of Fort William Henry and recover his reputation after the Oswego massacre. After capitulation, he immediately put the British under heavy guard and tried moving them away from the area under the cover of darkness, but could not, because the Indians camped just outside the fort. As the British marched out of the fort

[263] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune,* 313-317
[264] Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the Massacre* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 89

on the morning of 10 August, the French Indians attacked the column. Montcalm and some of the French officers tried to stop them, but to little avail. When it became obvious to some Indians that their prisoners might be taken from them, they simply killed and scalped them instead.

Montcalm and his aide, Bougainville, were at their wits end. Montcalm had not wanted so many Indians, nor had he wanted their style of warfare. Most historians have concluded that he felt the advantages that the Indians provided were being more than offset by the atrocity and ill-discipline that accompanied them. However, one exception is Francis Jennings who claimed that Montcalm and Bougainville concocted most of their outrage without much action to prevent it.[265] With either explanation, it is generally agreed that Montcalm would use the Fort William Henry massacre to challenge Vaudreuil's way of conducting the war. Montcalm would hold back precious supplies for his own forces at the expense of the Indians. Once the word got out that he would prevent plunder, captive and scalp taking while also withholding shot, powder and food, the Indians went home and stayed home for the most part. To aggravate the situation, an outbreak of small pox in French camps scared other Indians back to their homes as well. The western Indians were now beginning to suspect the French were taking advantage of them. With the defection of so many of his Indian allies and so few French regulars, Montcalm did not feel that the southern edge of Lake George was conducive to being held for long, so he pulled back to the more defendable and supportable Fort Carillon on the southern end of Lake Champlain near the portage to Lake George. British adaptation to wilderness tactics and the arrival of more troops and material from Britain would change the course of the war, but the lack of Indians in the French service would also play its part.[266]

The massacre marked a turning point in the Indian relations between the two great powers.[267] It also sealed the fate of Lord Loudon, the competent logistician, but poor field commander. The Duke of Cumberland also resigned in controversy. William Pitt, a fierce critic of the previous prosecution of the war, became the Secretary of State for the Southern Department in London and took direct control for the war effort. On 30 December 1757, Pitt assigned Major General James Abercromby as head of forces in North America.

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[265] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune,* 316-320
[266] Anderson, *Crucible*, 196-200
[267] Stephen Brumwell, *White Devil: A True Story of War, Savagery, and Vengeance in Colonial America* (Da Capo Press, 2006), 93-96

Almost as important as Abercromby was Pitt's assumption of direct participation of the planning and strategy in the war in North America. Part of this participation was the assignment of Brigadier General John Forbes and Major General Jeffrey Amherst to specific campaigns. Pitt's orders for 1758 were clear, Abercromby would take Carillon, Amherst would take Louisbourg and Forbes would take Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio. They were to make use of all their capabilities, but action was the most important factor. [268] Lord Loudon's genius for logistics had set the campaigns on a strong support footing and the increasing wilderness warfare skills of the Rangers and British regulars gave the British better intelligence and movement security.

The Ohio Indians, after having cleared the frontier of most British settlers, were still accommodating French forces at Fort Duquesne, but the French trade goods were drying up due to the effectiveness of the British Navy's operations in the Atlantic. Several years of continual fighting meant the Indians were too dependent on the weakening French position and they knew their dependence would eventually cost them. Therefore, an increasing interest arose amongst the Ohio Indians for some kind of settlement with the British in an effort to restore a balance of power. Forbes would welcome the tentative contact with the Delaware, Shawnee and Mingo of the Ohio. He knew his mission to take Fort Duquesne, with all the same difficulties that Braddock faced, would be made immeasurably easier by coming to some agreement with them, but he also needed direct Indian support. The Cherokee were still in search of support against the powerful Creek and Choctaw in the south and from Iroquois raiders to the north, so they agreed to support Forbes' campaign. The Iroquois, who wanted to remain relevant to the balance of power in the Ohio region, were alarmed by the changes and the direction of the war in the Ohio country. Forbes' tenacity and insight into the strategic importance of the Ohio Indians, specifically, would have serious implications for the Iroquois and for Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the North, Sir William Johnson. Abercromby would get some help in his campaign on Fort Carillon from the Iroquois and Johnson, but it was not decisive and it had taken much browbeating by Johnson to obtain it. This may well have precipitated Abercromby granting Forbes permission to deal with the Ohio Indians directly. The lack of enthusiastic Iroquois support for the British since 1755 meant that both the Iroquois and Johnson were losing influence with the British leaders. However, even though the British could not secure

[268] Steele, *Warpaths*, 207- 208

widespread and active Indian alliances, the lack of French trade goods and support meant British strength was growing in North America.[269]

The 1758 campaigning season kicked off in June and July with Amherst securing Louisbourg with an amphibious landing and a long siege with the assistance of Major-General James Wolfe. Geographically, Louisbourg falls outside the remit of this thesis. However, it is important to note that Amherst denied the honours of war to the defenders, despite an honourable defence. The massacre of Fort William Henry was fresh in the minds of Amherst, Wolfe and their men. French forces were taken prisoner, the civilians deported to France, and the Micmac and Abenaki Indians present were hunted down, killed and scalped by the Massachusetts Rangers. Amherst, as mentioned previously, was already hardening his feelings against the Indians. Wolfe, who was new to North America, was following suit, saying of the French allied Indians, 'We cut them to pieces wherever we found them, in return for a thousand acts of cruelty and barbarity'.[270]

Further south, Abercromby was not faring as well. Although not as well supported by Indians as he had been previously, Montcalm was making the most of his position outside of Fort Carillon by entrenching fortified lines and building an enormous, interlocking set of abatis. Abercromby used his Iroquois to scout ahead of his force and thereby avoided being surprised, but their late arrival had meant that he did not have the kind of intelligence that comes only from regular patrolling. By denying Abercromby accurate intelligence, in part by still using his small Indian force to patrol to his front, Montcalm was able to trick Abercromby into thinking he had twice the force he actually had and was not complete in his preparation of his static defences. Abercromby attacked without bombarding Montcalm's position and did not take advantage of the nearby high ground. The French defended admirably and the British attacked valiantly in a battle that could have easily been recreated in Europe and conducted by European standards. Unfortunately for Abercromby, the attack failed and he lost 2,500 killed or wounded. Although Rangers and Indians were conducting reconnaissance for him, Abercromby, like the British leaders before him, still did not have the advantage of large scale and long term Indian patrolling and the intelligence that resulted from those patrols. For Montcalm's part, he felt vindicated in not using Indians as heavily as he had in the past, but he still lost 750 killed, wounded or

[269] Tootle, 'Anglo-Indian', 333-337
[270] Anderson, *Crucible*, 250-254

captured. He hoped to continue the war in this European manner, in spite of his lack of French troops and Vaudreuil's wishes. Feeling vindicated in their approach, aide-de-camp Bougainville exclaimed, 'Now war is established here on the European basis. Projects for the campaign, for armies, for artillery, for sieges, for battles. It no longer is a matter of making a raid, but of conquering or being conquered. What a revolution!'[271] Montcalm and Bougainville were to finally prosecute the war they wanted, but were soon to face the consequences of the war Vaudreuil wanted.

Abercromby, who had not yet learned of the eventual success of Amherst at Louisbourg, was devastated and knew that Pitt would not accept such losses without a renewed initiative. Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet, who had been the backbone of Loudon's logistical improvements and commander of a force of incredibly resourceful bateaux men, proposed a secret mission to disrupt the French supply line to the Ohio. Not considering it likely to succeed, but at a loss as to what action to take next, Abercromby agreed. Sir William Johnson, under pressure to deliver anything from the Iroquois, managed to provide seventy Iroquois to support Bradstreet through the Iroquois lands under the guise of simply re-building Fort Bull and the portage nearby. Once at Fort Bull, Bradstreet declared his real plan to invest and capture Fort Frontenac on the north shore of Lake Ontario. It was to be a daring raid that would surely fail if the French leadership learned of it soon enough. One half of the Iroquois decided it was not to their liking and stayed behind. Bradstreet promised the right of first plunder to keep the other half.[272] The French would learn of the expedition through the Iroquois, but not with enough time to take action. Bradstreet covered the distance to the former Fort Oswego quickly and set sail across Lake Ontario with a force of 3,100 made up largely of militia, a few regulars, and the remaining Iroquois. He found a lightly defended Fort Frontenac at the source of the St. Lawrence and laid siege to it on 26 August 1758. By 28 August, the French commander had had enough and surrendered his 110 soldiers and the civilians present. The fort was a veritable treasure trove of war material and trade goods destined for the French and Indians of the Ohio country. Bradstreet and his Indian allies took what they could with them and set fire to the rest. French operations in the midwest would never fully recover.[273] Bradstreet kept his promise of plunder to his Iroquois, but also kept them in control to prevent atrocity

[271] Bougainville, *Adventures,* p. 252
[272] Anderson, *Crucible*, 261
[273] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune,* 364-367

against the small military force, but larger civilian contingent. Bradstreet had seemingly managed the required secrecy and perfect ratio of Indian allies to militia and regulars. There were enough local Indians to navigate through their lands, but too few to overwhelm a chaos-filled fort capitulation. The Iroquois may have resented the lack of prisoners and scalps, but they had gained valuable goods and helped restore some of their credibility with the British. They would build upon that in the following twelve months.[274] Even Bougainville was impressed with the control with which Bradstreet conducted the Frontenac expedition.[275]

Further south, Forbes was trudging his forces through the Pennsylvania wilderness toward Fort Duquesne. In May, 700 Cherokee, recruited by the southern colonies for his use descended upon his camp, but he was not ready to use them. Forbes was trying to avoid the mistakes Braddock had made. He was moving deliberately while also beginning deliberations with the eastern Delaware who were in contact with the western Delaware, Shawnee and Mingo around Fort Duquesne. Forbes, like most British officers, wanted to maintain control of his allies, so he used the Cherokee sparingly by pairing them with Rangers and attaching British volunteers to their patrols. He had some success with this method, but he could not make use of the bulk of the Cherokee at his disposal. The Cherokee, like most Indians, wanted to either be on patrol for booty, prisoners and scalps or heading home to hunt and secure their homes. The standoff lasted for about a month when some Cherokee warriors began to leave in a very bad mood. Forbes, ill advisedly, detained some of the Cherokee and their leaders, including the influential Attakullakulla (Little Carpenter). The situation got worse and Forbes realised the diplomatic error and released his detainees and tried to make amends with gifts and promises of more. However, it was too late. By July, 500 Cherokee had left and the remainder would drift away in smaller groups throughout the rest of the summer. In this case, Forbes experienced much the same problem that Bougainville and Montcalm had complained of before the assault on Fort William Henry of too many Indian allies and too soon for the mission. The one saving grace was that they had not precipitated a massacre before leaving. They would, however, cause themselves more problems than they bargained for on their way home. The Cherokee felt under-appreciated after they had volunteered in such large numbers. As they traveled

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[274] Anonymous, *An Impartial Account of Lieut. Col. Bradstreet's Expedition to Fort Frontenac* (London: T. Wilcox, et al., 1759), 37-38
[275] Bougainville, *Adventures,* 276

back through the Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina backcountry, some relieved local British inhabitants of horses and other plunder. The whites, of course, retaliated and deaths on both sides ensued. Eventually, the Cherokee situation would turn into a full-scale conflict itself that will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.[276]

In mid-September 1758, one of Forbes' advance parties under Major James Grant was stopped from taking Fort Duquesne by a large French and Indian force. Grant and his immediate superior and Forbes second in command, Colonel Henry Bouquet, had thought they might surprise Fort Duquesne with a quick assault. Although Grant was captured along with a third of his force killed or captured, crucially, most of the force survived and retreated in an orderly fashion. Although Forbes was irate at the poor decision-making by his commanders, the Indians saw Grant's push as part of a renewed and far stronger offensive by the British. Adding to this, Bradstreet's destruction of Frontenac had severely restricted French trade goods reaching the Ohio country. The Ohio Indians began to rethink their French alliance. Forbes managed to make contact with the Ohio Indians and initiate a diplomatic conversation. After months of tentative discussions, Forbes managed to sideline many of the local Ohio Indians from French service with the Easton Treaty in October 1758. By the time the bulk of Forbes' force was close to fort Duquesne, the Ohio Indians had deserted the French. The French commander blew up the fort and dispersed his forces and supplies across the midwest.[277]

The Brigadier-General John Forbes expedition is one of the most interesting campaigns in this thesis. Three key players emerge from it in relation to how the Indians were used and addressed. Forbes himself saw the full range of Indian engagement. At first he wanted Indian allies to forestall a repeat of the Braddock campaign. The southern colonial governors delivered to him what they had failed to deliver to Braddock. Forbes took on a huge Cherokee force that came too early and was unruly in terms of his plans and timings repeating Montcalm's difficulties. He lost those warriors through inflexibility and diplomatic blunders. He fought with Sir William Johnson over the recruitment and influence of the Iroquois in the Ohio and southern regions. He had to negotiate a diplomatic minefield to reduce the power of the Ohio tribes allied with the French arrayed against him. He had to maintain provincial forces while also confronting the competing land interests of

[276] Oliphant, *Anglo-Cherokee,* 53-68
[277] Steele, *Warpaths*, 214-215

the colonies. Through Major James Grant, Forbes almost lost a significant part of his force within miles of Fort Duquesne just like Braddock had. Grant would learn from these lessons and lead a successful campaign against the Cherokee in 1761, discussed in the next chapter. Forbes' second in command, Colonel Henry Bouquet would later be the most eloquent writer on Indian tactics and played an important role in breaking the siege of Fort Pitt (Duquesne) in Pontiac's rebellion, also discussed in the next chapter.[278] Within the Forbes expedition, a way of dealing with the Indians of the midwest emerged. Unfortunately, these hard earned lessons would not be capitalised upon.

Dying from a long illness in early 1759, Forbes would not live long enough to pass on his hard won wisdom in his dealings with the Indians in future campaigns, but he did write impassioned letters to Amherst about the Indians. Amherst was appointed to replace Abercromby in 1759 as commander of the British Army in North America. In an incredibly prescient voice, Forbes pleaded with Amherst to try to understand the strength of the Ohio Indians and their views of what was happening to their land. Forbes thought that the commercial interests of Virginia and Pennsylvania, as well as the personal interests of Sir William Johnson, were perverting the interest of the larger interest of the imperial project. In 1759, Forbes clearly saw the potential for the future Indian uprisings from 1759 through 1764. The wildly successful campaign seasons of 1759 and 1760 against the French forces and Canadian cities would lull Amherst and others into thinking that the Indians and the French were one and the same in the French defeat. Forbes knew better, but would not be alive to counsel them further. One can only imagine how the British Army's approach to dealing with the Indians over the next fifty-seven years might have improved had Forbes lived longer and commanded larger British forces.[279]

From late 1756 to the end of 1758, British officers struggled with how to deal with Indian warriors and wilderness warfare. If one wanted to control one's Indian allies, merely having them was not always the answer, as witnessed by Montcalm in 1757 and Forbes in 1758, especially when the Indians arrived in great numbers. Indians were needed at specific times in varying numbers and for specific missions. However, though the Indians could endure extreme hardship, they seemingly would not entertain the discipline of a European Army in the field or boredom of Army camp life. The one way that Indians seemed most

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[278] John Morgan Dederer, *War in America to 1775: Before Yankee Doodle* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1990), 138-139
[279] Anderson, *Crucible*, 284

effective was when they were provisioned abundantly and given wide-ranging latitude to conduct war as they saw fit. This was a strategy that Vaudreuil and Rigaud favoured, but Montcalm looked down upon.[280] The strategy was employed by the southern colonies in sending out Rangers with small groups of Cherokee and Catawba warriors into the backcountry in 1756-57, but these patrols were not under the control of British Army officers.[281] Even if the British Army officers were tempted by this strategy, and there is little evidence that they were, it was not an alternative for them due to the lack of any kind of substantial Indian support. If they had to be employed within a larger force, it seems it was best to use them in small groups in a reconnaissance war where their skills were deployed to the maximum benefit and their freedom of maneuvre was maintained. At other times it was more advantageous to deny them to one's enemy, rather than have them serve directly as Forbes did in denying the French the help of the local Ohio Indians in 1758.

The British Army had certainly improved since the performance of Braddock but it was not a linear progression nor was it entirely consistent. Between the Monongahela and the end of the 1758, the British improved its alliances with the Indians, improved its use of Rangers, and it improved its own military to adapt to the conditions. Although the British Army was improving against the French, it is questionable whether or not it was improving against the Indians.

[280] Ward, 'Old Women', 299-301
[281] Preston, 'Make Indians', 285-289 & Oliphant, *Anglo-Cherokee*, 20-22

'There is no doubt that we are a very cruel people.'
-- Winston Churchill[282]

5. The Undefeated

Although 1758 had ended with Bradstreet effectively using and controlling a few Indians in his Fort Frontenac campaign and Forbes working through a way to effectively sideline the Indians from the calculation on Fort Duquesne, Pitt was still not happy with Abercromby. Pitt named Jeffrey Amherst commander of British forces in North America and charged him with an aggressive campaign season to strip the French of their power in North America. Amherst would launch the most ambitious campaign season yet in 1759 that started with him immediately asking Sir William Johnson and Edmund Atkin to raise as many Indians as possible for the upcoming campaigns to 'act with His Majesty's Forces'.[283] There would be a strong thrust up the New York lakes corridor to remove the thorns of Forts Carillon (renamed Ticonderoga) and St. Frederic (renamed Crown Point) led by Amherst himself. There would also be an amphibious assault on Quebec by an independent command led by Major General James Wolfe. Fort Niagara was to be attacked to further degrade the French influence and supply lines into the midwest. For Britain, 1759 would come to be known as 'Annus Mirabulus' for victories in all of these campaigns and more at sea, in Europe, the west Indies and India.

Indian allies would figure into some of these actions, but for the most part, they found they had waited a little too long in each case to be considered decisive. The year 1759 would also be the year that the Indians began to recognize that they might have diplomatically over-played their hands against the British. Amidst this year of flux, the Iroquois tried to regain their value to the British to influence the Ohio country, the Delaware and Shawnee tried to cement their control of the Ohio, and the Cherokee tried to form an alliance with anyone who would help them resist the encroachments of South Carolinian settlers and challenges to their free travel in the Appalachian backcountry. As discussed earlier, Amherst already had a low opinion of the Indians, even the domesticated Stockbridge Indians, and strove not to use them. [284] The depredations of the backcountry

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[282] James Morris. *Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire* (A Harvest Book, 1968), 418
[283] Amherst to Johnson and Atkin, 13 December 1758, Johnson, William. James Sullivan, Preparer. *The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 3* (Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 1921), 12
[284] Grenier, *First Way,* 124

and the massacres at Oswego and William Henry were still fresh in the minds of the British Army and Americans. Amherst and Wolfe had served together at Louisbourg the previous year where British Rangers were allowed some discretion in taking revenge for these acts. By 1759, the British Army seemed to be led by men who were fed up with inaction and began to deploy the frontier way of warfare where required with Indians, Rangers and British regulars. The ethical considerations of military honour may have influenced the way the British Army conducted itself from 1755-1758. By 1759, however, victory supplanted all other considerations. To cap off 1759, Amherst would express this new ethos by unleashing the Rangers on a raid on the Abenaki village of St. Francis. The results of this raid were as horrific as anything that had happened to date.

During the winter of 1758-59, the Seneca, the western-most of the five Iroquois tribes and previously the most French friendly, began to agitate for taking Fort Niagara from the French. Niagara was on the eastern side of the mouth of the Niagara River into Lake Ontario and provided the key point for goods into and out of the Ohio country. The Seneca could see how the Ohio Indians had withdrawn their support for the French at Fort Duquesne and feared ending up on the wrong end of the changing diplomatic scene. Needing no coaxing, Sir William Johnson jumped at the opening and presented the opportunity to Amherst. Amherst seized the opportunity and appointed Brigadier General John Prideaux to lead the expedition to rebuild Oswego and onward to take Niagara. The expedition would have probably occurred in the summer of 1759 anyway, but the addition of 1,000 Iroquois to his force meant he could rebuild Oswego whilst continuing onto Niagara before the French commander at Niagara had time to call forces back from their planned attempt to retake Fort Duquesne (Pitt). [285]

As Prideaux's force approached Fort Niagara on 10 July 1759, they found that there were approximately 100 Seneca present at the fort who were surprised to find nearly 1,000 of their Iroquois kinsmen with Prideaux. The French commander of Niagara, Captain Pierre Pouchot, was also surprised and immediately sent a messenger to Fort Machault, in western Pennsylvania, requesting a relief force to augment his 500 troops at Niagara. The leader of the French aligned Seneca, Kaendae, asked Pouchot to allow him to treat with Prideaux's Iroquois. Seeing not much in the way of alternatives, Pouchot agreed in order to buy himself some time. Kaendae almost convinced Johnson's Iroquois to abandon their plans to

[285] Steele, *Warpaths*, 215-217

help the British. However, the alert Johnson understood the danger and managed to avert the disaster by asking Prideaux to grant the Iroquois the right of first plunder when the fort fell. Understanding the precarious nature of the situation, Prideaux acceded to the plan. This was no minor issue as the Iroquois made up almost thirty-percent of his force. However, Prideaux had to know that with this number of Indians, it would be hard to control the bloodbath that was likely to occur when the walls of the fort fell. Prideaux might have known that the promise of first plunder had worked for Bradstreet at Frontenac, but Bradstreet had only 1/20th of the Indians and Frontenac was not Niagara. Niagara was a European style fortress that might well withstand a siege for weeks, enraging his Iroquois if they took too many casualties. This is the first sign of a senior British officer acquiescing under pressure to Iroquois demands and being willing to risk a Fort William Henry type massacre to gain a decisive edge in battle. Kaendae took his 100 Indians and retired to an area south of Niagara called La Belle Famille to avoid an Iroquois feud.[286]

By 14 July, the British had begun the siege. On 20 July, Prideaux was accidentally killed by one of his own mortars. Johnson assumed command, but with the competent help of Lieutenant Colonel Eyre Massey. On 23 July, the relief force from Fort Machault arrived near La Belle Famille. It was led by Le Marchand de Lignery, Francois-Marie (Lignery) who had recently decamped from Fort Duquesne and was planning a return to the forks of the Ohio. Massey rushed to the area and set up a blocking position.[287] Approximately one-half of Johnson's Iroquois set up nearby in a wood. More importantly, Johnson had sent word to Lignery's Indians that they should sit the battle out. It worked and Lignery ended up attacking the British with just his regulars and militia. After the defection of the Ohio Indians prior to Forbes arrival at Duquesne, Lignery was again on the receiving end of the changing diplomatic landscape. The French force was repulsed with severe casualties and the fleeing survivors were hunted down by the Iroquois in the woods.[288]

At Fort Niagara, Pouchot's relief at the Fort Machault force's arrival ebbed into despair as he realised it had failed. The British sent a surrender offer and he accepted on 25 July. Johnson's Iroquois did not fall upon the surrendering French, as Johnson, Massey and Pouchot might have feared. It is possible that the scalps and captives from the battle near

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[286] Anderson, *Crucible*, 330-339
[287] C. J. Russ, "LE MARCHAND DE LIGNERY, FRANÇOIS-MARIE," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 3, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003
[288] William M. Fowler, Jr. *Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763* (New York: Walker and Company, 2006), 195-196

La Belle Famille had satisfied them, along with the copious amount of goods they plundered at the fort. It is also possible that they were seeing the balance of power in the area decisively shifting towards the British. They may have understood that it would be better for their homeland and their influence in the Ohio to heed British requests to act in the British interest. Whatever the reason or combination of reasons, the British had conducted their second siege on a French fort within a year where they had managed to avoid an atrocity at the hands of their allied Indians. It stood in direct comparison to Montcalm's inability to do the same.

The loss of Fort Niagara was even more damaging to the French than the loss of Forts Frontenac and Duquesne in 1758. With the loss of Niagara, it was inconceivable that the French could support the Ohio or Great Lakes Indians effectively, nor could they orchestrate the kind of raiding that they had encouraged on the British frontier. The British Army controlled access to Lake Ontario and the British Navy largely controlled access to the St Lawrence. For all intents and purposes the French empire in Canada now began at Quebec ended slightly above Montreal. Furthermore, the French were beginning to realise that their long-standing Indian allies were no longer dependable.[289]

The Iroquois were not only active on Lake Ontario, but had also visited Fort Duquesne to tell the British commander there to watch out for the Delaware's intentions in the area. The Seneca who were very close to the Delaware had begun to see the emergence of a stronger and more viral form of independence based around a revival of Delaware traditions. This emergence of strength in the Ohio worried the Iroquois as it undermined their claim of suzerainty over the area. The Delaware with the support of the Shawnees, Mingoes and other tribes in the Ohio had turned against the French when the Treaty of Easton seemed to promise them freedom from further British encroachments. However, the capture and subsequent buildup of Fort Pitt (Duquesne) came with an ever more forceful British influence. The Iroquois had been able to secure their land in western New York by balancing European powers against each other. Part of that balance of power had been their ability to convince the Europeans that they actually controlled the Ohio. Delaware and Shawnee independence was starting to erode that diplomatic fiction. These machinations amongst the Indians went largely unnoticed by the British at the time. Forbes probably understood it best, but he had died in Philadelphia in March of 1759. Johnson may have

[289] O'Toole, *White Savage*, 205-208

had an inkling of the turning of the midwestern tribes into a more cohesive alliance, but he was only really concerned about the Mohawks and his own well-being. Amherst and Wolfe were too concerned with their own campaigns to spend any time thinking about the trouble brewing in the Ohio while they were focused on the French in Quebec and Montreal. However, the French were not all-knowing either. Bougainville still believed the Iroquois were largely neutral and the Delaware were still happy to be considered 'nephews' to the Iroquois as late as the winter of 1759. [290]The Indians of the North American midwest were giving signals to both the French and the British that favouring one side or the other or remaining neutral was a strategy for their best interests, not those of Britain or France. Britain and France were just too self-involved to notice.

Simultaneous to the Fort Niagara campaign, Amherst moved cautiously north toward Ticonderoga. Amherst, probably out of preference, had no Indian allies to speak of in this campaign. Amherst had become more comfortable with his Rangers. Rangers came with their own problems of high cost and low discipline, but they were increasingly effective in securing British lines and obtaining intelligence on the French and their allied Indian's movements. They also knew their way around the North American landscape, especially the lakes corridor. British Army Officers were often exasperated by their lack of decorum and adherence to military bearing, but knew their value on the march and on the screen line. They might be ill-disciplined and expensive, but they largely followed orders and could be depended upon to stay through a campaign. On 26 July, the day after Fort Niagara fell (unbeknownst yet to Amherst); the French commander of Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) Brigadier General Francois-Charles de Bourlamaque blew up the powder magazine and retreated north to Fort St. Frederic (Crown Point). Amherst sent his Rangers forward to track the French preparations St Fredric, but Bourlamaque had already blown it up as well. Amherst had gained control of the southern half of the lakes corridor with little effort and little need for Indian allies. Amherst received word of Niagara's capitulation and the destruction of Lignery's relief force at about the same time. Amherst seemed little concerned about the Iroquois' actions at Niagara, but was worried about Wolfe's assault on Quebec of which he had heard little since early July. This lack of information from Wolfe

[290] Bougainville, *Adventures,* 315

led Amherst to be suspicious about French strategy above Crown Point. Amherst decided on a slower approach to Montreal until he heard more from the siege of Quebec.[291]

Wolfe and his force had arrived at Quebec on 25 June and began his siege. However, Quebec was a far more formidable objective than anything else the British had tried to take from the French in North America. Duquesne was remote, Niagara formidable and Frontenac protected by water, but, surrounded by soaring cliffs, Quebec required a European style siege combined with a treacherous amphibious landing. Wolfe and his three Brigadier Generals, Robert Monckton, George Townshend, and James Murray were all experienced in modern European sieges. They were also somewhat experienced in partisan warfare from Flanders to Germany to Scotland.[292] Wolfe had hoped that the Canadian population around Quebec would realise that French rule was inevitably doomed and turn favourably towards the British. He was to be rudely disabused of that notion as Montcalm had issued orders to a sympathetic public that they were to resist at every opportunity. Wolfe found himself harried by Canadian militia and French allied Indians throughout July and August. Montcalm, who had won the argument with Vaudreuil about how Canada was to be defended, kept his most disciplined regulars and Troupes de la Marines close to him and ready to defend Quebec in a close siege. He felt he had a strong position that was still well supplied from the west and even if he failed, it would be an honourable defence.[293]

As the summer slipped away with little to show for it, Wolfe became desperate to find a way to engage Montcalm's conventional forces. The sporadic and increasingly ruthless fighting around Quebec was keeping the French hopeful that they could last until winter when it would be difficult for Wolfe to maintain the siege. All of Wolfe's brigadiers were turning against him in disgust for the way he was allowing the destruction of the civilian population that he was trying to terrorise into supporting the British. Wolfe admitted that it was 'War of the worst shape'. Deathly sick from fever and fearing his chance of glory was passing him by, Wolfe sent out one of the most famous orders relevant to this thesis. 'The Genl. strickly (sic) forbids the inhuman practice of scalping, except when the enemy are Indians, or Canads. dressed like Indians'. It is important to note that this was not an instruction to stop the brutalities and scalping altogether, but to only commit them against Indians and those dressed like Indians. As can be imagined, this instruction left wide

[291] Anderson, *Crucible*, 340-343
[292] Russell, *Redcoats*, 649
[293] Anderson , *Crucible*, 344-347

latitude for defining what constituted 'dressed like an Indian'. For the first time since the British Army's large-scale entry into North America, atrocities attributed to the British Army were wide-spread, including murder of women and children and scalping by Rangers and regulars alike. Wolfe admitted the wholesale destruction of the countryside to Pitt in a letter of 2 September 1759. It is telling that the portion that described the destruction and the reasons for it was deleted from the version that was published in the British press. Wolfe had provided two reasons for the savagery. First and foremost, Wolfe was trying to outrage Montcalm into an open battle. Second, Wolfe used the same reasoning he and Amherst had used at Louisbourg the year before; that it was revenge for the actions taken on the frontier.[294]

It would be easy to attribute this second reason to any number of officers that had served in the interior of North America. Men like Gage, who had been at the Monongahela and in Ranger parties along the lakes corridor, Bouquet, or Rogers who had seen the severe consequences of Indian warfare could have used this reason with far more force than Wolfe. However, although an experienced soldier, Wolfe had only seen North American warfare at Louisbourg and Quebec. Wolfe was channeling what other officers had told him of combat on the frontier, what he heard his soldiers complain of (the majority of which were British regulars and new to North American warfare), and possibly, the sensational articles that had appeared in the British press. It is possible that Wolfe used the second reason as a qualifying reason for his real reason that he had to bring Montcalm to battle to avoid his expedition being deemed a failure. If this was the case, Wolfe's need for glory harkened back to an earlier form of military honour where the search for glory could overcome other elements of honour. Seemingly, Wolfe would rather be known as a General who deployed brutalities on civilians than as the losing General in a battle for Empire. This is critical to understanding British Army officers' intentions. When they could win without Indian assistance or frontier tactics, they would forego them and claim the moral high ground. Throughout the time-frame of 1755-1815, British Army officers began conflicts with the highest principles, mainly because they looked down on the capabilities of their foes, whether Indian, French, or American. When winning was essential and uncertain, the

[294] Matthew C. Ward, 'Crossing the Line? The British Army and the Application of European "Rules of War" in the Quebec Campaign' in *Revisiting 1759: The Conquest of Canada in Historical Perspective*, edited by Buckner, Philip and Reid, John G. Toronto, Buffalo, London: The University of Toronto Press, 2012, Kindle edition.

standard of conduct was lowered. When they needed to use the Indians or their mode of warfare, they would begin using justification for their actions. One of the most common was retribution for Indian and French actions on the frontier.

Although Wolfe could not tempt Montcalm out of his fortress to save the civilians of Quebec, his next action would. Gravely ill, convinced that he was dying, and fighting off a near mutiny from his Brigadiers, Wolfe went for broke and led an assault near the Quebec citadel along a small, steep track that led up to the Plains of Abraham. The action has gone down in history as one of the boldest amphibious landings of all time. The chance of failure was high, but Wolfe's preoccupation with glory led him to risk his army to gain his victory. This gambit paid off as Montcalm came out of Quebec to meet Wolfe. Wolfe's force displayed the superiority over the ragged French army that Wolfe knew he had. Both Wolfe and Montcalm would die in the battle, but the glory that Wolfe sought above everything else in life would be secured in his death and declaration of him as a hero of the Empire. On 17 September 1759, Quebec capitulated.[295]

Amherst received word of the fall of Quebec and Wolfe's death on 18 October 1759. It was too late for Amherst to consider taking Montreal in 1759, so he decided to consolidate at Crown Point for the winter. He assumed Vaudreuil would pull back to reinforce Montreal, but he wanted to keep the pressure on the French.[296] Without Indian Allies, Amherst had increasingly relied on his Rangers to pull in the information that he needed to plan the final push on Canada. The Rangers were experts in woodcraft and were capable of super human feats of endurance, but they were also expensive compared to regulars and quite often insubordinate to anyone other than their own Ranger officers. From 1756-1758, the British had tried to use the Rangers to train British troops their skills and to use these troops in support of larger, more conventional forces. Colonel Thomas Gage had worked with the Rangers regularly and had become sure that he could replicate their success. He created the 80th Regiment under the approval of Lord Loudon. This force was trained by Robert Rogers, the pre-eminent Ranger leader in the Colonial Northeast. However, the need for Ranger skills by the British Army was not easily remedied by merely training its troops to operate only as Rangers. Once they had made their way through the wilderness, fought off ambushes, and arrived at their objective, they often had to re-form as European

[295] Fowler, *Empires at War*, 198-210
[296] Amherst Journal entry for 18 September 1759, Jeffery Amherst, J. Clarence Webster, Ed. *The Journals of Jeffery Amherst*. (Toronto: The Ryerson Press and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 182

conventional forces to fight a force of French regulars. Therefore, the British Army had to transform itself somewhat, but not completely. The task was no easy one. The Redcoat had to be taught to move and think independently on a screen line or patrol, but revert to being an automaton in formation when ranked on a pitched battlefield.[297] With these difficulties, it was not surprising that Rogers' and other Ranger units were still in heavy use at the end of the decade.

By early September, Amherst was still largely ignorant of Wolfe's position and was still nervous of the progress there. In August, Amherst had sent a small party to deliver orders and receive word on Wolfe's progress. This party had been captured by French allied Abenaki warriors from St. Francis on the St Lawrence in between Montreal and Quebec and rumour had it that they had been roughly treated. The notification of their capture that came under a flag of truce from Montcalm seemed to rattle Amherst excessively. Angry at his own caution, the lateness of the season, and ignorance of Wolfe's situation, Amherst broke with his cautious use of Rangers close to his formations. He determined that he had to have more information and that he needed to strike a blow against the French of his own, even if he could not risk moving on Montreal yet. Robert Rogers had presented Amherst with a plan months earlier that detailed a way to discourage Montcalm's allies. Rogers wanted to make the French allied Indians, namely the fierce Abenaki who had terrorised the northeastern frontier for years, feel the insecurity that the British frontier settlers had known. Amherst had not been convinced previously, but much like Abercromby the year before, Amherst feared the war was not going his way. He needed a way to declare a substantial success in thwarting the French initiative. Amherst gave Rogers the authorisation to conduct a raid on the Abenaki settlement of St. Francis. Amherst, who had little time for Indians or their ways of warfare, was still trying to appear to be acting honourably, but he wanted some level of revenge. Amherst gave his orders to attack St. Francis, but with the following rider, 'don't forget that tho' those villains have dastardly and promiscuously murdered the women or children of all ages, it is my orders that no women and children are killed or hurt.'[298]

Amherst may well have meant what he told Rogers not to do to women and children, but he was not naive either. He had been around the frontier since 1756 and knew that, once

[297] Stephen Brumwell, '"A Service Truly Critical": The British Army and Warfare with the North American Indians, 1755-1764', *War In History* 5 (1998): 146-175, 158
[298] Amherst to Rogers, 13 September 1759, *Annotated,* 171

launched, raids such as Rogers' did not stand on the laws of war when push came to shove. Amherst had heard the reports of prisoners killed when the lives of the Rangers were in peril. He knew the ferocity with which the lakes reconnaissance wars were fought. Amherst was trying to change the strategic calculation as his original plan of taking Quebec and Montreal was becoming more uncertain. To accomplish this, he was permitting his cultural norms to change slightly in terms of taking vengeance, but qualifying the action by making a clear statement of his intent that no women and children were to be hurt. Amherst may have hoped for no bloodshed of innocents, but he knew attacking an unsuspecting village would inevitably cause the deaths of women, elderly and children. On 13 September 1759, Rogers' force of two hundred left Crown Point in route to St. Francis. After an incredibly arduous march, Rogers fell upon St. Francis in the early morning of 4 October, killing many in their sleep and burning the town. Rogers did take some prisoners with him, but many others died in the conflagration, including women, children and elderly.[299] The raid was not successful in killing many Abenaki warriors, who were not present in large numbers, but it did send a message to the French allied Indians that they were no longer safe from the British. One can only speculate as to whether Amherst would have launched the St. Francis raid if he had known that the British had taken Quebec, but undoubtedly a corner had been turned. When Amherst was faced with failure, real or imagined, he was willing to employ rhetoric and designations to justify actions deemed previously unacceptable. Whether surprised by the fact or not, Amherst held fast to the belief that Rogers' force did not kill women and children when presented this fact by a captured Frenchman.[300]

With Quebec, Niagara, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point in British hands and St. Francis chastised, Amherst could have allowed himself to feel somewhat satisfied with his first campaign season as Commander-in-Chief. However, things were not perfect. Montreal had not been threatened by Thomas Gage coming down the St. Lawrence from Niagara as Amherst had wished. Amherst would need to plan a full-blown campaign in 1760 to dislodge the French from Montreal. To add to his problems, the Cherokee in the south were attacking frontier settlements and stopping the South Carolina militia cold in their tracks. Governor Lyttleton requested a regular force to put down the rebellion against the recent

[299] Brumwell, *White Devil*, 183-205
[300] Amherst Journal Entry, 2 November 1759, *Journals of Jeffrey Amherst*, 186

allies of John Forbes. Less known to Amherst, but far more serious was that the Seneca living nearest the Ohio region were busy floating a plan to other tribes to attack the British around the Great Lakes and Ohio. Even though this plan was not taken up, the seeds of discontent had been sown. Amherst's hatred of the Indians grew with these events. Amherst determined to end the war with the French and all of the Indians in 1760.

In the Spring, Amherst sent Archibald Montgomery to quell the troubles in South Carolina. Montgomery took 1,300 of his own Highlanders and Royal Scots, a small force of Mohawk and Stockbridge Indians, and fifty Catawba warriors into the Lower Cherokee towns. Amherst made clear to Montgomery what his mission was to be,

> I am not in the least doubt but you will effectually protect the Colony and punish the Indians for this infamous breach of the peace they had so lately made, in such a manner that His Majesty's subjects may hereafter enjoy their possessions without any dread of those barbarous and inhumane savages.[301]

And

> act against them offensively by destroying their towns and cutting up their settlements (as shall occur best to you for the future protections of the Colony, the lives and properties of the subjects, and the present punishment of those barbarian savages for their inhuman acts of cruelty).[302]

Amherst issued these orders with none of the caveats that he had given Rogers on the St. Francis raid, although he might have assumed that Montgomery and he shared an understanding that he had to make explicit to Rogers. There is also no discussion of whether to use the Catawba Indians or how they were to be employed or controlled. The message is clear. This was to be a punishment and Montgomery was to destroy Cherokee livelihoods to keep the situation from arising again, at least until the French could be forced to totally capitulate. There was no need to instruct Montgomery about how to control his Indian allies, because the British troops were to destroy the Cherokee towns with little restraint. Far from the previous British position of treating the Indian nations and North American warfare as an extension of European norms, Amherst is speaking like a colonial.

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[301] Amherst to Montgomery, 24 February 1760, Mays, *Amherst Papers,* 80
[302] Amherst to Montgomery, 6 March 1760, Ibid., 83

To resemble a colonial governor, the only thing missing from Amherst's instructions was a scalp bounty. These instructions follow the frontier ethic of causing such destruction that the enemy will think twice of attacking again.

On 1 June, Montgomery marched into the lower towns. They fought running battles with the Cherokee and burned five villages. Montgomery's report to Amherst on these attacks was reminiscent of Rogers St. Francis raid, 'Some of them who had concealed themselves were burnt in the town, which we left in ashes'. However, Montgomery's destruction did not stop with one village. He states further, 'and then proceeded to their other towns which all shared the same fate'. As for non-combatants, Montgomery reported 'a good many women and children were made prisoners, some could not be saved'.[303] The British stopped to parley, but the Cherokee were unresponsive. On 24 June, Montgomery headed for the middle towns, but was harassed the whole way by the Cherokee. He stopped on 27 June after taking Etchoe, the leading middle town, but encountered stiff resistance. The battle took its toll on both sides, but Montgomery realised that if he went further his casualties would only get more onerous on his logistical capabilities to transport them safely.[304] By 1 July, Montgomery was back at Fort Prince George and preparing to leave the frontier. By the middle of August, Montgomery and his troops were sailing back to New York. Montgomery may have been just anxious to return to what he felt was the real battlefield of Canada or he may have thought that he really had chastised the Cherokee into submission. However, unbeknownst to him or Amherst at this point, Fort Loudoun, the colonial post in the Cherokee upper towns, had surrendered to the Cherokee on 7 August 1760 after a rare Indian siege. The Cherokee headmen agreed the garrison could march out to safety with Cherokee escorts on 8 August 1760. However, by 10 August, in a situation eerily reminiscent of the massacre at Fort William Henry, the protective escorts had melted away and the colonial column was left exposed. A group of Cherokee attacked the column killing twenty-nine and taking 120 hostages. If Amherst and Montgomery felt that burning the lower towns would be enough to get the Cherokee to give up hostilities, they were plainly wrong. However, the Cherokee also seemed to hold the view that taking Fort Loudoun and repelling Montgomery's force would convince the British of the same. Both sides seemed blind to the reasoning of the other in their actions.[305]

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[303] Montgomery to Amherst, 4 June 1760, Ibid., 122
[304] Montgomery to Amherst, 2 July 1760, Ibid., 127-129
[305] Oliphant, *Anglo-Cherokee* ,135-139

The Cherokee concerns were very specific to their land and their security. Being insulted at new white settlements in their lands and having their lower settlements destroyed drove the Cherokee to revenge. However, what had made Amherst so aggravated with the Cherokee was that they were supposed to be British allies. First, in Amherst's view, they showed themselves to be poor allies in Forbes' march to Fort Duquesne. Second, they then caused trouble on the southern frontier. With the Montreal campaign on his mind, the need to send seasoned regulars to South Carolina to deal with the 'perfidious savages' was a distraction. Unknown to the Cherokee, they had committed the ultimate sin against Amherst. They risked Amherst's reputation by forcing him to lower his odds of ending the war for Canada. Amherst's descriptions of the Indians now took on a harsher tone with the uses of words like 'inhuman', 'barbarians', 'perfidious', 'and inhumane.'[306] Dr. Wayne Lee has made clear that these designations alone do not explain all situations where one side deems the other to be less than them culturally and deserving of the punishment. However, the instructions to Rogers in the St. Francis raid for vengeance and the instructions to Montgomery to punish the 'perfidious' 'barbarians' changed the cultural norms, because the calculation of what was required to win the war had changed. In other words, the British could not spare a huge force with the required logistical requirements in the mountainous terrain of South Carolina or into remote Indian villages of Canada. In Amherst's view, the only way to handle the situation was to send a small force, but have them act so violently that the Cherokee would have no choice but to capitulate, or at least refrain from further attacks. Once this line was crossed, the use of Indians against certain opponents, including the French, became far more acceptable.

While Montgomery was sent to deal with the Cherokee, Amherst engaged with what he viewed as his main work, to reduce French Canada to total surrender. Amherst's plan to take Montreal involved a three-pronged attack. One would originate from British held Quebec up the St. Lawrence River. The second would originate from Crown Point on Lake Champlain from the south. Amherst would lead the third from Fort Oswego across Lake Ontario and down the St. Lawrence. As he was passing through Iroquois lands, Sir William Johnson enlisted 706 Iroquois warriors to join them on 23 July 1760. As large as this force was, it was not an overwhelming percentage of his 11,000 regulars. Amherst showed no reticence in using the Iroquois and deployed them with British officers and Rangers on

[306] Amherst to Montgomery, 24 February 1760 and 6 March 1760, Mays, *Amherst Papers,* 80 & 83

reconnaissance as his large force moved. Amherst did make a few veiled comments on his feelings about his allies in his journals. On 25 August, having taken a French island post upriver from Montreal, Amherst sent in some of his forces to take the surrender, but stated flatly, 'I did not permit an Indian to go in'.[307] On 4 September, after the surrender of the Isle of Perrot, Amherst reported that the residents ran and hid, but returned in small groups and 'not a Soul was killed by our Savages'. [308]Of course, he could only enforce this dictates by having many more forces than the Indians. These actions precipitated the Iroquois leaving in droves. By the time Amherst took Montreal, only a quarter of the Iroquois were still with him. However, the Iroquois' real value was just being with Amherst in such large numbers in the march up to Montreal. As they passed through Indian villages that had traditionally supplied warriors to the French, the Iroquois spoke to the inhabitants and convinced them that the British were to inevitably win the war and it would behoove them to at least remain neutral in the coming siege of Montreal. On the French side, a conference had been called by the French commander of Montreal, Francois-Gaston, the Chevalier de Levis with the local Indians. Levis felt he had little chance against the British juggernaut, but thought that if he could just recruit a few hundred Indians, he might be able to hold out for another season. However, this was not to be as his conference was interrupted by an Indian messenger from up river who declared that the Indians were making their peace with Amherst and his Indian allies. The remaining Indians left immediately. Meanwhile, Amherst's three prongs arrived almost simultaneously at Montreal. Levis had not much choice, but to surrender Montreal and advised Vaudreuil as such on 8 August 1760. Amherst denied the French the honours of war for having excited 'the savages to perpetrate the most horrid and unheard of barbarities in the whole progress of the war'.[309] A European officer to the end, Amherst left little doubt that the use of Indians and the type of warfare that resulted over the previous five years disgusted him. Even if, perhaps especially if, Amherst had begun to accept the use of Indians and Indian tactics himself, he was going to punish those that he felt had forced this decision on him and the British Army by denying them the European honours of war. Francis Jennings says much of Amherst's vitriol towards the French was insincere. He said that the British and French both committed

[307] Amherst Journal Entry, 25 August 1760, Amherst, *Journals of Jeffery Amherst*, 239
[308] Amherst Journal Entry on 4 September 1760, *Journals of Jeffery Amherst*, 244
[309] Anderson, *Crucible* , 404-408

atrocities with and without Indians; the French just did it more and were better at it. [310] On 22 September 1760, Amherst ordered Johnson to outfit the remaining Indians as needed and send them home. Amherst may have felt that he had finally rid himself of Indian problems at last.

However, by mid-November Amherst received news that Fort Loudoun had fallen. The news took Amherst to new levels of aggravation, because he would have to send more troops to the southern sector. Since he no longer had the problem of securing the capitulation of the French, Amherst's language about the Indians could have softened, but it seemed to have hardened. In dispatching Montgomery's second-in-command in the first Cherokee campaign, Lieutenant Colonel James Grant, to handle the Cherokee problem conclusively, Amherst stated of the Cherokee,

> ... notwithstanding the most solemn engagements to protect the garrison [Fort Loudoun's defenders], and to conduct them in safety to Ft. Prince George, they, on their march, inhumanely butchered the commanding officer with several others, dragging the remainder into captivity; & and all this whilst the barbarians were actually suing for peace... These repeated outrages ... calling aloud for the most exemplary vengeance.[311]

Added to Amherst's previous list of grievances are terms of butchery and accusations of bad faith in peace negotiations and failing to honour the rules of capitulation after the siege. Critically, although subtle to this analysis, is Amherst's language in repeating his accusations of perfidy, barbarism, and inhumanity when his strategic calculation had changed. He no longer feared loss or delay of victory against France, but still believed the Cherokee deserved not only chastisement of the severest form, but 'to reduce them to the absolute necessity of suing for pardon, & effectually to put them out of their power of interrupting the peace.'[312] These directions indicate that Amherst now feels he is dealing with barbarians for certain and his instructions to decimate and deliver vengeance are justified, even if he now had the available force to conduct a more humane campaign.

Grant arrived at Charleston on 6 Jan 1761 with Mohawk and Stockbridge scouts as part of his force although we know little of their missions. Grant, who had also served with

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[310] Jennings, *Empire of Fortune,* .199
[311] Amherst to Grant, 15 December 1760, Mays, *Amherst Papers*, 150
[312] Amherst to Grant, 15 December 1760, Mays, *Amherst Papers*, 150

Forbes and Bouquet in their 1758 expedition with Cherokee warriors as allies as well as with Montgomery against the Cherokee in 1760, was wary of the small size of his force, the mountainous terrain and the remaining strength of the Cherokee. He took from January to mid-May to get to the lower towns. He was building and training his force that included Indians and militia and preparing his supply train. Simultaneously, he was sending out feelers to the more peaceable Cherokees led by Attakullakulla to try to reach a settlement before he had to march into the middle towns. This last effort was against Amherst's orders, but Grant was convinced that the Cherokee could be brought around to save their homes. Far more than Amherst, Grant knew the magnitude of the venture. However, on 7 June, he marched towards middle towns with a force of 2,800, including Catawba and Chickasaw warriors, but without any promise of bringing the Cherokee to peace. Grant's Indian allies provided an invaluable service on the flanks in protecting his large column.[313] On 10 June, he met the Cherokee at Etchoe and fierce battle began. The Indians made a stand similar to the one against Montgomery a year earlier, but Grant's force was larger and better prepared and provisioned. The fight was a draw, but eventually the Cherokee had to withdraw due to lack of ammunition. Over the next month, the Cherokee could only harass Grant while he proceeded to destroy all fifteen middle towns. As the British casualties and hardships grew and Grant could not force a decisive encounter with the Cherokee warriors, he seemed to have become enraged and took on a demeanour much closer to Amherst's. Grant finally issued the order to 'put every soul to death' that was found in the middle towns. The devastation of the towns and all of the crops increased in ferocity.[314] Among historians, there is some debate if this meant only warriors or also women, children and the elderly, but it is not denied that he gave the order to a force that would have been incredibly frustrated at the toil and guerilla harassment of their force. Regardless of its whole intent, Grant's order ratcheted up the violence against the Indians not seen until this point. Grant's Catawba and Chickasaw warriors scalped two old women as well as a few Cherokee they had captured, but not much more. In Rogers' raid on St. Francis and Montgomery's Cherokee campaign, the leaders at least tried not to harm non-combatants and prisoners. Fortunately, the order did not have a huge impact, because the towns and fields were all deserted, much to Grant's frustration. Grant finally had to return to Fort Prince George due

[313] Brumwell, 'Truly Critical', 169
[314] Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 132-140 & Anderson, *Crucible*, 465-466

to his troops' destructive exhaustion, but the destruction of the middle towns had its intended effect. They had destroyed 800 houses and destroyed 1500 acres of crops and driven 5,000 refugees to the upper towns. Approximately one-third of the Cherokee had been killed by violence or disease since 1760. By August 1761, the Cherokee began to seek peace. [315]

With total French capitulation and the Cherokees under control, Amherst was eager to get British relations with the Indians onto a peacetime footing. All of his experience with Indians to date had led Amherst to a very dim view of their reliability as allies. Like many senior British officials, except possibly John Forbes and Sir William Johnson, Amherst did not really even consider any Indian tribe's reasons for fighting, much less the various reasons for conflict each tribe had from Quebec to South Carolina. Amherst wanted the Indians and the whites to have limited contact and serve their King in the ways required by the Crown. Unlike the frontier settlers that Amherst and many British officers saw as little better than the Indians, Amherst did not seek to deprive the Indians of their lands. However, he did want to get trade and security in hand while also drastically reducing frontier costs to the incredibly stretched British finances. Amherst declared to Sir William Johnson that he wanted to stop the custom of gift giving and supplying more ammunition than was needed to hunt. Amherst's goal was twofold. First, he wanted to wean the Indians off of British subsidies to encourage them to work to produce trade goods and support themselves. Second, keeping them busy with supplying goods and providing for themselves would also drastically reduce their time available to conduct treachery against the British.[316] To prove his point that the Indians needed a firm hand from the British, Amherst took Grant's violence on the Cherokee as his proof to Johnson that, 'From this Example the Indians may be Convinced that We have it in our power to Reduce them to Reason, and You will accordingly make use of this'. [317]With these actions, even in peace, Amherst was making clear that if the Indians did not like the new regime, they would suffer the same fate as the Cherokee.

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[315] Oliphant, *Anglo-Cherokee,* 162-164 and n. 147 on p.246 and Thomas M. Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 139

[316] Amherst to Johnson, 9 August 1761, William Johnson, James Sullivan, Preparer, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 3* (Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 1921), 514-516

[317] Amherst to Johnson, 11 August 1761, Johnson, *Papers Volume 3*, 517

By early 1762, the British Army in North America had finished its large-scale operations and was monitoring the course of the remainder of the war against France in Europe. Amherst felt he had the situation under control and Indian allies were not needed in Britain's active service. Amherst did of course want to keep the Indians peaceful. However, the orders to severely restrict gift giving providing supplies of food, alcohol and ammunition were making it hard for those in British service to keep the Indians placated. Throughout 1762, the Indians began to send envoys between their communities extending war belts to those that would listen. The precipitation of this situation came from three main causes. First, the Indians of the Ohio Valley were becoming more suspicious that the British did have designs on their land. An influx of traders, hunters and settlers in the backwoods of Pennsylvania and Virginia looked to most Indians just like the dispossession the Delaware had seen in eastern Pennsylvania. Additionally, the army began reconditioning old forts and building new ones in the heart of the Ohio country. Second, the paucity of goods and supplies was seen by the Indians as a way of keeping them weak and subjugated. Finally, a series of 'prophets' had emerged, most notably a Delaware named Neolin, who advised the natives that they should reject the white man's ways and return to their traditional way of life. Amherst seemed unconcerned at the intelligence he was sporadically receiving of the Indian threat. He seemed to genuinely believe that the Indians feared destruction by the British and had only to be reminded of British strength to be brought back into line. As if the preceding eight years had never happened, Amherst entered 1763, much like Braddock had in 1755, entirely dismissive of the Indians capability to defend the midwest.[318]

By the summer of 1763, the Indian rebellion known as Pontiac's War was underway. By the autumn, the Indians of many different midwestern tribes had taken all of the British forts west of Fort Pitt, except Detroit. The war would drag on for a year as the army put together relief expeditions to each of the forts, some of which ended in disaster. Others were successful, but at a high cost and were close run endeavours. The Indian sieges eventually ended, as they could not be held by warriors that needed to hunt and defend their own villages. The Indians were not successful in driving the British out of the midwest, but they did drive Amherst out of command in 1763 and the British authorities out of their

[318] Richard Middleton , *Pontiac's War: Its Causes, Course, and Consequence, 1763-1765*. Routledge: New York and London, 2007), 47 - 64

misapprehension that they could merely control the midwest by diktat. By mid-1764, there was an uneasy truce that slowly eased the tension. There are few battles or campaign particulars to discuss that are pertinent to this paper, except for the extremes Amherst was willing to go to stop the rebellion. British Army Officers distributed blankets from the small pox hospital to Indians who were besieging Fort Pitt in the summer of 1763. Although the action did not originate from Amherst's direct orders, he did suggest it as a course of action subsequently; not knowing it had already been implemented. To Colonel Henry Bouquet, Amherst wrote '[y]ou will Do well to try to Innoculate the Indians by means of Blanketts, [sic] as well as to try Every other method that can serve to Extirpate this Execrable Race'. Small pox did indeed rage through the Ohio communities in 1763 – 1764 and took a huge toll on Indian society for disease took out not only warriors, but the wise old chiefs and women.[319] It did not extirpate the Indians, but that result was not from a lack of trying.

For the next decade, Britain would make decisions about the Indians without really understanding if they wanted to be allied with the Indians. The Indians were subjects of the British King, but were they worthy of being considered British subjects, with all of the rights and responsibilities, by the British leadership? Much was written about war time service with and against the Indians. Some of it was written for titillation of base fears, but some of it was a serious attempt by individuals in the British Army who were trying to help the British leadership understand what they were dealing with. A treatise by Captain Gavin Cochrane stated,

> The Indians have one great advantage over us. They ly [sic] concealed, count our numbers, & see all of our movements, whilst it is impossible for us to know, very often, that any enemy is near; this enables them to attack us to the greatest advantage, if they think it convenient to do it; & we are ignorant to every thing relating to them. by making constant alarms, night, & day, they can fatigue our Troops beyond measure, & when we come not to mind them, attack us when we least expect it. Their meeting with the most shocking deaths with

[319] Elizabeth A. Fenn, 'Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffery Amherst', *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Mar., 2000):1552-1580, 1552 – 1557, & Matthew C. Ward, 'The Microbes of War: The British Army and epidemic Disease among the Ohio Indians, 1758-1765' in Skaggs, David C. & Nelson, Larry L., Eds. *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 63-78

> indifference shows they don't want for courage, tho' it is their maxim in war to act in Stratagem. The worst is, whilst we endeavour to punish them their insolence and treachery they retaliate without mercy on the poor inhabitants. It corrupts our morals: people of good Character talk of such way of revenge, as were always till now held in the utmost abhorance. [sic][320]

Cochrane was a junior officer, but was writing to a senior British minister and was making it clear how hard it was to engage the Indians and keep one's military honour. After a decade of fighting with and against the Indians in North America, the British Army still had no idea what its position was on using the Indians as allies.

Starting with Braddock's campaign, the British had tried to fight the war with European military honour in both ethics and technique. They had to make many adjustments in organisation and tactics, largely without the help of the Indians. In increments, they had made concessions to their way of making war by integrating Indians (and colonists) and their way of war, but had tried mightily to retain their ideals. Only after four years and near exhaustion at the task did the British find Generals that were capable of adapting their concept of honour to meet the task. The break with those ideals was complete by 1763 due mainly to Wolfe's and Amherst's leadership, although the reasoning had been carefully constructed in turning the Indians into 'inhuman barbarians' that deserved no better than they gave. With Pontiac's War, Amherst and the leaders of the British Army had come to engage in a type of warfare that no gentleman would have accepted on a European battlefield. They were no longer inhibited by notions of honour in using Indians or fighting them.

In terms of being able to recruit large bodies of Indian allies, the English were at a decisive disadvantage against the French at the beginning of the Seven Years' War. With some notable exceptions, they would remain at a disadvantage throughout the next fifty years due to their mishandling of Indian allies and their pretensions of invincibility. The British Army seemed incapable of understanding Indian motives and needs, even as they sought their help. The English would force the French to leave the American midwest, but

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[320] Gavin Cochrane to Lord Halifax, 1764, later published as Gavin Cochrane, *Treatise on the Indians of North America: Letter to Lord Halifax*, NL, MS 176, p. 9, Ch. 5

the English would never truly control it themselves and would eventually lose it altogether. In 1764, owning the American midwest was only a reality on a piece of paper in Europe.[321]

[321] Ward, *Backcountry*, 255 - 261 and in Mark H. Danley and Patrick J. Speelman, *The Seven Years' War: Global Views* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012), 47 - 71

'*A soldier is a Gentleman*
His honour is his Life
And he that Wont Stand by his Post
Will not Stand by his Wife'
-- Popular continental Army soldier's song[322]

6. Indians in a Civil War

The American Revolutionary War is the most fertile area to see many of the variations of British Army officer behavior with respect to honour and Indian ally use. The record is voluminous and well kept, if under explored in terms of military honour as a driving force in decision making. Especially important to this paper is the knowledge we have of the senior British Army officers' lives and views. By 1775, through years of reporting on both sides of the Atlantic, the British public, the army, the political establishment and the press were fully aware of the Indian way of warfare and had firm opinions about its use. No one could credibly claim to have been surprised by what Indian allies would do if employed, although some still thought they could control them.

The Revolution was certainly not exclusively about control of the midwest, but the attempt to exact taxes for the costs of its security and to restrict its free access by the American colonists were two leading causes of the war.[323] In 1775, the line of settlement was still on the margins of the midwest, but trans-Appalachian settlements in the Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Virginia backcountries were causing great pain for the Indians and British Army alike. Therefore, the campaigns on the midwestern periphery during the Revolution were very important to the Indians who viewed it as a war to control the midwest rather than a colonial independence movement. Furthermore, much as they had in the Seven Years' War, midwestern Indians most often chose neutrality, a British alliance, or a colonial-American alliance depending on which option would most likely improve the Indians' chances to control their portion of the midwest in the manner they chose.

The British Army generally chose their Indian allies as a matter of specific need, while trying to control their use with white officers attending them. The British Army was working with the expectations of a very vocal honour group of Britain's popular press,

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[322] Caroline Cox *A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington's Army* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 37-38
[323] Jeremy Black, *Crisis of Empire: Britain and America in the Eighteenth Century* (New York and London: Continuum, 2008), 104-105, Sosin, *Whitehall*, 79-98 & Woody Holton, 'The Ohio Indians and the Coming of the American Revolution in Virginia', *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Aug., 1994): 453-478

some politicians, and the general population. This group made clear to their forces and their civilian ministers that they did not approve of indiscriminate Indian attacks on their American cousins.[324] Therefore, during the period of 1775 to 1783, the British Army certainly did hinder its effectiveness, because of a reluctance of some officers to make full use of the capabilities of Indian allies. Where Indians were deployed fully, well-supplied, and allowed to make the most of their skills, they were incredibly effective. This was especially true when Indian and British objectives aligned. When the British wanted to force a diversion of American manpower to the backcountry, the Indians were enthusiastic to help, because it meant striking areas that they felt were inappropriately settled by the Americans. One of the interesting situations of this era was the half-hearted use of Indians, especially Indians recruited from far-away lands who had no ties to the area of battle. Specifically, the Burgoyne campaign threatened their full use, but did not allow them to operate effectively. Much as the French General Montcalm experienced in 1755 to 1757, this created the disadvantage of a propaganda disaster and Indian alienation without the advantages of the Indian effectiveness. It was becoming clear that European armies could choose to ally with Indians or not according to their principles, but the idea that they could be used effectively under the total control of those armies was proving an illusion.

The midwestern Indians, in general, were more disposed to align themselves with the British or remain aggressively neutral against the American colonists. Therefore, the British Army potentially had many opportunities to recruit Indians as allies or auxiliaries. To establish why this was the case, one must understand what had happened in the Midwest from 1763 to 1775. Following the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763, the British government was deep in debt and wanted to reach a peace where trade could flourish in North America to help pay off the debt. The Indians of the Midwest did not think the peace terms included their lands. The British government certainly believed the midwest to be part of its conquests, but did not feel it needed immediate development to reignite commerce in North America. In the short term, Britain was willing to trade commercial expansion for security in the midwest. The American colonists, on the other hand, felt they had fought the war almost exclusively for the right to develop the midwest. These facts were to inflame the region for the next fifty years beginning with the Indian rebellion known as Pontiac's War in 1763-1764. In an attempt to establish order, the British declared

[324] Bickham, *Savages* 243-271 & Bickham, *Headlines,* 206-233

the ridge of the Appalachian mountain range as the dividing line between Indian and colonist in his Proclamation of 1763. Of course, there were already white colonists living west of this line, especially the area leading to the Forks of the Ohio River, but these were individual settlers rather than land speculators. To partially appease the speculators and open up the area to large-scale settlement and trade, Indian Superintendent of the northern Indians Sir William Johnson negotiated the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 with the Iroquois which opened up the area around Fort Pitt, most of modern day eastern Kentucky, and West Virginia to white settlement. The Iroquois conducted these negotiations on behalf of the tribes that lived in the area as the Iroquois still claimed suzerainty over them and the area through historical conquest.[325] In the south, Superintendent for the southern Indians, John Stuart, negotiated the Treaties of Hard Labor (1768) and Lochaber (1770) with the Cherokee who also conceded large tracts of land in modern day eastern Tennessee, Kentucky and southern West Virginia, some of which overlapped with claims in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix.[326] The Shawnees and Mingoes (Ohio area Seneca), as well as some renegade western Cherokee, known as the Chickamauga, who lived and hunted in the conceded area had not been consulted or had their views ignored. This situation set the scene for further conflict over settlements with raids and reprisals almost continuously from 1765 to 1774.[327] Along with these grievances was a nascent Indian solidarity movement building in the midwest. Rumours of this movement made their way to London and caused the British government to enforce the Proclamation of 1763 more strictly. British officials were trying to ward off another costly Indian rebellion, but the speculators kept looking for ways to open the trans-Appalachian frontier.[328] By 1774, Indian raids on colonial settlements in Kentucky (then part of Virginia) reached a point where the Virginia Governor, John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore, a supporter of the speculators in Virginia, was able to justify action in launching a militia campaign to chastise the Shawnee and Delaware in particular. The result was Lord Dunmore's War where the Indians were defeated near modern day Point Pleasant, West Virginia (also then part of Virginia). The resulting Treaty of Camp Charlotte, concluded with only a grudging acceptance by the

[325] Davis, *Auxiliaries,* 710-712
[326] John R. Alden, *The South in the Revolution 1763-1789* (Louisiana State University Press and The Littleton Fund For Southern History Of The University of Texas, 1957), 133-139
[327] Ruben Gold Thwaites, *Documentary History of Dunmore's War 1774* (Madison: The Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905), pp. ix-xii
[328] Woody Holton, 'The Ohio Indians and the Coming of the American Revolution in Virginia', *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Aug., 1994): 453-478, 453-474

Shawnee and Mingo, produced more land concessions in the Ohio. The British government in London took a dim view of the treaty, but had more pressing matters building with the colonial rebellion. As Britain and the American colonists headed towards war, the midwestern Indians along the American frontier from Pennsylvania to Georgia were not at all happy with American incursions since 1763.[329] The Shawnee leader Cornstalk expressed this feeling directly in the Autumn of 1776,

> … all our lands are covered by white people, & we are jealous that you still intend to make larger strides – We never sold you our Lands which you now possess on the Ohio between the Great Kenhawa & the Cherokee, & which you are settling without ever asking our leave, or obtaining our consent… That was our hunting Country and you have taken it from us.[330]

Fear of the colonists' continuing pressure on the frontiers in both the north and the south meant the Indians of the midwest were most likely to side with the British. Therefore, the help of a large portion of Indians seemed certain for the British Army, if they chose to engage them in ways that would enhance the Indians' local security. However, this did not mean that the British jumped at the chance. The decision to use the Indians as allies against the French in the Seven Years' War had been a tortured one as demonstrated previously in this paper. The decision to use them in large numbers only came near the end of the war, when the British Army leadership had become disgusted with the French and their Indian allies. The British largely adopted Indian tactics, but only attempted to use Indian customs when fighting Indians or French acting in concert with Indians. As previously demonstrated, to allow themselves to do this required labeling the Indians barbarous and inhumane. This gave the British Army officer corps some philosophical cover for conducting operations that normally would have caused dishonour had they occurred in Europe. Unconsidered, or perhaps not having the luxury of being considered, were the consequences of these epithets. They would begin to build a picture of the Indians as cruel and inhumane in the British consciousness.

Conducting operations against the rebellious Americans would be a different matter. At the beginning of hostilities in America, the British leadership was hesitant to enlist the help

[329] Thwaites, *Dunmore's*, xiv-xxiv
[330] Calloway, *Indian Country*, 166

of the Indians for all of the traditional reasons explored previously in this paper. The British and the Americans preferred sympathetic neutrality from the Indians, but both the Americans and the British feared that if they did not appeal to the Indians to stay friendly to them that the other side would actively recruit them. The British did prepare for the possibility of having to use the Indians. Lieutenant General Thomas Gage, the commander-in-chief in North America, had been almost exclusively in America since 1755 and had as much experience in North American warfare as any British leader. Gage wrote to several Indian agents as early as December 1774 to direct them to keep the local Indians friendly to the King's interest and ignore entreaties to side with the colonists.[331] In early 1775, the Americans also began to try to keep the Iroquois friendly with Congressional speeches sent via a missionary. However, they also went further and recruited Stockbridge, Passamaquoddy, St. John's, and Penobscot Indians. These Indians were known as 'domiciled' Indians as they lived in villages near American settlements and were often integrated with American colonial society. [332] It has been argued that these Indians did not qualify as 'real' Indians, because they lived lives similar to the American colonists. However, when it came to warfare, their methods were still more Indian than European culturally. One of the Stockbridge Indian leaders, Captain Solomon Uhhaunauwaunmut, reported to the Americans on 11 April 1775 that he would fight for them, but

> One thing I ask of you if you send me to fight, that you will let me fight in my own Indian way. I am not used to fight [sic] English fashion, therefore you must not expect I can train like your men. Only to point out to me where your enemies keep, and that is all I shall want to know.[333]

The Stockbridge Indians did join the American forces besieging Boston and it seems that the Americans did allow them to fight in their 'own Indian way'. Thomas Gage received intelligence on 30 April that 'A company of Indians are [sic] come down from Stockbridge [&] more are to be provided if they are wanted'.[334] Gage later wrote to John Stuart that '…they have brought down all the Savages they could against us here [Boston],

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[331] Gage to Lernoult (Detroit), Guy Johnson (Johnson Hall), Caldwell (Niagara), & Stuart (Charleston) (TGP)(AS125), separate letters all dated, December 1774, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 125
[332] Wilcomb E. Washburn, 'Indians and the American Revolution' at http://www.americanrevolution.org/ind1.html - Note 5
[333] Force, ed. (1839), *American Archives, Series IV, Volume II*, pp. 315-316 as quoted by Davis (1887)
[334] Joseph Warren to Gage, 30 April 1775, unsigned, unaddressed intelligence report. WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 128

who with their Rifle men are continually Firing on our Sentries'.[335] This report is corroborated by diary accounts of those present at the siege of Boston. In the early modern era of European warfare standards, firing on sentries was considered a dishonourable and ungentlemanly way to conduct warfare. [336] These are critical facts that help provide a frame of reference for what Gage was thinking when he began distributing orders to actively recruit Indians into the British cause.

Prior to hostilities, Gage had requested more British troops to quell the rebellion and had been refused by London.[337] As John Shy has pointed out, the British leadership in London, showing a dangerous misunderstanding of British capability, focused too much on what should be done, rather than what could be done with the British Army in America. [338] They felt any British Army force could deal with the colonial militia. This often led them to calculate that they did not need more troops or the help of Indian allies. One experienced officer, Major General Frederick Haldimand, was under no illusion of the strength of the colonial militia, stating, 'The Americans would be less dangerous if they had a regular army'. [339] Haldimand would make his mark authorizing and managing Indian use in Canada later in the war. Proving Haldimand correct, the fights at Lexington and Concorde 19 April 1775 and the siege around Boston were to show the British that the American forces were going to be harder to defeat than they originally thought. It is worth quoting General John Burgoyne at length to make this point explicit,

> I believe in most states of the world as well as our own, the respect, and control, and subordination of government … depends in a great measure upon the idea that trained troops are invincible against any numbers or any position of undisciplined rabble; and this idea was a little in suspense since the 19th of April.[340]

Two days after Lexington and Concord, Gage wrote to Guy Carleton, Captain-General and Governor in Chief of Quebec, that a body of Canadians and Indians would be 'of great use', but he makes clear that they should be 'Under the Command of a judicious person'.[341] To add to Gage's problems, Ethan Allen of the 'Green Mountain Boys', a Ranger-like

[335] Gage to Stuart, 12 September 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 135
[336] Davis, Auxiliaries, 715-716
[337] Shy, 'Gage' in *Opponents, Volume II*, 24
[338] Shy, *Towards Lexington*, 423
[339] Shy, 'Gage' in *Opponents, Volume II*, 27
[340] Burgoyne to Germain 20 August 1775, quoted in Billias, *Opponents, Volume II*, 30
[341] Gage to Carleton, 21 April 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 127

militia from the Vermont region of Connecticut had captured the British garrison at Fort Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775. Allen had then issued a letter to the Canadian Indians encouraging them to join his force and attack the British.[342] Not only had the Americans recruited and deployed Indians to Boston, but they were allowing them to fight in the Indian manner. The prospect of Indians working in conjunction with New England Rangers would have been especially vexing for Gage. Probably better than anyone, he knew from experience how effective these two groups could be together. Thereafter, Gage informed William Legge, the Second Earl of Dartmouth and the minister responsible for the colonies, of these facts on 12 June 1775 and suggested that the British should not fear bringing the Indians since the Americans had done it first. Although he did state that the Stockbridge Indians were not 'distant Indians' and 'not of great worth'.[343] This remark is interesting and unexplained. Whether Gage was trying to keep Lord Dartmouth from worrying too much about the Indians or whether sniping at sentries had not yet had great effect is unknown. Regardless of his reasoning, Gage had begun to instruct his subordinates, specifically Guy Carleton in the North and John Stuart in the South to begin recruiting and deploying Indians.

Not only did Gage instruct Carleton and Stuart to recruit Indians for defence, but specifically to have them attack the frontiers. He directed Carleton to have the Canadians and Indians 'fall upon the Frontiers of this Province [Massachusetts] and that of Connecticut, in order to make a Diversion of their force'.[344] Carleton could construe his mission as he wished, and he did, because he had other forces at this disposal. For instance, he had enough white officers to send with the Indians, to maintain control and limit the worst behavior, in the way that had always been favoured by the British. This would have allowed Carleton to make the case that the Indians were not dishonourably 'unleashed' on the population. However, Gage directed Stuart to have the Indians 'distress them all [colonials] in their Power' and Stuart did not have many white officers at his disposal which Gage knew.[345] Therefore, it can be asserted that Gage was not erring towards escorted Indian missions at this point. The only mitigating event that had occurred between

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[342] Allen to The Assembly of Connecticut, 26 May 1775, Peter, Ed. Force, *American Archives, Fourth Series, Volume II* (Washington, D.C.: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839), 713-714
[343] Gage to Carleton, 3 June 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 129 and Jack M. Sosin, 'The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-assessment of Responsibility.' *Canadian Historical Review*, 46 (June 1965): 101-121., 110
[344] Gage to Carleton, 3 June 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 129
[345] Gage to Stuart, 12 September 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 135

Gage's letter to Carleton on 3 June 1775 and his 12 September letter to Stuart was the Battle of Bunker (and Breed's) Hill on 17 June 1775. The British under General Howe had taken the hill, but with severe losses. It could be that Gage was more open to any use of Indian forces after Bunker Hill. His subsequent chain of letters to Carleton asking for a diversion on the Massachusetts and Connecticut frontiers could be an indicator of his panic over the weakening of his Boston situation.[346] Gage's delay in directing Stuart until September seems to be due to the fact that he did not know where to write to Stuart. He knew that Stuart had decamped from Charleston under pressure, but was unsure to where he had moved.[347]

Gage had written to all of the western post commanders that communications would be very hard, due to the rebel action in the Northeast, so they should take their orders from Carleton.[348] Although Gage would continue to write to Carleton and urge him to use the Indians he had in his service, the tactical decisions to use the Indians in the north shifted to Carleton sometime in June.[349] This was a critical juncture as most of the western commanders were more than willing to undertake action against the colonial frontiers. Up to this point, Gage had only asked the commanders of the western posts to prepare to recruit the Indians and to make sure they were not siding with the colonists. Guy Johnson, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the North (since his uncle Sir William Johnson had died in 1774), had readied two separate forces of 1,500 and 1,700 at Montreal. Johnson had not released his recruits onto the frontier but had used the traditional language and ceremony in the process of inviting them "To feast on a Bostonian and drink his blood".[350] However, Gage was now inserting Carleton as the decision maker on how they would be used. Gage's assumption that he would not be able to communicate regularly with his western post commanders may have cost him dearly in the North.

Carleton was very hesitant to use the Indians at his disposal. Contrary to Gage and Stuart, Carleton's career had mostly been spent in Europe. He had accompanied his mentor,

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[346] Gage to Carleton 3 July 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 131 & Gage to Carleton 12 August 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 132 & Gage to Carleton 18 August 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 134

[347] Gage to Stuart 12 September 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 135

[348] Gage to Carleton, Guy Johnson (Guy Parke), Caldwell (Niagara), De Peyster (Michilimackinac), and Lernoult (Detroit), Five separate letters, all dated 20 May 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 129

[349] Paul Lawrence Stevens, 'His Majesty's Savage Allies: British Policy and the Northern Indians During the Revolutionary War. The Carleton Years, 1774-1778', (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1984) 308

[350] Graymont, *Iroquois*, p. 68

James Wolfe, at Quebec in 1759, but had returned to England wounded in that same year. The remainder of his service in the Seven Years' War was in Europe. Being close to Wolfe, he would have sensed all of the frustration of dealing with the Canadian population and the swarms of Indians that pounced on any weakness from the shadows. His opinion of the Canadian populace and their reluctance to volunteer for the militia secured his opinion of the population as feckless and probably seditious. On the subject of the Indians, he seemed to have had a very strong view that the atrocities they would inevitably commit were not worth the price. If the rebels wanted to invade Canada and corrupt the Canadians into revolt, he would certainly use the Indians in defence. However, if Canada could be secured, Carleton seemed to be in the camp of British officials that viewed the best way to end the rebellion was to show mercy and humanity towards the Americans while simultaneously rebuffing their violent actions.[351]

Therefore, unlike Guy Johnson, Carleton did not trust the Indians being recruited. Carleton was trying to assemble a force to create a diversion, but one that was controlled by him, even though he was struggling to assemble a Canadian militia and he had sent most of his regulars to support Gage. He felt it was most prudent to keep the Indians close and in defence for fear that they would only cut off 'a few unfortunate Families, whose Destruction will be but of little Avail towards a Decision of the present Contest'. [352] This made the Indians in his service very impatient. Fall and winter were coming and they needed to hunt to support their families. They were roused to fight by Guy Johnson with their traditional cultural norms and being held in check by a cautious leader was not in their plans. A few participated in the defence of Montreal modestly, but were kept within the bounds of Canada. Even though he was very careful in using his Indian allies, the Americans accused him of using them indiscriminately. He defended himself to Lord Dartmouth, 'I would not even suffer a Savage to pass the Frontier, though often urged to let them loose on the rebel Provinces. Least cruelties might have been committed, & for fear the innocent might have suffered with the guilty'. [353] Never one to embrace anyone with close confidence, Carleton was especially cool to Johnson and Daniel Claus. Johnson pushed Carleton to use the Indians more widely and free them to do what they did best.

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[351] Smith, 'Carleton' in Billias, *Opponents, Volume II*, 103-119
[352] Carleton to Gage 27 July 1775, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS132 & Sosin, *Use of Indians*, 109-110
[353] Isabel Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant, 1743-1807, Man of Two Worlds* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 156, quoting Canadian State Papers Q11:270

Carleton would have none of it and relieved Johnson and his deputy, Claus of their duties in Canada. By October 1755, unbeknownst to Gage, Carleton had not done anything to relieve the pressure on Boston. Although Johnson and Claus had brought a huge force of Indians to the British cause in 1775 as Gage requested, they were not to play a decisive role in the years' events. Exasperated with Carleton's lack of using the huge Indian force at his disposal, the Indians went home and Guy Johnson and Daniel Claus, along with a Mohawk warrior named Joseph Brant, went to London to plead their case.[354] By the end of 1775, Carleton had lost Montreal and was under siege in Quebec.

Unlike the north, Gage really could provide very little direct influence in the south due to the distance and poor communications and might never have been able to significantly influence the Indians use there. However, his orders to have the Indians fall on the southern frontier were not implemented immediately by the southern Indian Superintendent John Stuart either. Stuart was a man thoroughly out of step with most of the coastal southerners, although he had lived in the colonies since 1748. Stuart, his family, and close friends, mostly from Scotland, could not identify with the independence movement and they made that plain in colonial Charleston. Stuart was a loyalist who felt that London knew best on colonial matters. In his view, the only mistake London had made was to be too lenient with the colonists. This fact, along with his insistence on a fair deal for the Indians under his charge, made him powerful enemies of the land owners and speculators of the colonies of Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. When rumours of Stuart agitating the Indians to attack the frontier surfaced, they were taken as fact. In these colonies where slaves outnumbered whites significantly, rumours of slave revolts and Indian attacks were taken very seriously. Stuart tried to explain that the rumours had been started by his political rivals, but to no avail. Stuart had to leave Charleston in a hurry at the end of May 1775. Stuart had not tried to instigate an Indian war, but his correspondence pertaining to Gage's 1774 instructions to make sure the Indians were well disposed to support the King if needed were taken as confirmation of the rumours. Stuart decamped to St. Augustine, Florida and re-started correspondence with Gage from there in July 1775. When Gage finally learned where Stuart had established himself, he issued the orders of 12 September 1775 mentioned

[354] Guy Johnson to the Earl of Dartmouth, 12 October 1775, Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan, Ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York; Procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq. Volume VIII*. (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1857), 636-637,

above.[355] Stuart wrote two letters to Gage upon receipt of Gage's 12 September letter. In the first Stuart agreed with Gage stating, 'I shall pay the strictest attention to your commands contained in it'. The second states that the 'great majority' of the backcountry was strongly in support of the King and Stuart did not believe it was advisable to let the Indians loose unsupervised. As Carlton had worried about the Indians falling on scattered families in the north, both rebel and Tory alike, Stuart was very worried about the Indians falling on the Tories of the Carolina backcountry. It is unclear if this was new intelligence, but it marked a distinct change from the previous letter to Gage on the same day. [356] It seems that John Stuart interpreted that Gage's orders were not clear to send the Indians immediately and without white attendance. There is little in the record from October to December that explains how Stuart came to interpret his orders so leniently. However, to his deputies, he took to stating that they should encourage the Indians to attack only in concert with other forces, whether that was with loyalists or British forces. He sent letters to the southern colonial governors telling them he would bring the Indians to any official plans they had. However, it took until March 15, 1776 in a letter to Lieutenant General Henry Clinton that he explained that he had taken his orders from Gage to mean not sending the Indians indiscriminately onto the southern frontier.[357] Therefore, the southern Indians were being prepared to strike, but they would not be put into action until the following year. Again, how Stuart came to this reasoning is left untold. Why he did not make it clear to Gage that without any 'concerted' plans in 1775 there would be no Indian offensive on the southern frontier in 1775 is also not clear from the record.

Until June 1775, the decision to use Indians seems to have resided wholly with Thomas Gage. In his spring and summer correspondence, he directed preparation and use and the record does not indicate him asking for permission, nor extended discussion on the merits of using them. If he had any reservations in using them, he showed little of it in his correspondence. [358]Although Gage has been somewhat rescued from the early historical literature as having been solely responsible for unleashing the Savages onto the American

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[355] Snapp, *Stuart Empire,* 153-166

[356] Peter Force, Ed. *American Archives, Fourth Series, Volume IV*. (Washington, D.C.: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1843), 316-317

[357] Hamer, 'John Stuart's Indian Policy During the Early Months of the American Revolution' , *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Dec., 1930): 351-366, 360-366 & Sosin, 'The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-assessment of Responsibility.' *Canadian Historical Review*, 46 (June 1965): 101-121, 113-114 & John R. Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1944), 268-271

[358] Stevens, 'Savage Allies' 309-312

populace, it is clear from his directions to Carleton and Stuart that he meant for them to unleash the Indians on the American populace. It is only from restraint on the part of Carleton and Stuart that they were not sent early in the war.[359] Unlike the rest of the British leadership, Gage had never really been separated from the effects of Indian War and war in North America. He had seen it and its results from virtually every angle from 1755 through 1774. He also knew the capabilities and shortcomings of the British Army in North America better than anyone. Gage has been painted as a good administrator, but poor field commander and this may be true. [360] However, he has rarely been given credit for seeing what few others in the British leadership saw in the summer of 1775, that the British Army needed help if it was to quell the rebellion. It became conventional wisdom in the British leadership that the British Army's problem in 1775 was due to the geography of Boston and the ardor of the independence movement in Massachusetts. However, had the large forces of Indians recruited by Guy Johnson been released onto the northeastern frontier, as Gage had directed, it is not outlandish to suspect that the rebel siege of Boston would have been greatly diminished.

London eventually lost confidence in Gage and recalled him to London in late September 1775 and Lieutenant General William Howe, the pyrrhic victor of Bunker Hill, became the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in North America. In November of 1775, Lord George Germain, First Viscount Sackville, became the Secretary of State for the Colonies and took over from Lord Dartmouth. Even though Gage and Dartmouth had both ordered the use of Indians on the frontier, it had not taken place by November 1775. Howe had far larger conventional plans for 1776 and the use of Indians was put onto the back burner. Lord Germain was adamant about using whatever force necessary to put down the rebellion, but he was still very cautious of the effect of using Indians would have on the British public. He stated to the Governor of East Florida that the Indians 'perhaps ought not be pressed forward, but in proportion as it may be necessary to counteract any Steps of the like tendency, which may be taken by the rebels'. [361] By the end of 1775, Carleton and Stuart were seemingly vindicated in their interpretation of Gage's orders not to deploy Indians onto the frontiers without escort.

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[359] Sosin, *Use of Indians*, 101-104 and p. 121
[360] Shy, 'Gage, in Billias, *Opponents*, Volume II, 29-33
[361] Bickham, *Savages*, 249

In December 1775, Guy Johnson reached London between Christmas and New Year. Johnson had taken his voyage to Britain seriously and had created a detailed argument to present to Germain. He immediately sought a meeting with Lord Germain. Johnson explained how unleashing the Indians onto the frontiers would be the best way to use them. Over the next month, Johnson would formalize his proposals in a document. Lord Germain was impressed, but still cautious in committing to the full use of Indians as independent actors. Since he had taken office, Lord Germain and his Generals had committed to a plan for 1776. Lieutenant General William Howe would leave Boston and take New York City and use it as a base. Lieutenant General Henry Clinton would take Wilmington, North Carolina as a point of entry in the south. Finally, Lieutenant John Burgoyne would join Governor-General Carleton in the retaking of Montreal and driving down the Lake Champlain corridor towards Albany. The intention was to link up the forces of Howe and Carlton in New York and cut off the northeast from the rest of the colonies. Johnson had been thanked for his input, but Lord Germain was sure the British could win the war in the conventional manner and with conventional forces. The Indians should be held on side to prevent the Americans from tempting them, but they were to be used only in conjunction with troops or loyalists and their main benefit would be in scaring the colonists. Johnson did have his position confirmed which gave him the authority to work with the Iroquois again. Johnson and his party sailed back to New York in June 1776. Johnson and Brant would sail back to America in the spring. [362]

With the spring of 1776 also came re-enforcements for Canada, led by Lieutenant General John Burgoyne as second-in-command to Sir Guy Carleton (a Knighthood having been bestowed on him for his defence of Quebec). The mission was to relieve the siege of Quebec, retake Montreal and chase the fleeing Americans to Albany. The American siege of Quebec collapsed immediately upon seeing the British re-enforcements. As the re-enforcements grew throughout May and June, Carleton moved on Montreal which also fell. However, Carleton was slow to pursue the Americans and they managed to retreat south along the Richelieu River. Carleton did use Indians and 160 of them were in the van at Montreal in May 1776. Furthermore, some were released to harry the American retreat. However, even as tight a leash as Carleton meant to keep, there were scalping incidents

[362] William R. Nester, *The Frontier War for American Independence* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2004), 97-99

around Montreal and the Richelieu River.[363] When Carleton found out about the Indians displaying the scalps in Montreal in June 1776, he scolded them and offered to purchase the freedom of any other prisoners they held. Predictably, this caused consternation in the Indian camps and most of them deserted Carleton again. At the time Carleton was happy with this as he needed to spend time constructing a naval capability to continue his pursuit of the Americans.[364] During this time, Carleton continued his tight grasp of his Indian auxiliaries, much to the disgust of Lieutenant Colonel John Johnson who was leading a band of loyalists and Indian from the Mohawk Valley. However, there were still instances of scalping that Carleton was very angry about when he found out about them. These stories made their way back to the tribes and made it harder to recruit them when needed and probably inclined some of the Iroquois to the American side. [365]

In the south in 1776, John Stuart had held his ground against American attempts to recruit the Indians. He also tried to keep the Indians from taking on the Americans in a frontier war. However, Governor Tonyn, who was adamantly for unleashing the Indians, had met a frontier loyalist named Thomas Brown. Brown was a large landowner in the Augusta backcountry who had run afoul of the rebels in his area. He had been tarred and feathered and held an enormous grudge against the rebels. Tonyn commissioned Brown as a leader of loyalist Rangers and immediately sent him to the Cherokee towns. News of Lieutenant General Henry Clinton's initiative against North Carolina was welcomed by both Tonyn and Stuart. Clinton was going to land at Wilmington and meet a loyalist force coming down from the backcountry. However, the loyalists, made up largely of recent Scottish highlander immigrants, were ambushed by rebels at Moore's Creek Bridge in February 1776. The force lost over half killed, wounded or captured. With the rebels so un-expectantly strong, Clinton decided to land his force at Charleston instead. This setback delayed the initiative until June. Stuart seemed happy to wait for very specific orders to use the Indians. He had interpreted Gage's orders as to only send out Indians in concert with British forces. He was helped along with his inaction by Howe and Lord Germain who had written less than rousing letters to him to keep the Indians on side, but to keep them from

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[363] Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, Eds. *The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants*. (Edison, New Jersey: Castle Books, 2002), 212-214
[364] Nester, *Frontier*, 108
[365] 'The Indians answer, Old Abraham, speaker', (1776), NL, Ayer MS 7

committing depredations.[366] Stuart, knowing Indian warfare from the Cherokee wars of 1759-1761, did not take any chances. However, Governor Tonyn was anxious to unleash the Indians in any capacity at all writing to Clinton in May 1776, 'nothing would have been more easy than to have the Indians in action'. Responding to Stuart's worry that the Indians would fall on loyalist and rebels alike in the backcountry, Tonyn argued, 'the King's Loyal Subjects could be easily separated from the rebels, and the attack, which would doubtless be cruel and wrong, but there are ways to do it distinguishably. It is cruel to continue doing nothing. It is always a losing game'.[367]

Tonyn was not just the Governor of East Florida, but also a Colonel of the 6th Dragoons with a distinguished record in the Seven Years' War. He also had strong relationships with the Floridian tribes. He might have been bombastic, but he was not naïve about Indian warfare.[368] Seemingly discounting Tonyn, Clinton added more to Stuart's desire to keep the Indians idle by writing to him in May 1776 and ordering him to keep the Indians friendly, but inactive. Tonyn was furious and wrote to Clinton again, 'The Americans are a thousand times more in dread of the Savages than of European troops. Why not avail of their help.'[369] This is probably the strongest case made by a British official, with the possible exception of Lord Dunmore of Virginia, to have the Indians fall on the frontier. However, Tonyn was surrounded by Indian Agents who had seen Indian war and knew how brutal it could be and British officials who thought that they could win the war without using Indians. The British leadership of the war effort may have believed that the Americans feared the Indians more, but that was because the Americans had not experienced the disciplined British bayonet yet. That was to begin to change as Clinton found that he could not invade Charleston either. He returned north to rejoin forces with Howe in New York.

However, there was an Indian war in the south in 1776. Although Stuart was against the Indians attacking the frontier, but he and Tonyn's loyalist Ranger commander, Thomas Brown, had been supplying them with goods, powder and ball to keep them friendly to the British cause. Still, the Indians had their own motives and encroachment from settlers was

[366] Stevens, '*Savage Allies*, 690-691
[367] Tonyn to Clinton 21 May 1776, quoted in Nester, *Frontier*, 114-115
[368] Murphee (2004), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
[369] Tonyn to Clinton, 11 June 1776, quoted in Snapp, *Struggle for Empire*, 170

their main concern.[370] The supplies provided the Cherokee, led by the militant Dragging Canoe, what they needed to take revenge on the settlers that had been encroaching on their lands, especially the settlements around Fort Watauga. Possibly spurred on by a visit from Shawnee, Delaware and Mohawk warriors from the north in May 1776 asking for concerted action against the frontiers, the Cherokees decided it was time to attack the settlements.[371] Not understanding that the loyalist had lost North Carolina and Clinton had been repulsed in Charleston, the Cherokees launched raids across the backcountry. There would be no British help to speak of to help them in the summer of 1776. The supply route from Pensacola in West Florida was too long to provide anything other than material support. These attacks were not directed by British agents, but Tonyn was right that the Americans feared the Indians more than the British. In a rare case of co-operation, the southern colonies quickly raised over 5,000 militiamen and marched into the Cherokee towns from multiple approaches. The Americans released devastation worse than even the British campaigns of 1760-1761. The peace faction of the Cherokees re-asserted themselves and agreed to the patriots' demands of peace and more land concessions. Once again, Indians found themselves having their expectations raised by the British, but found that action was not forthcoming when they were in trouble. The lack of British help and the swift retribution doled out by the Americans made the Creek think twice. They too had unwanted settlers on their land, but they calculated that there might be a better time to solve those problems. There would be sporadic attacks by militant factions of the Cherokee and Creeks throughout the rest of the war, but they would never rise to the potential that was present in 1775 and 1776. [372]

By July 1776, Guy Johnson and Joseph Brant returned to New York from England. Brant had fought with the British in New York, but was anxious to return to his Iroquois homeland. He made his way through American lines in November and up the Mohawk Valley to find that the rebels had rid the valley of most of the loyalists. He was told that John Johnson had moved his family and associates to Montreal to help the British there. Brant continued to Fort Niagara and did meet loyalist John Butler. The two would begin the long process of trying to get the Iroquois to come to the aid of Britain. However, there were some disagreements. Butler was following Carleton's orders to keep the Indians warm, but

[370] Calloway, *Indian Country*, 194
[371] Dowd, *Spirited*, 49
[372] Blackmon, *Dark and Bloody*, 51-93

not active. Having spoken to Lord Germain, Burgoyne, Howe, and the King during his time away, Brant had other ideas. He and Guy Johnson had formulated a plan to assist British. Brant now heard what he did not know when he was with Howe, Carleton had let the rebels escape and the British forces were defending Canada and not threatening the New York frontier. Brant was not impressed and made the case to Butler that they should not be following Carleton's orders. In a recruitment letter to a village of Mohawks, Brant wrote,

> …you may depend on having your own way of making war. I do not think it right to let my brothers go to war under the command of General Carleton as General Carleton expects & trys to have the Indians under the same command as the regular Troops, but it will be the best method for us to make war our own way.

Carleton got wind of this letter and wrote to Butler and Captain Lernoult that their orders remained the same. Brant would continue to recruit, but with limited success. It would take more time and a lessening of Carleton's influence for him to become a major force for the British.[373]

Guy Johnson stayed with General Howe in New York and New Jersey, but would not make it back to lead his Iroquois for another year. Howe led a very conventional campaign against Washington in New York and New Jersey with solid results until Christmas when Washington struck back at Trenton, New Jersey. The rest of 1776 passed quietly on the frontier, except for independent raids in Kentucky from both the north and the south. The settlers, most famously Daniel Boone, were sure that John Stuart in the south and Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton of Detroit were to blame. Much like Stuart, Hamilton would claim that he had only supplied the Indians around Detroit and the Ohio Valley, but had expressly asked them not to strike the frontier. [374]

By the end of 1776, the British had rarely used Indians in any way except to defend Canada and East Florida, even though Gage and Tonyn would have had a full scale Indian frontier war if they had had their way. The more reflective minds of Carleton, Stuart, Howe, Clinton, and Germain had urged caution. They had made great strides in keeping the Indians friendly and mostly away from active service with the Americans. Of course, the Americans did not see it that way. Every time they approached the Indians, they heard that

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[373] Kelsay, *Brant*, 186-187 & notes 6 and 7, p. 676

[374] Arbuckle to Fleming, 15 August 1776, Thwaites and Kellogg, *Revolution*, 185-187 & Blackmon, *Dark and Bloody,* 57-61

a British officer or agent had just been there and promised them much more. The American paranoia was understandable if not justified by facts. The Americans formally declared independence in July 1776 with the following statement forming one of the grievances against King George III, 'He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions'.[375] The Americans had few hard facts to substantiate this claim against the King, but it certainly was not from a lack of trying by his Commander-in-Chief in the first year of the war. The Americans might have been struggling in the field, but they were beginning to win the propaganda war in both America and Britain.

Therefore, the British government began 1777 in much the same position it had started 1776. The London government was not happy and neither was the King. Lord Germain had been kept out of the loop from Sir Guy Carleton's operations in Canada and New York. What he had heard and would hear in the coming months would not please him given the Governor-General's request for troops and supplies had been amply met. The lack of progress into New York from Canada in 1776 had meant that fewer American troops were needed to defend the area. Those extra troops were sent against Howe's force in New Jersey and caused great problems. The loyalists in the south were not as strong as the government had been led to believe either. Thus, Clinton's southern adventure had been called back. John Burgoyne was worried about being associated with Carleton's pace in pursuing the Americans or in his limited use of Indians. He travelled back to London over the winter and reported his feelings to Lord Germain. Germain would take the information to heart and began devising a plan to cut Carleton out of the military operations for the coming year. Carleton and Germain were not on good terms and their relationship would get only worse with the planning for how to run the Canadian side of the war going on in London without the input of Sir Guy Carleton.[376] These operations and the supplanting of Carleton from the decisions in the north were to cause a dramatic change in the use of Indians in the war. Not only would Indians who were closely associated with American settlements, but many from much further away would be summoned. This would have a

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[375] *Declaration of Independence*, American National Archives, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html , Accessed last on 31 July 2013.
[376] Alfred Leroy Burt, "The Quarrel between Germain and Carleton: An Inverted Story," *Canadian Historical Review*, 11 (1930): 202–22, 211-214

lasting effect on how the Indians would and *could* be used. Carleton's tight control of Indian war customs and his on-again-off-again approach to using the Canadian and New York area Indians had made them less willing to come forward to which Brant's and Old Abraham's comments mentioned above have alluded. Certainly, many still participated, but more Indians were to be brought from much further afield. These Indians from the far west did not have axes to grind with the American settlers (yet), so they came for the traditional reasons warriors had always gone on the warpath, personal glory and plunder. The British officers' lack of understanding on this issue would become a serious problem for Burgoyne. In this most important of years, Burgoyne and Henry Hamilton would come to be closely associated with the Indians operations on the American frontier.

John Burgoyne was a talented, but grandiose officer who had entered the Army in 1747, sold his commission shortly thereafter when needing money, and re-entered in 1756 when his fortunes had improved. An anonymous essayist remarking on London's high society stated, 'No man is more tender of his reputation'.[377] He had been successful in the Seven Years' War with a history of innovation in light cavalry and leadership. He had served with considerable success in France and Portugal and had gained Royal favour for his Sixteenth Light Dragoons. In 1761, he was elected to Parliament and in 1774 published a play that would later be performed to popular success in London. A love of good drink, gaming, and the high life were characteristics of his life when Burgoyne began service in the Revolution. In Boston in 1775, he witnessed Bunker Hill, but without significant command. He traveled back to London in 1775 where he spent his time lightly, but effectively criticising Thomas Gage, the North American British Commander of forces, and unsuccessfully seeking an independent command. He returned to North America in 1776 with troops for Governor Guy Carleton to protect Quebec from the Americans who were threatening along Lake Chaplain. Whilst in England in early 1777, Burgoyne detailed a plan to attack the rebels down the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson River corridor to Albany where he would meet Lieutenant General Sir William Howe to cut off the northeast from the rest of the colonies. There would also be a diversionary force of regulars, loyalists and Indians led by Lieutenant Colonel Barrimore St. Leger from Lake Ontario up the Mohawk Valley.[378] The plan was accepted by Whitehall and Burgoyne was sent back to

[377] Anonymous, Notes and Illustrations by Robert Heron, Esq. *The Letters of Junius Volume II*. (Philadelphia : Samuel F. Bradford, 1804)
[378] NA, CO 42/36, 19-25

Quebec in 1777 to put it into action. He had accomplished his wishes through confidence, energy, and sheer will. In short, 'Gentleman Johnny' Burgoyne was a bon vivant who translated his personal success, his good luck, and his connections into an independent command of forces in the Revolution.[379]

Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton was commissioned in the British Army in 1755 and served in the Seven Years' War in continental North America and the Caribbean. He served in Britain from 1768 to 1775, but was sent back to Quebec in 1775. There, he sold his Army commission, but accepted the quasi-military post of Lieutenant Governor of Detroit in 1775. There were two other governorships in the upper midwest at Kaskaskia and Vincennes as well. Although civilian in name, the governorships became militarised by the locations of the forts at the onset of the Revolution and had some British Army troops under their control if not official command. The midwest was of strategic concern as the Americans had been settling in Kentucky since the early 1770s. This door to the rear of British Canada was of great concern to Hamilton, even if it was not a pressing concern to his superiors yet. In 1775 and early 1776, Hamilton sought guidance from his direct superior, Guy Carleton, and London, but his instructions were vague when they existed at all. Added to the lack of communication and Detroit's remote location was the fact that Hamilton became a pawn in the escalating war of words between Sir Guy Carleton and Lord Germain. [380]

Mainly on his own initiative, Hamilton took the action he deemed necessary to protect Detroit and used the resources available to him, namely local militia, mainly of French ancestry, and Indians. The Indians of the midwest used Detroit as a supply and trading post in 1775-1776, but operated throughout the Ohio valley. Hamilton equipped them with British supplies and instructed them not to attack frontier settlements, but he knew his control of them once they left the Detroit area would be virtually non-existent.[381] The Indians looked after their own strategic requirements of ridding the Kentucky hunting grounds of settlers. The outcome of Lord Dunmore's War in 1774 had not been satisfactory to the Shawnees and Mingoes of the area and they had sworn vengeance at first

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[379] Mackesy, *War for America*, 107-108, John Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution* (New York: Savas Beatie, 2008), 8-12 and Billias, 'Burgoyne' in Billias, *Opponents Volume II*, 142-172

[380] Afred Leroy Burt. "The Quarrel between Germain and Carleton: An Inverted Story," *Canadian Historical Review*, 11 (1930): 202–22

[381] Michigan Historical Commission. *Michigan Historical Collections, Volume 10. Second Edition*. (Lansing: Pioneer Society of the State of Michigan, 1908), 268

opportunity. The resulting sporadic raids on Kentucky and other backcountry settlements in 1776 accomplished the Indian purpose of revenge and hindering the settlement of the area. Although not yet fully understood by the British, the actions also had the desired effect for the British as well when it caused the rebels to assemble forces to try to stop the raids. Each soldier needed to protect the frontier was one that could not serve against the British Army in the more conventional war on the east coast. As Virginia (Kentucky's parent colony) began to fund forces from the frontier to put a stop to the raids, Hamilton's nemesis emerged in the form of a Virginia surveyor named George Rogers Clark who would lead one of these forces and label Hamilton the 'hair buyer' General.[382]

In many ways, Burgoyne and Hamilton were quite dissimilar. Burgoyne's letters to government ministers were to people he viewed as peers or less. His writing style and oratory were often extravagant, but exacting at other times. Burgoyne's careful criticisms of Gage and Carleton were meant to inflate his importance and they worked.[383] Burgoyne did not seek guidance from ministers, he sought influence over them.[384] In contrast, Hamilton's letters are cloying and in search of guidance to Carleton and the Earl of Dartmouth.[385] Hamilton is hesitant and his declarations that the Indians will do as they choose, even when he has instructed them not to, is an obvious escape clause for the offenses that are sure to follow. Burgoyne lays down the law to the Indians that are to serve under him with either the highest cynicism or naiveté, depending on one's view of him. Burgoyne was a bold social climber with multiple illegitimate children and a hint of scandal in his own birth that seemed to haunt him. Hamilton was a family man with a love of art and the natural world.[386]

However, Hamilton was no lightweight and Burgoyne was not untouchable. Hamilton would later become the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec and the Governor of both Bermuda and Dominica. He was also to be demonised by the Quebecois for his attempts at reform of the political system in the 1780s. Hamilton's success in Bermuda earned him the capital being named after him.[387] Burgoyne was to go back to Britain and defend in Parliament his campaign that resulted in the loss of his army at Saratoga. Both men showed a remarkable

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[382] Downes, *Council Fires*, p. 191
[383] Mackesy, *War for America*, 108-109
[384] Burgoyne to Germain, 6 December 1776, NA, CO 42/35 and CO 42/36, 19-25
[385] Downes, *Council Fires*, 127-135 & *Michigan Historical Collections, Volume 10,* 264-270
[386] Barnhart, *New Evaluation*, 644
[387] Elizabeth Arthur, Elizabeth (2003) "HAMILTON, HENRY," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 4, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003

resiliency in their character to keep acting toward their internal compass and attempted to defend their honour. Finally, the importance to this paper is that they both felt they were justified in using Indians in their missions, had tried to control the Indians by instructing them not to commit atrocities, and were accused of not doing enough to prevent the atrocities that were committed on their watch.[388]

With short biographies of Hamilton and Burgoyne, an analysis of their use of Indians will follow. However, one more individual that was summoned by both needs an introduction. Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade was omnipresent in the commercial and warfare worlds of the upper midwest from 1750 to 1800. Langlade was the product of a prominent French trader and the sister of a respected Ottawa Indian chief. Having hit the warpath with his Ottawa uncle, Nissowaquet, at the tender age of ten, Langlade was a living emblem of the middle ground. Not content with operating in one culture, Langlade joined the French Troupes de la Marines, or French colonial regulars, in 1750. Langlade led a force of Indians into the Miami Indian area of modern day Ohio in 1752 to chastise a British leaning chief known as Memeskia or 'Old Briton'. Although the war between Britain and France would not begin for another three years, the declaration of loyalties had already begun. When Memeskia refused to give up his allegiance to the British, Langlade performed what was probably the most infamous atrocity of the era. Langlade had him publicly killed and cannibalised on the spot. When no help from the British or American colonists followed, the Indians in the area decided on a French alliance. Langlade would later serve with Montcalm at Fort William Henry in 1757 as well. Montcalm had depended on Langlade to cool the Indian temper after the honourable capitulation of the British fort. He failed miserably, if he tried at all, when the British were attacked mercilessly by the Indians as they marched away under nominal French protection. In 1759, Langlade was with the Indians at the Plains of Abraham, reputedly serving with the Indians who killed Wolfe from the flanking woods of the British position. Langlade retired to his home area of Michilimackinac and eventually surrendered the French fort to the British in 1761. However, Langlade adjusted to his new Imperial masters and even gave them some idea that the rebellion named after the Ottawa chief Pontiac was about to happen in 1763. From 1763 to 1775, Langlade concentrated on commercial work in La Baye (Green Bay) and

[388] Michigan Historical Commission. *Michigan Historical Collections, Volume 9, Second Edition*. (Lansing: Pioneer Society of the State of Michigan, 1908), 489-516, John Burgoyne, *A State of the Expedition from Canada*. (London: Printed for J. Almon, 1780)

became a founding father of modern day Wisconsin.[389] In summary, through twenty years of contact and reputation, Langlade was well known to the British Army. If a British Army officer or official wanted a 'proper leader' to help stop Indian atrocities in battle, Langlade was likely the last person they would have chosen. However, desperate times invoke desperate measures. Years had dimmed Langlade's dubious exploits and he became, if not a reputable, at least a qualified Indian guide and interpreter for the British. Even Carleton had sung his praises. [390] As the Revolution progressed and the need for Indian allies increased, Langlade became an Indian coordinator for the British, but with predictable results.

By early 1777, Lord Germain had provided instructions for Hamilton and Burgoyne. Burgoyne's instruction had practically been written by himself, but Hamilton's passed through Guy Carleton. Carleton and Hamilton were instructed to use the Indians to the best effect on offense as well as defensively, but to ensure that the Indians would be led by 'proper leaders' to avoid atrocities on the frontier inhabitants. Germain goes on to make it clear that the King himself has spoken on the matter.[391] These instructions were not much different than Carleton's position of not using Indians unless they could be properly commanded by a reliable British force. The thorny question had always been what constituted a 'proper leader' of Indians. Burgoyne got his independent command and the right to attack from Canada without Carleton and was also given instructions to use the Indians in a similar manner. Although, Burgoyne would later say that he used the Indians only at the behest of Germain, it is likely that Burgoyne's conversation with Germain had led the Secretary to believe Carleton had been too tentative in their use. This insult over the use of the Indians and Burgoyne's independent command so infuriated Carleton that he began agitating Germain until he was relieved of command and replaced by Frederick Haldimand in 1777. However, Haldimand could not reach Quebec in 1778. Carleton continued in his role throughout 1777, but increasingly only participated in matters that he thought were his to decide alone.

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[389] McDonnell, Michael A. 'Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade: Warrior, Soldier, and Intercultural "Window" on the Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes' in Skaggs, David C. & Nelson, Larry L., Eds. *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001. 79-103

[390] Carleton to DePeyster and Caldwell, 6 October 1776, *Michigan Historical Volume 10*, 270 & Trap, Paul. MOUET DE LANGLADE, CHARLES-MICHEL,' in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 4, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003

[391] NA, CO 42/36, 69-72

Burgoyne traveled to Quebec in the spring of 1777 and assembled his force to invade along the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson River corridor. In June, Burgoyne met 400 Indian auxiliaries with great fanfare. He gave them a speech, which the Americans ridiculed for its pompousness, to hold the British King's wishes to heart and never commit atrocities upon the civilians. Burgoyne also took the opportunity of his campaign launch to send a missive to the rebels in the area threatening to unleash the Indians upon the frontier if they impeded his campaign. The flyer, sent throughout the frontier, announced '… I have but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to overtake the hardened enemies of Great-Britain and America, I consider them the same, wherever they may lurk'.[392] Burgoyne would later dismiss this threat as a ploy, but it provided plenty of propaganda for the American forces. One who did not think of it as a ploy was a French Canadian named St. Luc de la Corne, who was a slightly more respectable, eastern version of Charles Langlade. La Corne was Burgoyne's Indian leader and had been with Langlade at Fort William Henry in 1757 and the Plains of Abraham in 1759. Interestingly, as a member of the Legislative Council of Canada, La Corne would later become the bane of Hamilton's reform battles of Quebec in the early 1780s. La Corne was a hard liner against the rebels after his harsh treatment as a prisoner at their hands earlier in the war. More than anyone else in Burgoyne's army, he wanted to unleash the Indians in full force against them.[393]

At the onset of the campaign, Burgoyne quickly moved down Lake Chaplain and took Crown Point and Ticonderoga with much less than anticipated effort. However, as he approached the Hudson River, the terrain closed in and his force was running low on critical supplies. The need for scouting and foraging parties in this slow moving part of his campaign was his undoing. Along with la Corne's Indians, who were chafing at having to work with Captain Alexander Fraser's provincial troops in Brigadier Simon Fraser's Corps, Charles Langlade showed up with a force of 150 western Indians intent on gaining plunder for their efforts. It did not take long for the inevitable to happen, an Indian raiding party had butchered a farm family in the Camden valley and another who had been evacuated further south. Although under Fraser's nominal control, the killings had happened anyway. Indians

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[392] NA, CO 42/36, 285

[393] Pierre Tousignant and Madeleine Dionne-Tousignant, "LA CORNE, LUC DE, Chaptes de La Corne La Corne Saint-Luc," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 4, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003 & James Hadden, *Journal and Orderly Books*. Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1884.
517-537

who were upset with the lack of action and opportunity had been deserting steadily along the route, but Langlade's Indians had stayed. Langlade was to once again be implicated in an atrocity. A young loyalist lady by the name Jane McCrea had been captured by Langlade's Indians with her aunt. At some point during her captivity, she was killed and scalped. The news hit the frontier like wildfire. The news that McCrea was a loyalist seemed to vindicate both Carleton and Stuart who felt it was impossible to protect loyalists on the frontier. Not only were people friendly to the British being killed and mutilated, but also the majority, who were neither actively patriot or actively loyalist, was beginning to believe the British did not care about their protection. Burgoyne was mortified. He knew he could not execute the Indians responsible with his force so fragile, but his verbal rebuke was enough to chase La Corne, Langlade, and most of the remaining Indians away. The western Indians had come for glory and plunder. Their goals were not at all aligned with Burgoyne's.[394]

At approximately the same time of the Jane McCrea murder, Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger was leading a combined force of 300 British regulars, 500 loyalists and approximately 700 Indians on their way from Fort Oswego to Fort Stanwix near the Great Carrying Place in the Mohawk valley. John Johnson, Daniel Claus, Joseph Brant and a loyalist named John Butler led the loyalist and Indian forces. The strategic goal was to divert American troops to keep them from re-enforcing the American forces along the Hudson River valley. They were traveling light and had expected Fort Stanwix to be unfinished, lightly manned and to fall unceremoniously. Upon arriving, they found it finished, well-constructed, and manned with 700 Americans. St. Leger, in a stroke of extreme over-confidence issued an offer of immediate surrender to avoid an Indian massacre. The Americans refused. When the fort did not fall quickly, they had to conduct a siege that they were unprepared for and the Indians did not want. The patriot militia in the area assembled a force of 1,000 to relieve the siege. St. Leger could not afford to send his regulars who were the only members of his force that could continue the siege. Therefore, he sent John Butler and twenty Rangers along with John Johnson, Brant, and 400 of the Indians, mostly Mohawk and Seneca, to meet the patriots. The force moved quickly to the area near the Indian settlement of Oriska and set up an ambush. The patriot force, led by General Nicholas Herkimer, also had sixty Oneida Indians from Oriska with him. This

[394] Luzader, *Saratoga*, 84-92

would be the first time that individual tribes from the Iroquois six nations would meet when aligned on opposing sides of the war. The British force sprung the trap too early and only caught about half of Herkimer's force. The rest retreated and some Indians took chase. However, with the numbers much more even, the battle of Oriskany commenced. It was a brutal fight that was punctuated by a heavy rain and hand to hand fighting. The Seneca chased many of Herkimer's wounded and scalped them alive. The fighting also pitted Iroquois against Iroquois in a fight that would rupture that nation forever. The British force took the field, but with significant casualties to its force of Seneca, which left that tribe traumatized. In the meantime, an American force from Fort Stanwix had raided the British Indian camps and plundered their possessions. The Indians were enraged and were hard to reconcile once the magnitude of their situation settled upon them. The Seneca and Mohawk had taken some American prisoners during and after the battle. St. Leger tried to get control of the American prisoners, but the Seneca in particular were too enraged by their losses. As part of their mourning rituals, they forced their American prisoners to run a gauntlet where they were clubbed to death. The battle was one of the bloodiest of the war and would change Iroquois calculations of serving with the British and further feed the American propaganda operation.[395]

When the Indians returned to Fort Stanwix, they were in no mood to continue the siege. John Butler tried to keep them by promising that the fort would soon fall and they could expect their revenge and plunder then. Butler did issue a threat to the fort saying that if they did not surrender quickly, he would unleash the Indians on the rebels of the valley and on the remains of the fort once capitulated. However, the American fort stood firm. A force led by American General Benedict Arnold was sent to relieve Fort Stanwix. Rumors of the size of the force from local Oneidas convinced the British Indians that they did not want another bloody internecine battle, so they began leaving. St. Leger decided that he could no longer continue the siege without the Indians and retreated back to Oswego. As the movement began, panic set in and many of the loyalists began to run and separate. To add insult to injury, some of their Indian allies began to assault the British forces. The Oriskany diversion ended as a costly fiasco. Although it had initially helped draw Americans away from Burgoyne's thrust, St. Leger's retreat freed them again. Upon securing Fort Stanwix, Arnold took his force to the Hudson River valley to help repel

[395] Graymont, *Iroquois*, 125-143

Burgoyne. Arnold would later prove to be a large factor in the coming battle. On 11 August 1777, St. Leger wrote to Burgoyne of his failure and blamed it on the Indians. [396]

In the Hudson valley, Burgoyne would not have welcomed the news, but he had far more problems. The killing of McCrea did not bring in the hordes of new American recruits as has often been reported. However, the American General that he was facing, Horatio Gates, did take considerable glee in goading Burgoyne about the incident. The American press and government used it to prove their cause was just and the colonies should have no more doubt about who the enemies were. As one historian has said, '[w]ords won the Revolutionary War as much as cannonballs and bayonets'. Along with a costly defeat at Bennington at the hands of militia on 16 August 1777, the killing of McCrea did foretell the end of Burgoyne's luck. The Indians had provided little along the route, cost him considerably, and now he was going into a major battle without their help. The Continental Army did have Indian scouts who were already harassing his regulars' reconnaissance. The Americans had amassed a formidable force in a solid position near the Hudson River and Burgoyne was effectively blind to its position. The calamitous battles of Freeman's Farm on 19 September and Bemis Heights on 7 October sealed Burgoyne's fate. At Saratoga on 17 October 1777, Burgoyne surrendered his entire surrounded army.[397]

In the west, the British allied Indians were just getting started. After supplying Indians throughout 1776, but discouraging them from attacking the frontier, Henry Hamilton began sending war parties from Detroit in 1777 with the new instructions from Germain to strike terror on the frontier, but to 'restrain them from committing violence on the well affected and inoffensive, inhabitants...' of the Virginian and Pennsylvanian frontiers. At this point Carleton had washed his hands of all responsibility for the use of Indians. He forwarded Lord Germain's instructions without further guidance. [398] Predictably, the Indians fought the only way they knew how and Hamilton's name drew curses on the Kentucky frontier for the devastation that ensued. By September of 1777, Hamilton claimed that there were 1,150 Indians on the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontier conducting raids. Hamilton was not a man to be limited only by local considerations either. He contacted John Stuart and tried to arrange a summit between the Ohio Indians and the Cherokee and Creek to co-ordinate their attacks on the settlers. Hamilton always claimed that he exhorted the Indians to

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[396] Graymont, *Iroquois*, 143- 147 and Luzader, *Saratoga*, 133-135
[397] Higginbotham, *Independence*, 188-198
[398] Germain to Carleton 26 March 1777, NA, CO 42/36, 69-72 & BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21781, 4

operate by British standards of combat, but the scalps being brought back were telling a different story. He was attracted and repelled by the Indians he knew. His journals detailed a man at odds with what he was doing, but doing it anyway. There also seems to be little evidence that he sent British officers or loyalists to conduct all of the war parties with the Indians. Whether he paid cash for scalps or whether he merely supplied the Indians with goods in return for proof of their grim duty, Hamilton was named 'The Hair-Buyer' by the frontier settlers. Regardless of the names he was called and how gruesome the outcome, it is clear that Hamilton was very effective at the task that he had been given.[399]

By early 1778, the Kentucky frontier was rapidly losing settlers. The memories were fresh from the Indian frontier destruction of the 1750s and early 1760s, so the rebel governments of Virginian and Pennsylvania knew that the next stage for the Indians would be the older Virginia settlements. The British induced Indian attacks had to be stopped and Virginia chose George Rogers Clark to do it. Armed with the news that France had entered the war on the American side after Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga, Clark took a small force to capture Kaskaskia and Vincennes in the Illinois country in June of 1778. At Kaskaskia, Clark surprised the French residents and captured the fort easily. Far from the British stronghold of Detroit, Clark interrogated the French inhabitants and found that many were sympathetic to the American cause. Clark convinced them that with the British loss at Saratoga and France on the rebel side, the place for this frontier outpost was with the Americans. The nearby towns of Cahokia, Prairie du Rocher, and Saint Phillips also fell in short order. The Indians in the Illinois country had not felt the pressure of the American settlers the way the Ohio and Pennsylvania Indians had, so were far less pro-British. When the Indians heard that the French were on the American side, the whole area became more malleable to Clark. With the residents of Kaskaskia on side, Clark sent emissaries to Vincennes which surrendered quickly, as the British Governor there had already left for Detroit. Clark spent the time he had in the Illinois country well by building up a reputation for even-handed justice in the towns and signing treaties with the tribes in the area. Indeed, Clark's greatest achievement was not defeating the British, but in diplomatically disarming the Indians of the area.[400]

[399] Sheehan, *Hair Buyer General*, 1-28
[400] Downes, *Council Fires*, 228-236

After the American capture of Vincennes, Hamilton was very worried that Clark's next move would be on Detroit and that was what Clark wanted to do. However, as with most issues affecting the frontier for both sides, money was short, manpower was shorter and leaders back east thought they knew better. With his small force spread wide and severely limited by its supply chain, Clark decided to settle in for the winter and plan for bigger things in 1779. In contrast, Hamilton did not feel he could leave Vincennes in American hands through the winter. He put together a small force of thirty-three British Army regulars, one-hundred and forty-two Canadian militia and seventy Indians. To improve his Indian numbers, Hamilton sent to the Michilimackinac fort for more who would be led by Charles Langlade. Hamilton tried to move fast, but was limited by his Indian allies demanding that strict war party custom be observed. Picking up more Indians along the way, Hamilton eventually reached Vincennes in December 1778. Hamilton's force was still small, but larger than the American defenders. The American commander of the ragged fort at Vincennes saw immediately that he could not defend it with his paltry force. The surrender completed a successful campaign for Hamilton, but he would not be satisfied until the area had been rid of Clark and his American forces in the Illinois country. However, the river-laced area was heavily swollen with floodwaters, so Hamilton decided to wait for a Spring offensive.[401]

Switching roles, Clark now felt he could not wait for the inevitable and decided to take a small group of Americans and French militia, but notably no Indians, on an arduous march across the extremely wet country in winter conditions with little support. Clark kept the element of surprise by showing up in Vincennes completely unannounced in March 1779 with his Kentucky sharpshooters. They began picking off the British in the fort and getting the French residents to side with them, until Hamilton had no choice but to seek terms. Clark personally kept busy by executing several captured Indians in the middle of Vincennes in a gruesome manner to make his point. Shocked and worried for his party's lives if they continued to resist, Hamilton finally surrendered the fort. Hamilton had become the nervous frontiersman and Clark the savage.[402] Hamilton was sent back to Virginia and kept in chains for by Virginia Governor Thomas Jefferson who held very firm views between 'civilised' and 'savage' warfare. Jefferson treated many captured British

[401] Harrison, *War in the West*, 19-38
[402] White, *Middle Ground*, 378

officers very well, but viewed Hamilton as dishonourable for having supported the Indians on the Virginia frontier. Hamilton would not be paroled until 1780.[403]

With these short histories of Hamilton's and Burgoyne's American campaigns, one can begin to ask specific questions, make observations, and analyse the effectiveness of their use of Indians. Both Burgoyne and Hamilton were dealing with known entities in La Corne St. Luc, Charles Langlade, and less notorious Indian agents like Daniel Claus, John Johnson, John Butler, and Guy Johnson. These were men who had fought the French and Indian War with incredible ferocity. There is little possibility that either Hamilton or Burgoyne did not know at least some of the backgrounds of these men. Both La Corne and Langlade were well known in Canadian commercial, military, social and political circles. Hamilton fought in the French and Indian War, spent many years on the frontier, and was surrounded by the French-Canadians of the frontier in Detroit. There is simply no question that Hamilton knew what the Indians he was supplying were doing on the frontier. Hamilton admits as much in his 29 August - 2 September, 1776 letter to the Earl of Dartmouth.[404]

On the face of it, Burgoyne might have had a stronger claim to be ignorant of the Indians' proclivities. His Army career prior to 1775 had been exclusively in Europe with conventional units. Burgoyne's life had certainly been more urbane than Hamilton's to date. A noted historian has stated, 'One would find it difficult to conceive of a character less likely to gain insight into Indian culture or less likely to succeed in changing the native way of making war'.[405] However, the instructions from Lord Germain and Burgoyne's previous service with Indians in Carleton's 1976 campaign would have been enough to alert him to the risks. There is a chance that a man of Burgoyne's ego merely believed that other commanders simply did not command their Indians well enough. Certainly, no one ever declared John Burgoyne of being under-confident. The bombast of his pronouncements to the Americans and the Indians in June 1777 can only be explained by two extremes. Either Burgoyne was cynically making over-the-top pronouncements to provide future cover when the inevitable atrocities came to light or he truly believed his own presence and direction could tame the Indians. If cynical, Burgoyne could have been

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[403] John E. Ferling, *A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1980), 51-52
[404] Hamilton to Dartmouth, 29 August – 2 September 1776, *Michigan Historical Volume 10*, 268
[405] Starkey, *European and Native,* 121, quoting Bernard Sheehan

hoping that the atrocities would be of the routine variety and he could reap the benefits of the Indians without the repercussions to his external honour. If naive, it would not have been his only gross miscalculation of the campaign. Burgoyne did hold some rather modern ideas of the humanity and value of his troops that endeared him to them compared to other officers.[406] He might have thought that a similar method and actions could do the same for the Indians. Either way, a case can be made that the murder and scalping of the beautiful fiancé (McCrea) of a loyalist officer in his campaign would have shocked an officer who was operating under either approach.

Both Burgoyne and Hamilton began their operations by using the Indians effectively. In the Burgoyne campaign, the Indians were deployed in the vanguard as scouts and skirmishers. Their performance in moving the large British force down the Champlain valley with the reconnaissance element in an expeditious manner by keeping the commander informed and the path clear helped secure Ticonderoga and Crown Point easily. However, when the campaign slowed east of Lake George, Burgoyne began to lose control of the Indians. The lack of pace frustrated the Indians who wanted to attack, plunder, and go home. If Burgoyne had either stayed on the water by using Lake George or designed hunting and raiding missions for the Indians to keep them busy, he might have made more effective use of them. When the Indians began devising and conducting their own parties the atrocities began. The chastisements and restrictions that followed the McCrea murder drove away those Indians that were still present, leaving Burgoyne virtually blind when he needed the Indians the most as he sought the American positions near Saratoga.

Although not wanting them to conduct missions on behalf of the British initially, Hamilton still supplied the Indians in 1776, knowing they would use the supplies to fall on the outposts that most aggrieved them. These attacks laid the foundation for his 'hair buyer' sobriquet, deserving or not, but also helped keep the American settlements in the midwest from actively supporting the war effort in the east. Hamilton certainly kept track of the number of scalps brought to him as shown by his correspondence. When Hamilton, by Germain's orders, actually began sanctioning Indian attacks in 1777, albeit with instructions not to harass or kill innocents, Virginians were outraged enough to take action against British interests in the midwest. To this point, the British had been able to maintain

[406] Billias, 'Burgoyne' in Billias, *Opponents Volume II*, 149

their forts and keep the rebels at bay in the midwest with virtually no troops, so one would have to describe this as effective use of the Indians. The raids accomplished the goals of keeping the flank secure, keeping frontier militia members at home in defence, and creating calls for help from the frontiers to the Continental Army. However, once Clark succeeded in capturing and subverting British control in the Illinois country, Hamilton found his means limited to respond. By trying to use the Indians as a conventional force to march on, take, and hold Vincennes in 1778, Hamilton expected the Indians to perform the duties of a British Army unit. He gained no great strategic advantage and lost much respect from the Indians. His inability to prove to the western Indians and eventually the Ohio Indians that the British were going to defeat the rebels meant the Indians would be less likely to continue their active operations in the midwest.[407]

Hamilton and Burgoyne shared the same language of military honour, but had different honour groups. Hamilton knew the Indian capabilities very well and had a deeper relationship with the Indians in his area than Burgoyne did. Hamilton's drawings of Indians and notes on their culture show that he had at least a passing admiration for their culture and their plight. Hamilton knew the advantages of using the Indians in raiding frontier settlements. The fear and panic caused on the frontier by the Indian raiding parties were the intermediate goals of the military mission. Hamilton's use of Indians for frontier raiding missions, though needing to be couched in appropriate language and qualifying instructions, were effectively sanctioning the Indian style of warfare. The qualifying instructions served as a kind of plausible deniability, to use modern terminology. The ability to plausibly deny any direct participation in the raids is telling as it showed that Hamilton did care about how the missions would be viewed by his peers and society. However, when Hamilton used the Indians directly, he had to establish far more control over them and this undoubtedly reduced their effectiveness. However, this fact cannot be held too strongly against Hamilton as he had very few other choices for troops either.

Contrasted to Hamilton, Burgoyne did restrict his options on how to use the Indians from the very start of his campaign. Although the Indians were useful early in the campaign, the direct control that he sought over their actions offended them. Therefore, when the going became more difficult, they were far less amenable to adapting. The proclamations of June 1777 are telling of Burgoyne's mindset. The proclamation to the

[407] Barnhart, *New Evaluation*, Sheehan, *Hair Buyer General*, 1-28

rebels threatens to unleash the Indians upon the frontiers with bloody consequences, but his proclamations to the Indians show direct prohibition of the very behaviour he has threatened. In a very neat package, Burgoyne was explicitly acknowledging that he believed that the rebels would fear British backed Indians on the rampage, but he held the Indians back to maintain the decorum that an officer and gentleman was expected to keep. Burgoyne and Hamilton both were concerned over Indian action in their commands, but only Hamilton did not let this affect his decisions on how to best use them to accomplish his mission. Burgoyne restricted the Indian use from the start and caused a collapse in their support when the inevitable atrocities came to light. This hindered his operations dramatically. Hamilton continued to use the Indians as best he could until his capture. Although their mission and capabilities were different, it is hard to see how Hamilton could have used them any more effectively and hard to see how Burgoyne could have used them less effectively.

From 1774 to the end of 1777, the British had prepared Indians to help them win their war against the American rebels. Scarce attention had been paid to why the Indians would want to fight with the British. The British assumption seemed to be that the Indians would want to fight for the British regardless of whether it served their interests or not. When the British received Indian allies who were only present for the glory and plunder, like the western Indians with Burgoyne, it cost them dearly in the propaganda war. When the British allied with Indians that had disputes with settlers over land, they got a far more balanced type of action, but the British still seemed surprised that the Indians would use the chance to fall on settlers who were squatting on land the Indians claimed, regardless if they were rebel or loyalist.[408]

As to the question of a stain against their military honour, all British Army officers surveyed in this chapter, except Thomas Gage, seemed concerned about the use of Indians to some degree. Gage and Lord Dartmouth were willing to unleash the Indians in the offense with the slightest of excuses, but disregard for their orders ensured that the ramifications of their decisions did not haunt them as it did with others. Henry Hamilton was the most effective and the most vilified in his treatment, although it did not impinge on his future career in the British Empire. John Burgoyne is the most interesting for his use within a larger campaign, his high profile personality in London, and the catastrophic

[408] Washburn, 'Indians and the American Revolution'

failure of his use of Indians. His defence of his honour in Parliament will form part of the next chapter's examination of the debate on Indian use in Britain. Sir Guy Carleton's principled stand on the use of the Indians and his view of them will also be brought out in the next chapter as he returns as Lord Dorchester.

'What is honor?... ile none of it.'
- Falstaff[409]

7. Capitulation.

After the catastrophe of the Burgoyne campaign in 1777, the British took a hard look at their operations. Large scale operations that tried to treat the Indians like the Hessian mercenaries were not working. The Indians had no desire for British Army discipline and they shared none of the European martial culture with them as the Hessians had. Compared to Burgoyne's fiasco, Hamilton's operations were a success. His coterie of midwestern Indians had drawn away resources from the east at very little cost by forcing the Americans to re-enforce the backcountry settlements of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas. However, those operations were not without criticism either. The British Governor of Vincennes, Edward Abbot, wrote to Sir Guy Carleton in June 1778 stating that the inhabitants of the backcountry would have,

> put them themselves under His Majesty's protection were there a possibility: that not being the case, these poor unhappy people are forced to take up arms against their Sovereign, or be pillaged & left to starve; cruel alternative. This is too shocking a subject to dwell upon. Your Excellency's known humanity will certainly put a stop if possible to such proceedings, as it is not the people in arms that Indians will ever daringly attack; but the poor inoffensive family that fly to the deserts to be out of trouble, and are inhumanely butchered sparing neither women or children.[410]

This impassioned plea would echo conversations in London, but Carleton had long since washed his hands of a policy that he had scorned from its inception. However, there was also not much choice if Britain were not to give up on the whole enterprise of keeping the colonies in the Empire. With the minutemen of the northeast, the Continental Army in the mid-Atlantic, and the rebel militia in the south being harder to conquer than expected, the British became less concerned about the prospect of Indians committing atrocities on the frontier than they were of losing the war. This period was ushered in by the French and the Spanish entering the war on the American side and the Dutch financing it, so, once

[409] William Shakespeare, *King Henry IV, Part I* (London, 1598)
[410] Abbott to Carleton, 8 June 1778, *Michigan Historical Volume 9*, 489 & Nester, *Frontier,* 198

again, European circumstances were driving British decision making. Additionally, the fear of the Indians attacking loyalists began to fade as the British establishment realised that the number of loyalists was much smaller than they originally had hoped. The British continued to try to control the actions of the allied Indians with loyalist officers and some lower ranking British Army officers. However, from 1778 to the end of the war, the British Army forsook using large bodies of Indians in major campaigns. These new operations were far more focused and took advantage of the Great Lakes forts that the British could communicate with more reliably. Unsurprisingly, these operations were more successful as they were much better aligned with the various tribes' objectives of clearing out the frontier settlements.[411]

However, their own officials were not the only ones lamenting the damage being done by the Indians on the frontier. The reports, of sober truth and hysterical rumour, continued to fuel the American propaganda fire. The accusation of massacres and atrocities filled American and British newspapers. Interestingly, as the British allied Indians stepped up their frontier operations against the Americans from 1778 to 1782, the conversation about their use was reaching a fever pitch in London. Edmund Burke stood up in Parliament to denounce the practice of employing Indians against the Americans as did the aging William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, stating that Britain had set

> the savages of America loose upon their innocent inoffending [sic] brethren; loose upon the weak, the aged, the defenceless; on old men, women, and children; upon the very babes upon the breast to be cut, mangled, sacrificed, broiled, roasted, nay, to be liberally eaten.[412]

With eminent statesmen and frontier officials abhorring the use of Indians, it is hard to imagine their use any further, but there were supporters as well. The Earl of Suffolk stated that using the Indians was necessary to win and the rebels had brought the scourge upon themselves due to their rebellion against lawful obedience to the King.[413] John Burgoyne was brought before Parliament in the spring of 1778 to explain his use of Indians in 1777. He promptly blamed it on Germain's orders and claimed that he did not really mean to

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[411] Jack M. Sosin, *The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783* (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto, London: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), 124-141
[412] T. C. Hansard *The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Volume XIX.* (London: T.C. Hansard, 1814), 694-708, 6 February 1778
[413] Nester, *Frontier War*, 187

implement the Indian threat he had issued to the Americans. Germain went so far as to challenge another Member of Parliament to a duel over the question of his honour on the issue. The opposition to Lord North's government took every opportunity to beat them with his administration's alleged inhumanity in using the Indians against the Americans.[414] With such a fractious political situation in Britain, there was also a fair amount of hypocrisy. The Earl of Chatham was accused of using Indians when he was leading government, but condemning it when in opposition. The Earl of Chatham claimed that he knew they were used, because the French General Montcalm had used them first and left Britain with no choice. However the Earl contended that he had never issued orders to British Officers to use the Indians. He sought Lord Amherst's support on the issue, but was rebuffed when Amherst declared he could prove that he had been instructed to use Indians and could produce correspondence to prove it.[415] Upon hearing of the Earl of Chatham's assertions, Lord Bute was incredulous and claimed to have documentation that showed how willingly the Indians were used in the Seven Years' War.[416] In short, there was no coherent government plan in London to prosecute the war with Indian allies, nor an agreement on the morality or efficacy of the use of Indians.

It would be going too far to state that the atrocities committed by the Indians in the Saratoga campaign or the midwest frontier were the sole cause that added an old enemy to the war against Britain. France had many reasons to side with the Americans after 1777, but Benjamin Franklin, working as American Ambassador to France, regaled the Parisian salons with the stories of Indian atrocities. Once the French recognized the new country and joined in its defence in the spring of 1778, Benjamin Franklin and the Marquis de Lafayette began brainstorming ideas on the types of propaganda that would be most effective against the British. These included prints that depicted 'Savages killing and scalping the Frontier Farmers and their Families, Women and Children, English Officers mix'd with the Savages, & giving them Orders & encouraging them' and 'The King of England, giving Audience to his Secretary at War, who presents him a Schedule intitled [sic] Acct. of Scalps. which he receives very graciously' among others.[417] The introduction of France, and soon thereafter

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[414] Bickham, *Savages*, 267-268
[415] Stockdale, John, *The Parliamentary Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Lords.* (London: reprinted for John Stockdale, by Wilson and Co., 1802), 49-101
[416] Graymont, *Iroquois*, 161-162
[417] Leonard W. Labaree, *et al.,* Eds. *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, *Volume 29* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 590

Spain, into the war meant the British now had far more to worry about than securing the American midwest.

The setbacks of 1777 had not been expected, so London had not designed a new strategy by the spring of 1778. As it had in the Seven Years' War in North America, necessity drove the British to consider their options and they were few. The previously successful operations around Philadelphia were now being strained. Lieutenant General Howe had resigned at the end of 1777. Lieutenant General Henry Clinton took command of His Majesty's forces in North America. The new threat to Britain from France meant that more forces from Britain would be extremely unlikely. Clinton and the civilians in London came to the conclusion that the only option left was to attack Georgia with the bulk of the remaining forces and make their way north while gaining loyalist forces. The Indians would be unleashed on the frontiers to keep the patriot ranks on the coast from swelling. However, Clinton's plan had little direction for the commanders in the interior, so they had to improvise answers to the problems they faced locally. With few British regulars in Canada and Burgoyne vanquished, Quebec looked weak again. It would be even harder to defend a renewed American attack. One way to slow the Americans down would be to destroy the Anglo towns and crops in the bread basket of the Mohawk valley. The panic caused and the destruction of food could affect the operations of the Continental Army. This plan also had the advantage of allowing the British allied Iroquois and loyalists to take revenge for their losses and secure their villages in the valley. However, Sir Guy Carleton was still holding his view that the Indians should be used in defence only and he resumed the use of the Canadian Indians after Burgoyne's defeat. Therefore, the first half of 1778 was relatively quiet on the northern frontier. If the leaders in western New York wanted different guidance, Carleton directed their attention to his replacement, Major General Frederick Haldimand.[418]

Haldimand was a Swiss officer who had served the British Army in the Seven Years' War in North America, as well as several European armies previously. He later served in East Florida. He had seen Indian combat up close and had no illusions about being able to control them once in the field.[419] The only senior officers who had arguably seen more

[418] Patrick Griffin, *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 156

[419] Stuart R. J. Sutherland, Pierre Tousignant, and Madeleine Dionne-Tousignant, "HALDIMAND, Sir FREDERICK," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 5, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003

Indian combat in North America were Thomas Gage and Henry Bouquet, though Gage had returned to Britain and Bouquet had died in West Florida in 1765. Haldimand took command in June 1778. He was immediately worried about Quebec and the possibility of a new combined threat from the Americans and the French. Since he could spare no regulars himself, he was sympathetic to those proposing loyalist and Indian operations out of Fort Niagara. Initially, these operations were not directed from London, nor did they have senior British officials in attendance. As Hamilton was doing, the officers at Fort Niagara were facing up to the fact that if they did not attack, their homes and those of the Indians might be overrun by Americans. This new way of operating also involved men who the Indians trusted and who understood their motivations, like Lieutenant Colonel John Butler, his son Captain Walter Butler, Guy Johnson, John Johnson, and Joseph Brant. The area of operations also tended to be places that the Indians cared about as well. They rarely were conducted in direct co-ordination with British forces. However, they did have the desired effect of drawing off American forces from the eastern campaigns. For the most part, the British officers leading these forces were loyalists who attained military rank through their merit or connections, but had little in common with regular British Army officers. Their honour groups, namely their friends and family, resided on the frontier and their interests and opinions were what they measured themselves against. These operations would form the organization that would define British operations in America until 1794.[420]

Lieutenant Colonel John Butler had been authorized to form a battalion of loyalist rangers after the collapse of St. Leger's campaign against Fort Stanwix in 1777. He employed his son as senior Captain in command of one of the companies. Captain William Caldwell was another, as well as the Mohawk Joseph Brant. By May 1778, Brant was active in the Cherry valley and Butler's Indian allies were active in the Susquehanna valley.[421] On 30 May 1778, he and his company struck Cobleskill where he defeated the local militia and secured livestock for his force. By June, John Butler's force was ready to take to the field with Indian allies. The first target was the Wyoming Valley on the north fork of the Susquehanna River. The area had known Indian raids for years and was prepared with militia and blockhouses for each of the small settlements. Butler's force consisted of 110 rangers and 500 Seneca and Cayuga. Butler worked from settlement to

[420] Graymont , *Iroquois*, 157-191
[421] John Butler to Carleton Niagara, 10 April 1778, BL, Haldimand Papers Add MS 21756, 35

settlement picking off unwitting logging or hunting parties. Eventually, the local militia decided to sally forth to meet Butler. His force received word that the patriots were marching, so they laid an ambush. Butler's force routed the Americans, killing 302 and leaving a trail of butchery, but seemingly only against combatants. Some of the American force escaped to another fort, but Butler followed and issued the ultimatum that they should surrender or face the wrath of his Indian allies. The American commanders complied and the entire community became refugees flowing east. The Indians had been held in check and did not molest the fleeing civilians, but they did destroy hundreds of houses and forts. The refugees told tales of a massacre which, of course, fanned the propaganda flames again. When Butler's Indian allies heard the tales, they became enraged that their humanity had not been acknowledged, but flagrantly manipulated. They would seek their revenge later in the year. In September, Brant and his Mohawks joined Captain William Caldwell's Rangers to attack German Flats along the Mohawk River. The human toll was not as large as the Wyoming raid, because the settlers managed to cram into a few well defended forts. However, the destruction of property and the stealing of livestock devastated the area.[422]

The Americans tried to strike back to stem the tide, but most of their raids were ineffective. However, at the Indian village of Oquaga, they managed to destroy a large store of corn, burn the village and kill the wife of an Oneida chief. The most notorious event happened on 11 November 1778 when a force led by Captain Walter Butler and Joseph Brant attacked the Cherry valley. Butler and Brant caught the settlers by surprise and killed most of them. The carnage inflicted by the Indians on surrendering civilians got so bad that Butler actually protected a party of Americans and escorted them to safety. Brant also tried actively to curtail the atrocities by leaving his war paint on young girls to signify his protection of them. Cherry valley was merely the largest toll. Butler's and Brant's forces conducted smaller raids throughout the area in the second half of 1778. Some of these occurred to villages so far east that they had not experienced Indian attacks in living memory.[423] Word of the Cherry valley 'massacre' reached Haldimand by December of 1778 and he was quick to let Major John Butler and his son know that they needed to re-double their efforts at restraining the Indians.

[422] Nester, *Frontier War*, 201-204 & Kelsay, *Brant*, 214-234
[423] Graymont, *Iroquois*, 186-191

> I have also received your letters of the 1st of December enclosing Captain Butler's relation of his operations at Cherry Valley, the success of which would have afforded great satisfaction if his endeavors to prevent the excess to which the Indians in their fury are so apt to run, had proved effectual; it is however very much to his credit that he gave proofs of his own disapprobation of such proceeding; and I hope that you and every Officer serving with the Savages, will never cease your Exhortations to them, till you shall at length convince them, that such indiscriminate vengeance, taken even upon the treacherous and Cruel Enemy they are engaged against, is as useless and disreputable to themselves, as it is contrary to the disposition and maxims of their King whose cause they are fighting.[424]

By early 1779, the mass evacuation of the Susquehanna valley was causing consternation in the American government. Pressure was swelling for Congress and General George Washington to do something. Lord Germain, having survived the criticism in Parliament for using Indians, began 1779 more committed to the endeavour than ever. In a letter to Haldimand, he states, 'The astonishing Activity & Success of Joseph Brant's Enterprises, and the important Consequences with which they have been attended, give him a Claim to every Mark of Our Regard, and which you think would be pleasing to him.'

This is Lord Germain talking about a Mohawk Indian who has been accused of routine atrocities in New York throughout 1778. Not only is Lord Germain not discussing curtailing the activities, but he is considering offering him a 'Commission signed by His Majesty, appointing him a Colonel of Indians'.[425] And it was not just Brant. Lord Germain mentions the Butlers in high regard, but counsels Haldimand, 'you will acquaint them that their Care to prevent the Indians from molesting the unarmed Inhabitants, is much approved by the King'. Lord Germain continued to inform Haldimand of Sir Henry Clinton's plan for the south in the coming season and that he had informed John Stuart to support the backcountry Indians to participate where they could. With the level of acrimony and recrimination in Parliament and the British press in 1778, this letter is the best evidence that

[424] General Haldimand to Major John Butler, 25 December 1778, BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21756
[425] Germain to Haldimand, 16 April 1779, NA, CO 42/39, 17

the British government had decided that there was no other choice but to use the Indians whole-heartedly.[426] However, this decision to use Indians does not mean that everyone agreed on the frontier. Buried in a long letter that was mainly concerned with supply issues, Lieutenant Colonel Mason Bolton shared concerns that

> I am really of opinion that to keep the Indians in good temper (as it's called) has cost old England much more than all the Posts are worth, & as to their Scalping Women Children & Prisoners I find it's not impossible to prevent them, such cruelties must make an Expedition very disagreeable to the King's troops when needed on Service with them.[427]

Although concerns such as Bolton's were not uncommon, the need to use Indians overcame the risks. To prove that Lord Germain was correct in his assumption that the Indian operations were having the desired effects, the Susquehanna valley was not the only problem facing Washington. The raids in the Ohio had never let up and Washington was forced to send a force, in addition to George Rogers Clark's, to the Pittsburgh area to help relieve the suffering of the frontier settlements. The British southern sector was active, but limited in its success. Stuart had tried to rally the Creeks and a few Cherokee to support Clinton's operations in the south. However, each time the backcountry rebels got word of an Indian offensive, they sent parties to cut them off. The southern Indians, especially the Cherokee who were already short on food, became despondent and were not much help. To add to their misery, their long-time friend and supporter, John Stuart, died in March 1779. However, even these small parties of Indians raised and supported by Stuart managed to draw off American forces that were sorely needed in the south.[428]

For the Mohawk valley, Washington would need something much larger. This area was a strategic reserve for his Continental Army. He was trying to limit the major operations to the seaboard and use areas like the Susquehanna valley as safe havens in times of trouble. However, the attacks from Niagara had put all of that at risk. For the summer of 1779, Washington planned an operation against the Indians that would rival any that the British had conducted in the Seven Years' War or Pontiac's rebellion. He ordered Major General

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[426] Ibid, 18
[427] Bolton to Haldimand, 8 February 1779, BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21756, 71-72
[428] Richard D. Blackmon, *Dark and Bloody Ground: The American Revolution Along the Southern Frontier* (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, LLC, 2012), 164-176

John Sullivan to march through the heart of Iroquoia and destroy all of the villages and farmland in his path. Unlike the Continental Army of the early war, Sullivan's Expedition had clear objectives, routes, and alternative plans for what they might encounter. They were also as well supplied as any American force could be and led by competent leaders in Sullivan, Brigadier General James Clinton and Colonel Daniel Brodhead. The expedition took three different routes into the Iroquois lands with Sullivan and Clinton eventually joining forces. From July to September of 1779, Sullivan's forces devastated the Iroquois homeland. He was in search of decisive battle to reduce the ranks of Iroquois warriors available to the British, but all he found was deserted towns with houses and farmland, which American soldiers marveled were similar to their own. Sullivan's troops did not let the lack of battle slow their work as they burned houses, uprooted fruit trees and levelled crops. On 29 August, Sullivan got as close to decisive battle as he would ever get. The Butlers and Brant had set up breastworks near Newtown with approximately 800 Indians, loyalists, and Rangers. Sullivan arrayed his forces in a conventional manner and assaulted the breastwork with artillery and maneuver. The British force melted away almost immediately. Sullivan continued his devastation until early October, but met with few Indians or British forces. In the end, the expedition destroyed forty Indian villages and their means of subsistence.[429]

Although Sullivan was not able to take Fort Niagara as Washington had hoped, he did force 3,700 Iroquois refugees to descend on it. The clearance of the Iroquois homeland was also badly timed, because it came right after news of Governor Henry Hamilton's capture by George Rogers Clark. Haldimand wrote to Lord Germain in September of 1779 that he had concern that 'our Indian allies have it in contemplation to desert us'.[430] The loss of the Detroit-supplied Indians would have been a major loss to the British. Luckily for Haldimand, the resolve of the Iroquois, especially the Seneca, helped restore the faith in the British cause, mainly because both sides saw that continuing was in their own interests. The winter of 1779-1780 was particularly harsh on everyone at Niagara, but the refugees were especially hard hit. By the summer and fall of 1780, Niagara was once again sending out war parties, but the logistical strain would mean that Fort Niagara would never be able to

[429] Fischer, Joseph R., *Well-Executed Failure,* 34-60 & Nester, *Frontier*, 251-267 & Graymont, *Iroquois*, 204-220

[430] Haldimand to Germain, 13 September 1779, CO 42/39, 234

operate as effectively as it had in 1778.[431] Throughout the period of Sullivan's Expedition, Haldimand continued to encourage and supply the Indians of Niagara and Detroit. In an unusual display, for a senior British officer, he not only encouraged the Indians around Niagara to fight for the King, but to fight for their own lands. Haldimand understood that the strength of the Indian alliance was built on mutual benefit. Brant continued his raiding of the American settlements as far east as the Delaware River even while Sullivan was destroying his homeland. In Haldimand, Brant, and the Butlers, the British alliance had found a way to accomplish much with very little. The episode was a disaster for the Iroquois people, but it would continue to occupy American forces that were needed elsewhere.[432]

From 1780, the Indian raids continued to be effective and encouraged by the British officials and officers. Guy Johnson, who eventually made it back to his Iroquois charges in 1779, wrote to Haldimand that a force of 220 Indians under Brant had been harassing the 'Wioming' [sic], but was careful to point out their humanity by stating that Brant had 'liberated above twenty women and Children' who had fallen into the Indians hands.[433] Continuing his campaign to secure more support for his Indian operations, Johnson later wrote to Lord Germain in July of 1780 from Niagara that

> The partys [sic] have ranged along the rear of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and although (unaccompanied with troops) their mode of Warfare does not admit of any thing capital, it is still of much importance to His Majestys [sic] service in keeping the rebels in a continued state of Alarm and apprehension, and destroying their resources.[434]

In Kentucky, George Rogers Clark had to arrange a new expedition into the Ohio country to stymie the multitude of attacks south of the Ohio River. The raids were mostly conducted from Forts Niagara and Detroit by Indians with or without rangers, but there were also smaller attacks and sometimes even larger campaigns coordinated with British

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[431]Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 129-141

[432] Kelsay, *Brant*, 239-253 & McIlraith, Jean N., *Sir Frederick Haldimand* (London: T.C. & E.C. Jack, 1905), 147-150

[433] Guy Johnson to Haldimand, 3 May 1780, BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21766, 6-7

[434] Guy Johnson to Germain 26 July 1780, Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan, Ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York; Procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq. Volume VIII*. (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1857), 797

regular forces. Major Arent De Peyster, who had replaced Hamilton at Detroit, implemented the most complex Indian plan to date with attacks down the Mississippi by Langlade, on the falls of the Ohio (modern day Louisville, Kentucky) by Captain Henry Bird, and, if possible, to secure Vincennes again. All of these operations had been planned and communicated by Lord Germain. Captain Henry Bird's force was comprised of 150-200 British Army regulars and 500 Indians.[435] Leading the Indians were British Indian Department agents, Matthew Elliott, Alexander McKee, and Simon Girty. These three men played a significant role for the British in recruiting and managing the midwest Indians from 1780 to the end of the war. They were often successful in their aims of supporting the British war effort, but were often unable to control their Indian charges. On the Bird expedition, from May to July of 1780, the Indians refused to attack Clark's fort at the falls of the Ohio even with the support of British artillery. Bird had to re-direct his force to softer targets near the Licking River in central Kentucky to please the Indians. When the British and Indian force came to Ruddell's and Martin's stations, Bird warned the settlements that if they chose to resist that he could not guarantee their safety from the Indians. Seeing the British artillery, the settlers knew they would eventually succumb and decided to surrender without a protracted siege. Unfortunately, Bird's promise of safety was not entirely secured. At Ruddell's station, the Indians slaughtered some of the defenders anyway. At both Ruddell's and Martin's stations, the Indians destroyed all of the cattle and food that they could not carry. Now having to support nearly 300 prisoners as well as his force and low on supplies, Bird determined to turn back to Detroit where he arrived on 4 August, 1780. Although the campaign had been devastating where it struck, it had to forego the further missions of trying to reclaim Vincennes and strike Clark's force due to a lack of supplies.[436] This situation perturbed General Haldimand. In August Major DePeyster passed along a request from the midwest Indians for Haldimand to send more British Army units to conduct joint raids into the American held frontier. Haldimand stated that he would not send further troops and it was the Indians fault, because they had

[435] Neal Hammon and Richard Taylor, Richard, *Virginia's Western War 1775-1786* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2002), 123-130 & Trap, 'LANGLADE'
[436] Reginald Horsman, *Matthew Elliott, British Indian Agent* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), 28-29

prematurely curtailed Bird's mission with their indiscriminate slaughter of cattle that could have extended Bird's campaign by months.[437]

That these operations affected the New York, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky frontiers is clear, but it is harder to prove how much they assisted the overall British war effort. However, the raids on the New York frontier in the summer were no doubt meant to assist the seaboard operations. In an unaddressed letter from General Haldimand marked 'Secret & Confidential', he stated that the operations on the frontier were spreading general alarm and 'it is to be hoped something will transpire from the Neighbourhood of New York, as it is reported that General Clinton has returned there.'[438] This note provides some evidence that Haldimand's Indian and ranger operations had the support of the major British Army operations on the seaboard in mind. They were not envisioned as operations purely for their own purposes.

The year 1780 had been a huge success for Lord Cornwallis in the south. The rebels were reeling and the constant harassment of the backcountry settlements were a large part of the problem for the rebels. The argument over Indians had not died down in London. In 1780, Burgoyne published his journals of the Saratoga Campaign and, in a twist of fate, began supporting the opposition on the American question.[439] Many still condemned the use of Indians, especially unescorted, but after 1777 the British understood that the Indians were no longer just a possibility, but a requirement to defeat the rebels. It had taken five years, but the British had found a way to vex the American backcountry and conduct coherent operations on the seaboard simultaneously. Lord Cornwallis was one of the British officers who had promulgated the idea of treating the rebels humanely to encourage them to reconsider their rebellion.[440] However, by late 1780, even he used Indians to relieve pressure on his seaboard forces. In December of 1780, Lord Cornwallis wrote to Sir Henry Clinton, when backcountry rebels were causing trouble for British forces, that he should engage Thomas Brown to 'encourage the Indians to attack the settlement of Watoga, Holstein, Caentuck, and Notachuckie, [sic] all which are new encroachments on Indian territories. The good effects of this have already appeared'.[441]

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[437] Haldimand to Bolton, 10 August 1780, BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21756, 113-114
[438] Haldimand to unaddressed recipient(s), 1 September 1780, BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21766, 35
[439] John Burgoyne, *A State of the Expedition from Canada* (London: Printed for J. Almon, 1780)
[440] Sosin, *Revolutionary Frontier*, 128-131.
[441] Cornwallis to Clinton, 29 December 1780, Charles Ross, Esq., *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis, Volume I* (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1859), 76

If even Lord Cornwallis was coming around to the idea of using Indians more liberally, it stands to reason that worries about atrocities were lower, even in the north where Indians were be used heavily. In May 1780, General Haldimand wrote to Daniel Claus, an Indian agent at Niagara, in response to a request from him for guidance, stating that he should send whites with the Indians who know the loyalists in the areas being raided. General Haldimand added, 'Which I hope will in a great measure lessen an Evil, which in the present Situation of Affairs, cannot intirely [sic] be prevented.'[442] Further, he addressed the topic of Indian prisoner taking that makes explicit that he believed the Indians and the rebels were both subject to the King's authority. Haldimand states,

> The idea of Adoption must be totally discouraged, and you will inform them [Mohawks] that the present war, being different from a Foreign one, all the King's undutiful Children who are taken in it Whether by White Men or Indians, must be Delivered up, to be corrected by their father, as he shall think fit.[443]

In 1781, the operations continued across the frontier. In the north, the Mohawk valley was deserted, so Guy Johnson looked further afield. He sent a force of 1,200 regulars and Indians, led by British Army Major John Ross, on an attack on Schenectady, New York, but they were thwarted and chased back to Niagara. In the retreat, Captain Walter Butler was captured and executed.[444] However, the Ohio Indians were as deadly as ever as they continued to pound the Pennsylvania backcountry and the Kentucky settlements. Joseph Brant had even moved his forces into the Ohio region due to a lack of opportunities in the Mohawk valley.[445] Throughout this period, General Haldimand can be found writing letters to the British officers dealing with the Indians and giving directions as well as cautioning them about Indian tactics and targets. To Brigadier Powell at Niagara in April 1781, he advised, 'Keep intelligent Scouts Constantly abroad, in all Quarters, not Composed Entirely of Indians & these should have positive directions not to Discover themselves by taking Scalps, but to endeavour to bring off Prisoners & learn what is doing in the Country.'[446]

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[442] Haldimand to Daniel Claus, 4 May 1780, BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21774, 116-117
[443] Ibid.
[444] Grenier, *First Way,* 168
[445] William R. Nester, *The Frontier War for American Independence* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2004), 298-303
[446] Haldimand to Powell, 20 April 1781, BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21764

On 24 April, he said much the same to Guy Johnson.[447] These types of operations continued throughout the summer of 1781, even though General Haldimand seemed to wish for a more substantial campaign, possibly in support of Lord Cornwallis who had recently returned to Virginia after Pyrrhic victories in North Carolina.

However, by the autumn of 1781, he had resigned himself to keeping the frontier in flames and destroying as much of the rebel support network as possible. In a letter to Brigadier General Powell, he gave his normal orders to send out rangers and Indians and cautioned,

> You will give these Parties orders effectually to Destroy all kinds of Grains & Forrage - Mils & Cattle, and all Articles which Can contribute to the Support of the Enemy. They will as usual, have the strongest Injunctions to avoid the destruction of Women and Children, and every Species of Cruelty.[448]

However, in this letter he added something that makes clear that Haldimand did not feel these restrictions applied to other Indians. 'to extirpate the remaining unfriendly Oneidas, who much impede our Scouts and Recruiting Parties…'[449] At this point in the war, the northern Indians were very effective at keeping the rebels off guard. General Haldimand conducted the war in the way it had to be conducted in the midwest to ensure British opportunities on the seaboard. However, by late 1781, the old warrior had resigned himself to Indian warfare, but was becoming cynical about the Indians' motives.

> It is difficult to alter their System of war, and rendered so by a Succession of Presents which they claim upon every trifling Excursion – the Petite guerre is now become a Lucrative Profession, their ease and [unreadable] is gratified by it, and a total defeat of the Enemy or a sudden peace would be equally unacceptable to them.[450]

The Indian and ranger activities in the north continued their effectiveness throughout 1781. However, the Cherokees and the Creeks in the south were losing their will. The Cherokee had had their homes invaded many times by the Americans and they were living as refugees. The Creeks were struggling with disease. At the same time, American General

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[447] Haldimand to Guy Johnson, 24 April 1781, Michigan Historical Commission. *Michigan Historical Collections, Volume 19* (Lansing: Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, 1891, 1911 Reprint)
[448] Haldimand to Powell, 7 September 1781, BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21756, 119
[449] Ibid.
[450] Haldimand to Guy Johnson, 27 September 1781, BL, Haldimand Papers, Papers Add MS 21766, 38-39

Nathaniel Greene had turned a series of tactical defeats into strategic victories in the south. Lord Cornwallis had found himself chasing ghosts and eventually ran out of luck. In October 1781, Lord Cornwallis found himself trapped near Yorktown and surrendered his forces.[451]

The defeat at Yorktown ended major British operations on the east coast and serious peace negotiations got underway in Paris, but frontier operations continued for nearly a year afterwards. In March of 1782, the Indians of the Moravian mission at Gnadenhütten in western Pennsylvania were murdered by a band of Pennsylvania militia dead set on taking revenge on the Indians, even if they were not the Indians causing the problems. The Indians of the Ohio region were incensed. When another force of Pennsylvania militia led by Colonel William Crawford attacked the Ohio Indian villages in June 1782, the Indians and British rangers, led by Captain William Caldwell and Matthew Elliott, met them and annihilated the force. Many of the wounded prisoners were killed and Colonel Crawford was grievously tortured to death in retaliation for Gnadenhütten.[452] In August 1782, a large British force led by Captain Caldwell, loyalists Simon Girty, and Indian agents Alexander McKee and Matthew Elliott attacked the Kentucky settlement of Bryan's Station with several hundred Ohio warriors. The fort was alerted to the British force and managed to hold it off until Kentucky militia arrived. The British and Indian force retreated and the militia followed in hot pursuit unaware that the Indians had set a trap for them. At the Battle of Blue Licks, on 19 August 1782, the militia lost sixty-six dead and many more wounded. There would be more raids throughout the 1780s, especially in the Ohio region, but for all intents and purposes, the British Indian alliance had ended. The Kentuckians called on George Rogers Clark again to retaliate against the perpetrators of the Battle of Blue Licks. The invasion of the Ohio country fizzled out as the Indians deserted their homes and the Americans had to content themselves again with destroying empty villages.[453]

The last five years of the American Revolution saw the coming of age of a new way of warfare for the British. Specifically, medium sized parties of Indians with rangers and led by British officers had proven themselves incredibly effective against the Americans. It was

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[451] Richard D. Blackmon, *Dark and Bloody Ground: The American Revolution Along the Southern Frontier* (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, LLC, 2012), 192-214
[452] Horsman, *Elliott*, 36-39
[453] Patrick Griffin, *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 78-80

the culmination of all the experience since Edward Braddock's defeat in 1755. Those skills would be very useful for the Indians who would try to retain their homelands over the next twelve years with and without the British. Although sporadically used and poorly managed, they would also be useful for the British who were trying to retain their influence in the American midwest from 1783-1815. By 1782, there certainly seemed to be little reluctance on the part of British officials at any level to engage Indian allies against the Americans. There were often admonishments to act humanely to prisoners, the elderly, women and children, but these were often words with good intentions, but little credible meaning. Benjamin Franklin, playing his role of chief overseas propaganda officer, continued to play to the French proclivity of seeing the British as hypocrites on the issue of Indian atrocities. He had a New England newspaper print a manufactured report from Indians to King George III about a fictitious parcel of scalps 'cured, dried, hooped, and painted' and separated into packs. Among the packs in the report were, 'Farmers killed in their houses', 'Women; hair long… to shew they were Mothers', Girls' Scalps, big and little', and 'Infants' Scalps of various Sizes'.[454] When atrocities were in evidence, they made headlines on both sides of the Atlantic, but they did not materially affect deployments. The sheer volume of the reports, both true and manufactured, seemed to desensitize the British public.

However, the presence of Sir Guy Carleton and John Stuart had delayed the use of Indians for the two critical years of 1775-1776. No other senior British officials seemed as committed to the solely defensive use of Indians as Carleton and Stuart. Their clearly stated reasons for not using the Indians in the offense from 1775 to 1776 showed that their concern for humanity, especially towards innocents, was their overarching goal. Carleton's and Stuart's honour groups were slightly different, but the call upon them came from the same tradition. Whether internal honour drove their decisions or a desire to protect their external reputations is not clear, but it is also not required to make the point. This late start may not have lost the war for the British, but it most certainly grossly hindered the British effort. Their later use was largely successful in distracting the Americans and keeping the full force of their arms from being deployed on the coast. Of course, Indian atrocities drew criticism on both sides of the Atlantic and the Whigs (Americans and British) certainly won the propaganda war on the issue. There is little evidence that the condemnation in Britain or

[454] Smyth, Albert Henry, Ed., *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, Volume VIII, 1780-1782* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907), 437-441, Supplement to the *Boston Independent Chronicle*

America would have been more strenuous had the British unleashed the Indians offensively in 1775-1776 rather than 1777-1782. It is possible, however, that starting earlier might have changed the course, if not the very result, of the war.

In September 1783, the British and the Americans signed the Treaty of Paris ending the Revolutionary War without a single mention of the Indians of the midwest. The Americans were granted the land to the Mississippi River from the Great Lakes to Florida. East and West Florida reverted to Spanish control. The Indians were shocked that once again their lands had been signed away without their consent just as they had been in 1763. The Iroquois land was devastated, but the Ohio and southern Indians felt that they still had not been defeated. The idea that they had lost their land to the Americans seemed laughable, since they still directly controlled the overwhelming majority of the midwest. The American officials took an uncompromising line towards the Indians. They felt that the British allied Indians had chosen sides poorly and must suffer the consequences of those choices. The Indians were just as dismissive of the Americans. They told the Americans they had been swindled by being 'sold' something that the seller did not own. It seemed nothing had changed in the midwest. The warfare had been a series of revenge attacks on both sides that had not really changed anything materially and the enmity was still there, peace or no peace. Anything that could be burned or torn down could be re-built or replaced. The settlers kept coming and so did the Indians. Each would have to back up their assertions with force. If the Indians were deluded that Britain would consult them over peace terms, the Americans were also deluded that they had won a peace with the midwestern Indians. From the perspective of the midwestern Indians, the end of the American Revolution was only the end of another chapter in their struggle to hold onto their lands.[455]

The British officials in Canada and the midwestern forts had a different kind of honour to defend now. They had to try to convince the Indians that their interests had not entirely been sold for nothing. For the men who had asked the Indians to support them again and again in the war against the Americans, the Indians were brothers in arms and deserved better. However, they were as powerless as the Indians to influence European proceedings, at least initially. The primary inconsistency in the British position was that the new government in Britain had been in opposition for the course of the war and knew little of

[455] Calloway, *Indian Country*, 272-285

the detail of North American operations and geography. There is some evidence that they were even working with a faulty map of the western lands to the Mississippi River, but after berating Lord North's administration over its use of Indians for five years, it would hardly care what happened to the Indian allies afterwards.[456]

The new British government would slowly change its mind as highly regarded men like Governor Frederick Haldimand explained the volatile situation they had created. London began to realize they had given away too much for the peace. Haldimand felt that the best way to stabilize the situation was to keep the midwestern forts and to continue supplying the Indians with British trade goods. Joseph Brant, Daniel Claus, and John Butler went to England to explain the Indian position as well. The British worried about a repeat of the circumstances that led to Pontiac's rebellion which would put Canada at risk again as well as destroy the British dominated fur trade. It was within this context that British officials made the fateful decision to keep the midwestern posts as trading and diplomatic posts contrary to the Treaty of Paris. Various excuses were used to delay the handover of the forts at first, including waiting for the final signed treaty. The British finally settled on the Americans disregard for certain treaty provisions. At first, the British claimed that the Americans were persecuting the loyalists. Later, war debts became the stalling issue and some Americans even gave credence to this point. The ongoing benefit was the fur trade and keeping the Indians amenable to future alliances if the defence of Canada required it. Unspoken was that the British were also trying to make amends for their treatment of the Indians. There certainly were other issues that led to the decision to hold the forts throughout the 1780s. Vermont and Kentucky settlers were thinking aloud about separatism, the roles of Spain and France in America looked somewhat threatening, the navigation rights of the Mississippi River needed settling, and there was the ever present possibility that the new American nation might break up under a pile of debt and bickering assemblies. To British authorities and the Indians, the best way to monitor this situation and take advantage of it was to quietly stay in place.[457]

Through these actions, the British were able to claw back some of their credibility with the Indians. The British began to recommend that the midwestern Indians form cooperative bodies to make themselves stronger against the American demands. Old rivalries were hard

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[456] Sword, *Washington's Indian War,* 11

[457] J. Leitch Wright, Jr., *Britain and the American Frontier 1783-1815* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1975), 21-36

to suppress, but over time regional Indian alliances did emerge, especially in the Ohio. Of course, the situation in the south was more difficult. In the Treaty of Paris, Britain had given Florida back to the Spanish, so their ability to supply and influence the southern Indians was curtailed, but not totally extinguished. British traders supplied out of the Bahamas still carried some authority in Florida. The Cherokee had been so weakened by the war that they had to give up much of their remaining land to live in peace with the Americans. There was still the Chickamauga band that was militant, but it too had lost most of its power. The Creeks resumed their long term policy of dealing with multiple parties to gain the best advantage, but they too were now being pressed into land concessions in Georgia. British Indian agents like Joseph Brant, John Butler, Thomas Brown, Alexander McGillivray, Simon Girty, Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliott and Sir John Johnson eased this transition along. The fact that these men had been demonised by the backcountry settlers from 1777-1783 for their part in Indian atrocities meant that they cast a shadow on American views of British operations in the midwest. With every stolen horse, butchered cow or ambushed flatboat came the damnation of an Indian and an accusation against a perfidious British Indian agent like the 'White Savage' Simon Girty.[458]

In late 1786, Guy Carleton, now Lord Dorchester, returned as Governor of Canada, relieving Frederick Haldimand. On the ship that brought him back was Joseph Brant. Daniel Claus and Guy Johnson, both ill, stayed in Britain and each would die there within two years. Brant had managed to secure recompense for some of the losses the Indians had suffered in the war, but the new Home Secretary, Thomas Townshend, First Viscount Sydney, prevaricated on whether the British would support the Indians in holding firm to previous treaties like Fort Stanwix (1768) against new American claims. Long sea voyages were contemplative endeavours and passengers obviously talked. One can only wonder if Brant and Lord Dorchester spoke at any length about the North American situation. Lord Dorchester had previously left Canada in 1778, partially because he would not deploy the Indians the way Lord Germain had demanded. Brant had spent the war conducting some of the most brutal actions of the war. Both men were now older and in different situations. Brant came back with a more conciliatory mindset and the events of the next eight years suggest that Lord Dorchester may have become more comfortable with Indians and learned

[458] J. Leitch Wright, Jr., 'British Designs on the Old Southwest: Foreign Intrigue on the Florida Frontier, 1783-1803', *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, Volume XLIV, Number 4, (April, 1966): 265-284, 265-268

to understand their predicament better. Did one or the other change the ideas or perceptions of the other? The record makes no clear statement, but one can surmise that two old warriors had at least a few words together.

As the 1780s wore on and the sting of the Peace of 1783 faded, old rivalries and insults surfaced again. Indian raids on outlying settlements resumed as did the retribution from the settlers, including another foray into the Ohio country by George Rogers Clark in 1786. Brant knew that the evasive answer he received from Lord Sydney meant that the Indians were alone in their struggles against the Americans. The instructions Lord Sydney sent to Canada confirmed it, but it was not well known to the Indians. However, the British Indian agents and traders who worked and lived with the Indians every day were less forthcoming or, more cynically, self-serving in assuring the Indians that the British would come to their aid if the Americans became too aggressive. Whether the Indian Agents believed it or whether they thought that making the Indians expect it would encourage the British government to follow suit is unclear. However, the words meant something to the American settlers, even if they were spoken cynically. As the Americans demanded more land in the Ohio, beyond the Stanwix line, the Indians became more agitated and active. The American settlers became more confrontational and viewed the continued presence of the British as a sign that they would support the Indians. Indians and Kentucky settlers, alike, viewed a low level agent like Matthew Elliott or Alexander McKee as a representative of the British government, regardless of Lord Sydney's guidance.[459]

The Americans' hard line in forcing the Indians to give up new lands in treaties throughout the 1780s and early 1790s began to take its toll. From 1788-1794, there were outbreaks of violence between aggressive settlers and militant Indians. In the Chickamauga Cherokee territory, the members of the newly independent 'state' of Franklin (modern day eastern Tennessee) fought for six years over the settlement rights of the Tennessee and Cumberland River valleys. In Creek areas of Georgia, even though the Creeks had signed a treaty with the Americans in 1790, the same happened in 1792-1793. The new American government had as much trouble controlling its frontier settlers as the British had had. This situation contributed to the British interest in the area, because it was not clear at all that some of these areas would remain American. As always, there were accusations of British traders and adventurers in the south who were stirring up trouble and there was some truth

[459] Wright, Jr., *Britain American Frontier*, 37-49

to the accusations, even if it was not driven by British paid agents.[460] However, it was with respect to the newly created (1787) American Northwest Territory that the accusations had the most relevance.

The Northwest Territory was created out of the territory bordering the Great lakes in the midwest. It would eventually contain the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Of course, there were very few Americans in this area and almost all of it was controlled by Indians, but the Americans began to make their new treaties stick by encouraging settlers to occupy the eastern and southern portions of Ohio. The Indians in the Ohio area had been busy creating a loose confederacy of tribes that were feeling the pinch from American expansion. Centered on the Shawnee, Delaware and Miami tribes of central and eastern Ohio, they also drew in help from tribes further north and west, such as the Potawatomi. These tribes had worked together during the American Revolution with the British and were continuing that cooperation with British encouragement. With these movements came the inevitable conflict. In 1789, the Ohio tribes attacked the settlements along the Ohio River. By the end of the year, President George Washington declared an emergency and dispatched Brigadier General Josiah Harmar and an expeditionary force to quell the violence. In the fall of 1790, Harmar advanced to the area in between the Maumee and Wabash Rivers where many Miami Indian villages were located. As they had done many times before, the Indians retreated en masse in front of the American force, leaving Harmar to destroy their crops and houses, but losing few people. However, Colonel John Hardin, a Harmar subordinate, probed further with his smaller force and was caught out by the Indians. Over two days in late October 1790, the Indians led by the Miami chief Little Turtle and Shawnee Blue Jacket killed 178 of Hardin's force. The Indians made their way to Detroit soon thereafter to report their actions to the British and ask for relief. The destruction of the Miami towns had left the Indians destitute. The British reply was to help materially, but to encourage the Indians to seek peace with the Americans. The Indians did not feel that the British understood their position. They had decided that the Ohio River line of the Treaty of Ft Stanwix of 1768 was non-negotiable and they would fight to defend it. They continued their raids along the Ohio River. Lord Dorchester instructed the officials at Detroit to keep a close eye on the situation.[461]

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[460] Wright, Jr., 'British Designs', 265-284
[461] Allen, *Indian Allies,* 70-73 and Grenier, *First Way*, 195-196

There were no reports of British involvement at Harmar's defeat and certainly no direction of the effort, but soon thereafter, Simon Girty would begin going out with the Indians as an advisor and observer. Girty had conducted many such missions in the Revolution. He was a loyalist who had long lived amongst the Indians and knew several Indian languages. He was employed as a British interpreter for the British Indian Agent Colonel Alexander McKee and his assistant Matthew Elliott. The three were from western Pennsylvania, but turned against the rebels in 1778 to support the British. Although Mckee's and Elliott's jobs were to support the Indians commercially and Girty's job was to interpret, they were all heavily enmeshed with Indian life in the Ohio region. Their actions did not carry much weight with the British officials, but they did with the Indians. As the Indian attacks increased in severity into the summer of 1791, Girty kept McKee well informed of the Indian actions. Girty's presence would not have gone unnoticed by survivors of the Indian attacks either. He was notorious in Kentucky and southern Ohio. He had become well known for his actions in the Revolution. He had been present at the Kentuckian defeat at Blue Licks in 1782. To the settlers and the political leaders of the area, Girty's presence meant that the British were supplying and encouraging the Indians to act.[462]

The Indians had seen their new strength in acting together rewarded with a string of victories. Little Turtle had become the de facto leader with a strong back up of the renowned warrior Blue Jacket. The Miami-Shawnee alliance was proving much stronger than the sum of its parts. Watching these developments in horror were the beleaguered settlers of the Ohio. The settlers and political leaders pushed for more federal help. Governor St. Clair was given the additional title of Major General and the support to raise a new army to deal with the Indian threat. After months of delays and two ineffectual interim expeditions, St. Clair entered the Miami country in October 1791. The expedition was riven with discord at the senior level and the militia became mutinous. The result was a large force bumbling into the confident Ohio confederacy. On 4 November, Little Turtle and Blue Jacket struck. The result was the worst defeat of an American army by Indians ever recorded. St. Clair was routed with over 650 dead and over 250 wounded. As the survivors staggered back to the Ohio River, the reports began traveling to Washington who was reportedly distraught. It would take three more years and an abundance of American

[462] Sword, *Washington's Indian War*, 125-130

treasure to make another attempt on the confederacy. The Indians were jubilant as their interpreter and advisor, Simon Girty, gave guidance on the importance of the various captives and plunder.[463] London and Lord Dorchester might have felt they were walking a fine line, but as far as the Americans were concerned, they were aiding and abetting the Indians.

The St. Clair defeat forced the Americans to reconsider their strategy. They decided to try to treat with the Indians while also building a formidable army under one of their best Revolutionary Generals, Anthony Wayne. Throughout 1792 and 1793, the Americans sent negotiation overtures, including one from Joseph Brant to the other Indians, but it was too late. Two of the emissaries were killed in the process. The confederation of tribes in the Ohio area was full of their success, and they thought they could hold off the Americans. The militant factions' success had forced the peace chiefs to accept the situation. The new Lieutenant Governor at Detroit, John Graves Simcoe, even helped out by hindering the Americans navigating the Great Lakes to meet with the Indians. Simcoe was a veteran of the Revolutionary War where he had been wounded and captured. He held the Americans in contempt militarily and politically, but actually admired their frontier spirit and self-sufficiency. During this period of attempted American diplomacy, relations between the U.S.A. and Britain were also faltering due to trade imbalances and naval issues. The Americans had sent Chief Justice John Jay to Britain to negotiate a settlement. In the early 1790s, these negotiations were not going well. The correspondence from London to Lord Dorchester and Simcoe warned them of a potential conflict. With this in mind, both leaders decided they needed to curry favour with the tribes again. Simcoe authorized Alexander McKee to inform the tribes that Britain was behind their new found confederacy. On 10 February 1794, after returning from a trip to London, Lord Dorchester went further with an ill-considered speech to an assembled group of Indians. He told the Indians that he expected to be at war with the U.S.A. within the year and that Britain and the Indians would be allies again.[464] Lord Dorchester instructed Simcoe to erect a fort at the falls of the Maumee River in preparation. Simcoe, McKee and the Indians were overjoyed. It felt like

[463] Sword, *Washington's Indian War*, 179-191
[464] E.A. Cruickshank, Ed., *The Correspondence of Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe with Allied Documents Relating to his Administration of the Government of Upper Canada, Volume II* (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1924), 149-150

Britain was taking its alliance with the Indians seriously again.[465] A transcript of the speech made its way to American newspapers and was widely printed. The Americans were outraged and their feelings were expressed to Jay in London. Unbeknownst to them, Britain and the U.S.A. were on the verge of signing a treaty that would settle the question of the forts in the midwest and establish a much friendlier atmosphere between the two countries. By 1794, the spectre of France exporting its revolution was a much bigger concern to London that a few forts in the middle of nowhere, so the Indian alliance was once more sacrificed for European concerns. Keeping the Americans and the French from allying again was much more important to the British. The news of the treaty would not reach Canada until late 1795, but the correspondence from London took a much more hopeful tone in late 1794. Lord Dorchester and Simcoe were then being ordered to avoid direct confrontation with the Americans and to encourage the Indians to do the same.

By the summer of 1794, General 'Mad' Anthony Wayne was marching into the Maumee area with the strongest force yet. Wayne issued ultimatums to the Indians to seek a negotiated settlement, but the confederacy denied them. The Battle of Fallen Timbers would not be a battle where the Indians fought in their normal irregular manner. On 20 August 1794, with a force of 1,500 warriors, a great confidence from their previous encounters, and with a British fort at their back, the Indians took up a defensive position amongst the downed trees of a recent tornado. Finally having a conventional encounter to deploy their skills in, Wayne's well trained force out-maneuvered the Indians quickly and pushed them into a retreat. As the Indians fled the few miles to Fort Miamis, they were expecting help from the British. Unfortunately, the commander of the fort had orders not to intervene. The gates were shut to the Indians. Once again the British had betrayed their allies to make peace with the Americans.[466]

Although the battles and skirmishing in the midwest from 1783 to 1794 were not on par with the devastation of the American Revolution, they were an important part of the relationship between Britain and the midwest Indians. The Indians had learned the hard way that the British were still in the area to support their own objectives and the Indians would only be supported if it benefitted the British. However, the Indians had learned that a confederacy of tribes to stand up to the Americans was not a forlorn hope. The successes of

[465] Starkey, *European and Native,* 151-152
[466] Wright, Jr., *Britain American Frontier*, 96-102

the early 1790s were proof that they could hold their own in the right circumstances. The British officers and Indian Agents certainly showed no hesitation in encouraging the Indians against the Americans. The raids against the frontier were performed with British supplied trade goods, food, clothing and ammunition. The most interesting individual was Lord Dorchester. At the beginning of the American Revolution, he was probably the most conciliatory to the Americans which led him to restrain the Indians. By the 1790s, he held the Americans in contempt and was much less worried about British supplies going to Indians that he knew were attacking the American frontier from 1790 to 1794. Lord Dorchester symbolised the complete transformation of the British Army officer who did not use Indians offensively when he felt he held a superior position, but immediately relented when the British were at a disadvantage. The fact that Britain was facing an existential crisis with France had much to do with it.

'Cultivate peace between your different Tribes, that they may become one great people.' - The Trout, Ottawa warrior, 1807[467]

8. Final Stand

Three months after the Battle of Fallen Timbers, Britain and the United States signed the Jay Treaty. It would be nearly a year before the details of the treaty reached the Midwest, but it became effective in early 1796. Among other issues that the two countries had agreed upon, the British had agreed to finally give up the midwestern forts that had been supporting the Indians. The British immediately set up new posts near each of the existing forts within Canada. The distance might have been small, but the psychological distance was larger than ever. After the Jay Treaty was signed, but before it was implemented, the Midwest Indians signed the Treaty of Greenville in August of 1795. That treaty saw the Indians sign over large parts of Ohio and several other areas around the Great Lakes to the Americans in return for cash and trade goods. It was the first time that the Indians in the area had formally recognised any claims north of the Ohio River. It had been a difficult period, but the Indians of the Ohio had held their lands for twelve years after the Treaty of Paris had technically removed their claims. Although defeated and abandoned by the British, the Indians of the Ohio and the Gulf south still held vast tracts of land and they had proven that they could work together to force both the Americans and the British to take note of their grievances.

The British officials in London felt they had secured peace in the midwest at a time when the events in Europe were pressing them. However, the British officials on the ground in Canada had a far harder task, especially the Indian agents that continued to deal with the tribes. However, the Indians' need for trade goods and ammunition for their hunting meant the Indians maintained contact. The Americans set up posts to deal with the Indians as well, but British manufactures and traditional ties with British agents and traders meant the strength of custom remained. An important component of the Jay Treaty was that the Indians retained the right to move freely between the two countries unhindered. Therefore, from 1795 through 1805 a rough, but somewhat peaceful period passed in the midwest.[468]

During this time, many Indians in the midwest entered another period of spiritual awakening, much like the period around 1760-1764 with the Delaware prophet Neolin. This

[467] Dowd, *Heaven*, Frontispiece quote
[468] Allen, *Indian Allies*, 83-108

time the most famous spiritual leader was a Shawnee named a Tenskwatawa or simply The Prophet. Forty years had passed, but the message was much the same. After experiencing a series of dreams that he claimed changed him in 1805, Tenskwatawa preached an appealing message to those who believed that the Indians had brought their grief upon themselves by not being true to their creator, customs and culture. Tenskwatawa was not the only one preaching this message at the time, but he seemed to have been the most charismatic. He set up a community on the Tippecanoe River in modern day Northwest Indiana and attracted Indians from all over the midwest to hear his message. Much like the warrior Pontiac was associated with Neolin; a warrior named Tecumseh was also associated with The Prophet. In fact, they were brothers.[469] Tecumseh was born around 1768 to a Shawnee father and a Creek mother. He had been a youth during the Revolutionary war, but came of age during the period after the war. He participated in the ambushing of settler flatboats on the Ohio River in the 1780s. He travelled south and participated in the Chickamauga fights against the Franklin settlers around 1790. In 1794, he had participated in the Battle of Fallen Timbers. [470] From 1795 to 1805, Tecumseh settled back in the midwest and began to rekindle the idea of a pan-Indian confederacy that could withstand the American onslaught on their homeland. At this point, the British were not part of his plan, but a series of events would soon turn the midwest back into an international war zone.

As Tenskwatawa's fame grew, news began passing into the American frontier settlements of a brash new form of Indian resurgence. With it came the inevitable attacks on settlers, many of whom were once again stretching the limits of treaty boundaries. Simultaneously, Britain and America were beginning to agitate each other again. The British war against France had been going on for fifteen years with no end in sight. The actions that the Royal Navy was taking to secure the Atlantic were impacting upon America. In 1807, the Chesapeake affair had the two countries on the brink of war. Although calmer heads prevailed, Britain began to court the Indians of the midwest again just in case. The connections were once again through British Indian agents and traders. The Indians, including Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh were very wary of the British, but took the gifts and listened to the British agents anyway. The Americans did not go to war in 1807, but the affair had set in motion events that would eventually lead to war. Of course,

[469] Sugden, *Tecumseh*, 116-126
[470] Ibid., 44-94

as belligerence towards Britain increased, the suspicions of the British instigating Indian attacks arose again as well. Soon, a self-fulfilling series of events began to unfold.

By 1809, American settlers were looking avariciously west again. The new Governor of the Indiana Territory, William Henry Harrison had convinced some of the tribes of the midwest to sign a further cession of land in the Treaty of Fort Wayne in late 1809. Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa were enraged by the treaty and felt that all the Indians of the midwest would need to agree to the new cession. The results of the treaty led Tecumseh to the conclusion that war might be required to stop the settler tide. In 1811, Tecumseh travelled south to gather support from the southern Indians. Most of the southern Indians did not want to hear his message. Many tribes in the south had come to terms with white settlement or had not been affected by it yet. The Creeks were split between two factions. The 'White Sticks' were pro-American and were learning to become more agricultural. The 'Red Sticks' were more in tune with Tecumseh's vision of maintaining their traditional lands and way of life. The Red Sticks agreed to support Tecumseh. Unfortunately, while Tecumseh was in the south, Harrison confronted Tenskwatawa at Prophetstown. Tenskwatawa was not a warrior, but events spiraled out of his control. At the Battle of Tippecanoe on 7 November 1811, Harrison defeated Tenskwatawa's force and cleared Prophetstown. Tecumseh returned north to find his plans were scattered, but still intent on holding onto the Shawnee lands.[471]

Like many times before, the British were trying to keep the Indians on side, but ratchet down conflict. The British were trying to avoid war with the U.S.A., but finding it hard to avoid conflict without aiding the French on the high seas. Major General Isaac Brock who was the commander of British forces in Upper Canada was monitoring events in the midwest with apprehension. By late 1811, he had intelligence coming in about the events leading up to Tippecanoe and he was trying to keep the violence from spreading while also trying to keep the Indians warm if they were needed to defend Canada.[472] In the meantime, events on the Atlantic continued to insult the Americans, especially a group of Congressmen known as the 'War Hawks'. Even as Britain tried to alleviate the last of the issues, the U.S.A. felt its honour had been indelibly stained and declared war.

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[471] Horsman, 'British Indian Policy in the Northwest, 1807-1812', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jun., 1958):51-66 and Borneman (2005), pp. 30-31

[472] Brock to Prevost, 3 December 1811, Ferdinand Brock Tupper, *The Life and Correspondence of Sir Isaac Brock* (London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1845), 109,

At the start of the War of 1812, British Army officers in North America had to deal with two realities. In Europe, Britain was in a desperate struggle with Napoleonic France that many described as a battle for survival. In North America, Britain was dealing with a war it did not want in character or timing. Of course, the two issues were intertwined and affected each other. The existential nature of the battle in Europe meant that British officers in North America knew they could not expect large numbers of professional troops. Therefore, the calculation of whether to use Indians changed once again. Some British officers still shied away from making the difficult choice of using Indians decisively. By 1812, Sir Isaac Brock was not an officer of that class.

Major General Isaac Brock was born on Guernsey in 1769. Brock had spent his militarily formative Army years in Europe, mainly in Guernsey and England, with the 8th Regiment. Brock saw his first combat against the French in the low countries in 1799 with his new regiment, the 49th, and had acquitted himself well. Later, Brock participated in the capture of Copenhagen with Admiral Horatio Nelson. In 1802, Brock was sent to North America where he would stay until his death in 1812 with only one visit back to Britain and Guernsey. Brock began his service in North America having to discourage the Indians from attacks on the American outposts in the midwest, but his sympathies lay with the Indians. He developed a good working relationship with the British Indian Agent at Amherstburg, Matthew Elliott. By the time of the War of 1812, Brock was well familiar with the North American terrain, customs and forms of warfare. Although Brock planned on returning to service in Europe, he never seemed worried about praising the Indians or hesitating to consider using them whilst he had command in Canada.[473] Although Brock often despaired of not being in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, he declined the opportunity to return to Europe at the outbreak of the War of 1812.

At the beginning of the War of 1812, Brock sought to change the conventional wisdom of actively defending only Lower Canada and the great fortress ports of Montreal and Quebec that were so hard to take and could be readily re-supplied and supported by the Royal Navy. This strategy had been adopted by the British since the 1760s, but Upper Canada had changed in recent years and now was far more populated than in the past. Brock thought that if he could surprise the Americans with an unexpected show of strength

[473] Jonathan Riley, *A Matter of Honour: The Life, Campaigns and Generalship of Isaac Brock* (London: Frontline Books, 2011), 127-128

in the area, the Americans might have to re-consider the whole enterprise. However, above Brock was Canadian Commander-in-Chief and Governor General George Prevost who was far more conventional in his views and cautious on the issue of using Indians. This might be seen as a simple belief in not using the Indians for ethical concerns, but Prevost was also not an aggressive military commander with his own troops or the Canadian militia either. Prevost, who had been born in New York prior to the American Revolution, harboured hopes of a short war with no major campaigns if calmer heads prevailed. Prevost had written to Brock that aggressive tactics and the use of Indians might inflame American opinion and prolong what Prevost viewed as a most unnecessary war between cousins.[474]

Brock knew he would never get the required number of professional troops to defend Upper Canada. Additionally, he knew that the local population that would supply the militia was both undertrained and often pro-American in their allegiances. These two facts made Brock look to the Indians as the only force that was both opposed to American hegemony in the area and capable of conducting the wide ranging and distributed form of warfare needed to stop the Americans from subsuming Upper Canada. The problem with this plan was that the Indians had become very wary of British promises of aid due to their most recent history. In the early 1790s, the British had helped provoke the Indians into a war with the Americans in the Ohio region. After repeated assurances that help would be provided when needed, the British literally shut the door on the Indians after the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. Brock would need to prove to the Indians that he was serious about defending Upper Canada with British Regulars and militia before he could count on any size-able number of warriors joining his ranks.[475]

Since his arrival in the region, Brock had dealt with the British Indian Department, predominantly at Amherstburg. The Indian Agent there was Matthew Elliot. At eighty years old in 1812, Elliott had been involved with the Indians of the upper midwest since the 1760s. Elliott had been married to a Shawnee woman and they had two sons who also worked in the British Indian Department. Elliott's sympathies with the Indians were well known. Elliott, along with other Indian sympathisers in the area, like Simon Girty and Alexander McKee, had kept the Americans suspicious of British support for the Indians since the end of the American Revolution. Elliott had been dismissed from official

[474] Prevost to Brock, 30 April 1812, Tupper, *Sir Isaac Brock*, 148-149
[475] Baynes to Brock, 19 March 1812, Ibid, 135-136

capacities for several years before the War of 1812 by the previous Governor for leaning too far in favour of the Indians. The British were walking a fine line of keeping the Indians friendly, but not so well supplied that the Americans could credibly accuse them of instigating hostilities. Only the coming of conflict brought Elliott back into the official British establishment, as no white man was more influential with the Indians of the Ohio.[476]

Elliott was aware of the brewing troubles between the Americans and the Indians along the Wabash River in 1811. The Shawnee and other Indian groups of the midwest were being encouraged into a pan-tribal alliance by the Shawnee brother duo of Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa (also known as the Shawnee Prophet). Elliott could see that the Indian alliance being formed by the Shawnee brothers could be of great use to the British and suggested such to Brock. At approximately the same time Brock was writing to his superior, Prevost, about this grand plan to secure Upper Canada with a few bold strokes, Elliott was proposing a similar plan to his superior, Super-Intendant of Indian Affairs Daniel Claus.[477]

Elliott's ideas could be dismissed as just more of his favouritism towards the Indians with the balance in the Indians' favour. However, when Brock took up the idea that the strategically important forts at Detroit and Mackinac could be taken quickly by a combined force of Indians and British Regulars, the plan took on a new seriousness in the British establishment. Brock's concept was that the Americans could be taken by surprise before they had time to re-enforce these forts with militia from the frontier states of Kentucky and Ohio. With Detroit and Mackinac under British control, the settlers of the upper midwest would seek the safety of moving south and east to avoid the inevitable Indian raids. With Upper Canada secured and the population of the midwest on the run, American militia recruitment would suffer. If the upper midwest was neutralised, then Brock could concentrate his remaining forces on the Niagara corridor and use British naval superiority to better effect closer to Lower Canada. Brock displayed little compunction in suggesting such a plan. Nor did he shy away from making threats of unleashing the Indians on the Americans to induce capitulation. The importance of the Indians in the calculations cannot be overstated, but the Indians also brought baggage. They were hard to amass when needed,

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[476] Horsman, *Elliott*, 186-191

[477] Brock to Prevost, 2 December 1811, Tupper, *Sir Isaac Brock*, 123-130 & Elliott to Claus, 9 December 1811, Logan Esarey, Ed. *Indiana Historical Collections: Governors Messages and Letters Volume 1, 1800-1811: Messages and Letter of William Henry Harrison*. (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922), 660-662

required constant management with presents and consultation. Their actions of scalping and plundering after a battle were often propaganda boon for the Americans. Prevost appeared to be the leader with the most apprehensions of using Indians.[478]

Brock knew all too well the fear and hatred of the Indians by the Americans. Deploying units of Indians, even small units, was a known force multiplier for any British commander in deed and in lore. Stories of Indian atrocities were the 19th century equivalent of modern day horror movies. Every frontier child grew up hearing horrendous tales of babes and nursing mothers being killed by the same tomahawk stroke. Neither quilting nor drinking session, nor church picnic was complete without the retelling of the latest atrocity. Historian Alan Taylor referred to the Indian's systematic terror as a 'theater of intimidation'. [479] The Indians were excellent woodsmen and helped the British units move faster and leaner. They provided priceless intelligence on terrain and American troop movements. In short, the Indians were invaluable allies in Great Lakes warfare. As Taylor summarised,

> In the northern borderland, a powerful *combination* of British regulars and Indian warriors repeatedly defeated American troops. Together they made a formidable team. Consummate guerrilla fighters, Indian warriors guarded the British flanks, while the disciplined regulars controlled the center with bayonet charges that also terrified raw American recruits. [480]

In the strategic calculations, each side had its strengths and sought to maximise them at the other's expense. British conventional wisdom was that Britain owned the sea, lakes and the larger waterways, but could not spare land forces that were needed in Europe. The total number of British land forces in Canada was only a little over 8,000. This paltry number was the reason that Britain had little to no choice to engage the Indians. Canada had a population of approximately 500,000, but only 77,000 of those were in Upper Canada. Therefore, Britain looked to maintain its larger population centres, but to cede Upper Canada, when appropriate, to husband scarce land resources while the Royal Navy brought the American economy to its knees. The American conventional wisdom was to roll up

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[478] Prevost to Brock, 24 December 1811, Tupper, *Sir Isaac Brock*, 112-113
[479] Taylor, Alan. The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 206
[480] Ibid., 332

Upper Canada easily on the way to seizing the more heavily defended Lower Canada. The strategic thinking was that cutting off Upper Canada would cut off the supplies needed to keep the Indians and local militia friendly. In doing so, it would limit the amount of Indians and militia available to defend Lower Canada. The Americans calculated that when they had taken over Upper and Lower Canada, then the naval bases in the maritime provinces, it would remove the easy co-ordination of naval activities off the eastern seaboard. In inserting the Indians into an early and decisive stroke against the midwestern American posts, Brock was trying to remove the first link in the American strategy.[481]

Brock's originality lay in his ability to see a way to break the strategic deadlock very early on by surprising the Americans at Fort Mackinac and Detroit. Brock felt that if he could take these lightly defended forts before they could be reinforced, he could break the American plan to work up from Upper Canada through the population centres of Lower Canada and on to the naval bases on the Atlantic. Along with this major strategic interruption of American plans, Brock felt the early successes would assure the Indians that the British were serious about defending the area for themselves and the Indians. Additionally, having the Indians on side and securing the area would encourage more farmers to volunteer for the militia duty. Although brilliant and bold, the plan was also risky. Had it failed, it could have meant the fall of Canada very quickly as forces used on the offense might have been captured and not available to the more important Lower Canada. Prevost very politely advised Brock to keep his ideas, but not to execute unless given approval. Brock was not happy, but was polite to Prevost. Brock's plan was to keep pushing his plan until Prevost relented. At other times, commanders in the field might have received direction from London on issues such as these, but the administration was far too worried about the situation in Europe. In one of the few communications about the Indians from Henry Bathurst, 3rd Earl Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, he stated that he preferred the Indians to be neutral, but did not think it was possible as they would side with the Americans otherwise.[482]

However, this was not just another example of a local commander chafing at a higher headquarters for not understanding the local conditions and taking advantage of them. If Prevost, or even London, were to accept the risks of the Brock plans, there was the very

[481] John K. Mahon, *The War of 1812* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, Da Capo Press, Inc. re-print, 1972), 15-19
[482] Ibid, 36

real possibility of inflaming the Americans further, losing Upper Canada entirely and quickly, along with the militia and regulars stationed there. Although the regulars did not represent a large enough force to defend Upper Canada, they could be the decisive factors if Montreal or Quebec were to be threatened severely. Prevost liked Brock and thought highly of him, but the risks to the overall strategic calculation were just too high. In the forms of Brock and Prevost, respectively, stood the age-old strategic dilemma of striving to win versus striving to not lose. The situation was made more difficult by the fact that Prevost and Brock were not meeting in person, but communicating in writing. Each was careful not to be too hard on the other. Prevost praised Brock for his forethought and initiative, but simultaneously made clear that preparations were all that was allowed prior to a declaration of war. Brock was to remain on the defensive. However, as the Americans declared war, events took on a life of their own.

On 18 June 1812, the United States of America declared war on the Britain. Brock alerted all of his subordinates to stand ready to defend Upper Canada as he had agreed with Prevost, except to the commander of Fort St. Joseph. At the far northern British post of Fort St. Joseph, located where Lake Huron and Lake Michigan meet, conflicting and confusing orders were reaching the commander, Captain Charles Roberts. On Michilimackinac Island in the strait was the American Fort Mackinac. Initially, Roberts received a letter from Brock to take Mackinac, then another letter from Brock telling him to use his judgment to take it or not. Roberts chose to take it on 17 July 1812, but received a letter from Prevost immediately after the capture stating that he should remain on the defensive and retreat if necessary. The American commander at Fort Mackinac, Lieutenant Porter Hanks, was faced with a superior force that included many Indians. Hanks decided to save his small force and surrendered the fort with full honours. The Indians that accompanied Roberts were kept in check. Their mere presence, and the implication of no quarter if Hanks were to hold out, meant that a quick surrender was the best that could be hoped for by Roberts. The Indians were allowed to plunder the captured American stores that made for a good recruiting story for more Indian help in the future. As Brock had predicted, Indian interest in the British cause was quickly ignited when they saw that Brock's forces were serious

about securing Upper Canada, but it would be a few weeks before Brock was to know this for sure. [483]

Unbeknownst to Roberts and Hanks, General Hull, the Commander of Detroit, had crossed into Canada a few days before the capitulation of Fort Mackinac. Hull had landed unopposed near Sandwich (modern day Windsor), Upper Canada across the river from Detroit. The Americans, especially Hull, had real fears of the Indian threat.[484] As the first Governor of the Michigan territory, Hull knew all too well the leanings of the Indians towards the British. The first thing Hull did when he invaded Upper Canada was to issue a proclamation threatening total war if the population encouraged the Indians as part of their war plans. The Proclamation had a special threat to those who allied with the Indians,

> If the barbarous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages be let loose to murder our citizens, and butcher our women and children, this war will be a war of extermination. The first stroke of the tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping knife, will be the signal of one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man, found fighting by the side of an Indian, will be taken prisoner—instant destruction will be his lot. If the dictates of reason, duty, justice, and humanity, cannot prevent the employment of a force which respects no rights and knows no wrong, it will be prevented by a severe and relentless system of retaliation.[485]

Initially, Hull's bravado worked. Many of the locals around Sandwich agreed to Hull's demands. Brock immediately shot back with a proclamation of his own on 22 July 1812, declaring that the Americans were the aggressor and they had no right to dictate that people, settler and aborigine, whose land had been invaded should be prohibited from fighting back in alliance to preserve their right to quarter. Brock stated to the Canadians that their government and its allies would seek to stop Hull and that the residents should not be worried. Brock specifically defended the Indians by stating, 'If their warfare, from being different to that of the white people, be more terrific to the enemy, let him retrace his steps— they seek him not—' Here was Brock declaring that the Indian way of war was

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[483] Tupper, *Sir Isaac Brock*, 205-207 & James Laxer, *Tecumseh & Brock: The War of 1812*. Toronto, Ontario: House of Anansi Press Inc., 2012), 126-127
[484] Ibid., 130
[485] Hull Proclamation, 12 July 1812, Tupper, *Sir Isaac Brock*, 186-188

legitimate, especially for a force that is defending its homeland. There are no apologies for using Indians or allowing them to use their traditional forms of warfare.[486] As tough as Brock sounded, he had fears that the worst was yet to come. The Upper Canada militia was not covering itself in glory and it was not clear if the Indians were going to side with the British or sit the campaign out. Brock sent Colonel Henry Procter to Amherstburg, which Brock assumed was the ultimate objective for Hull, to rally the defences and negotiate with the Indians there to join forces.[487] Procter arrived at Amherstburg on 26 July 1812.

Hull eventually received the news on 4 August 1812 that Fort Mackinac had fallen to the British, with the support of a large force of Indians, without a fight that made him extremely nervous of his own position. Brock had been correct in thinking that Mackinac was far more important to the Americans than its size warranted. To add to Hull's worry, Tecumseh and a small Indian force was busy harassing his communications to his south near Brownstown and Maguaga. Not only did Tecumseh's raids have the desired effect of spooking Hull, but also much of the American General's correspondence had been intercepted on 5 August 1812 and sent immediately to Brock.[488]

Brock sensed that the tide might be turning at this point and moved towards Amherstburg to take personal command of the forces amassing there. It was a mixed group of detachments of regulars, militia and a few Indians from the Grand River area. Brock arrived at Amherstburg on 14 August to find that Hull had already moved the majority of his force back across the river to Detroit. Brock could not believe his luck and began immediately making plans to assault Detroit. He hoped to shame many of the local militia into rallying to the cause now and use the Mackinac, Brownstone, Maguaga, and Sandwich successes to recruit more Indians to the cause. It was at this point that Brock met Tecumseh and the famous immediate friendship was instigated. Brock found Tecumseh to be a sober and "sagacious" warrior with whom he could work well. Tecumseh apparently felt the same and was impressed that Brock was so keen to take the offensive against Hull. With little fanfare, the two sealed a deal that would deliver nearly one thousand warriors to aid Brock's plans for Detroit. [489] There seems to be no detailed account of Brock insisting that

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[486] Brock Counter-Proclamation, 22 July 1812, Ibid, pp. 188-191
[487] E.A. Cruikshank, Ed., *Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit 1812*. (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1913), 190-191
[488] Riley, *A Matter of Honour,* 199-200
[489] Laxer, *Tecumseh & Brock*, 143-147

special measures be taken by Tecumseh to avert atrocities. It seems the dire situation and the opportunity at hand was all that was on Brock's mind.

Meanwhile, back in Detroit, Hull was fending off mutinous declarations from his own officers and declaring that Fort Dearborn (modern day Chicago) was no longer defensible due to the fall of Fort Mackinac and the shakiness of his own communications. Hull instructed Captain Nathan Heald of Fort Dearborn to abandon the fort and move his forces and dependents to Detroit. Heald's party was ambushed on 15 August by Indians, unassociated with Brock or Tecumseh, south of Dearborn with two-thirds of the party being killed and the remainder taken prisoner.[490] Things were about to get even worse for Hull.

With the fall of Fort Mackinac and the interception of Hull's communications, even Prevost was feeling much more confident about Brock's chances in Upper Canada. Prevost freed more resources to Brock, but still not much. Brock would move with what he had. On the day the Fort Dearborn party was ambushed, Brock spared no time in sending a party to treat with Hull at Detroit with the following demand,

> The force at my disposal, authorizes me to require of you the immediate Surrender of Fort Detroit--
>
> It is far from my inclination to join in a war of extermination, but you must be aware that the numerous body of Indians, who have attached themselves to my Troops, will be beyond my Controul [sic] the moment the contest commences-- You will find me disposed to enter into such conditions, as will satisfy the most scrupulous sense of Honor-- Lt Colo McDonnell & Major Gregg are fully authorized, to conclude any arrangement, that may lead to stop the unnecessary effusion of blood--[491]

If Brock had any concern about his honour in using Indians on this occasion, he did not display it. This threat is reminiscent of General John Burgoyne's threat in the Saratoga campaign in the American Revolution.[492] Burgoyne was to later try to defend himself in Parliament by declaring it an empty threat that he never intended to allow to happen. Whether Brock would have claimed the same if the situation had turned into bloodbath of

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[490] Riley, *A Matter of Honour,* 211
[491] Brock to Hull, 15 August 1812, Michigan Historical Commission. *Michigan Historical Collections. Volume 40* (Lansing: Michigan Historical Commission, 1929), p.451 -
[492] Luzader, *Saratoga*, 42-43, Billias, 'Burgoyne' in Billias, *Opponents Volume II*, 183

scalping, we will never know. Hull initially refused the demand, but continued to be rattled by the possibility of a fight with a large Indian force. As the British artillery opened up on the fort, Hull could see the 1,000 strong force of Indians taking up positions. Hull's obvious fear of an Indian rout after a strong defence animated his imagination far beyond the capability of the small British and Indian force. Having read Hull's intercepted correspondence and taken measure of Hull's withdrawal from Sandwich, Brock made a bet that Hull would fold or make a very bad decision in his defence. Brock was right and Hull soon thereafter ran up a white flag to open surrender negotiations on 16 August 1812. Not long after, Brock entered Detroit to accept full capitulation.[493]

Brock was elated and effusive in his praise for all that had participated in the surrender of Detroit. Brock singled out the Indians for special praise,

> A few prisoners were taken by them during the advance, whom they treated with every humanity; and it affords me much pleasure in assuring your excellency, that such was their forbearance and attention to what was required of them, that the enemy sustained no other loss in men than what was occasioned by the fire of our batteries.[494]

This declaration in correspondence was not unique. Atrocities with prisoners taken by Indians were such a common occurrence that praise like this was common when allied Indians did *not* commit an atrocity.[495]

The surrender of Detroit electrified the American midwest. For the Americans, it had taken less than two months to go from extreme confidence of the fall of Upper Canada to losing Forts Mackinac, Dearborn and Detroit in quick succession with little prospect of regaining them without a large force to open up and keep open the lines of communication from Kentucky to Detroit. Not only had they not secured Upper Canada, but also now they had the very real possibility of a full-blown Indian war on their own soil. [496]

Immediately after the Detroit victory, Brock headed back to Fort George, his headquarters on the Niagara corridor where U.S. troops had been amassing. On 13 October 1812, the Americans crossed the river and attacked Queenston and quickly took the high

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[493] Antal, *Wampum*, 95-97
[494] Tupper, *Sir Isaac Brock*, 273
[495] Calloway, *Calumet*, 211
[496] Sugden, *Tecumseh*, 304-306

ground at Queenston Heights. Brock assembled a small force and tried to dislodge the Americans but failed and was killed leading the charge. Later, a combined British and Indian force succeeded in removing them. After 3 months of war in Upper Canada, the British and the Indians were victorious on all fronts. However, the man who conceived the aggressive and surprising plan was dead. The British had lost their most capable General in Canada and the Indians had lost their most fervent and loyal supporter in the British establishment. There was little fighting for the rest of 1812.[497]

Honour did not hinder Brock or the British leadership in Canada. There is no evidence in the record by Brock or about Brock from others that suggested that he was concerned about his reputation for using Indians. There did not seem to even be any concern about threatening a possible post battle massacre, if Hull did not surrender Detroit. What was displayed was a General who was strong in his conviction that there were only two options. The first option was to surrender Upper Canada slowly, but surely, with the meager Regular units and weak militia units, who were concerned about their own families' safety from the Indians. The second option was to take the initiative and use the Indians effectively to take the American posts by surprise and continually harass their lines of communications. Brock felt that taking the initiative was the only way to win the war.

Like other British Generals who used Indians willingly, Brock knew the Indians and the Indian Agents from having served in North American for a long period of time. He was respectful of their customs and capabilities, but also a clear-eyed realist on their weaknesses. Although Brock had agitated for an assignment back in Europe, Brock chose to remain in North America when given the chance to return to Europe. After ten years in Canada, it is entirely possible that Brock's European based honour groups held less sway on him than his North American honour groups. These two circumstances of long North American service and a decision to stay could be prerequisites in being willing to use Indians. This issue will warrant further examination in comparison to other British Army officers.

Brock had been correct that if he could take the initiative in the western end of Upper Canada, it would free him to defend the eastern end more vigorously. However, the Americans were going to test him there too. Shortly after taking Detroit, Brock had to return to the Niagara region to defend an American invasion near Queenston near the falls

[497] Allen, *Indian Allies*, 138-140

of the Niagara River. Although he had a much larger force of regulars and militia than at Detroit, Brock also had approximately 600 Indian warriors, mainly from the Six Nations at Grand River settlement. He lost no time in sending much of the Indian force across the river to scout on and harass the American forces that were preparing to assault across the river. On 13 October 1812, the Americans landed and took the Queenston Heights. Brock immediately led a counter-attack. It would be his last battle. The British force faltered after Brock was killed, but the next in command, Major General Roger Sheaffe took over. Sheaffe sent a detachment of Iroquois under John Norton to harass the Americans on the heights while he formed another counter-attack. The British took the heights this time. [498] Queenston Heights showed that Brock's use of Indians was not a one-time event. He used the Indians in an independent capacity by sending them out as scouts and skirmishers. The action was swift, so he had little time to think about the repercussions of using Indians forward of his regulars and militia. However, there was little in the way Brock acted or in the orders he issued that would lead one to think that he was hindered in any way in his use of his Indian allies. Brock's big gamble had worked. Prevost and the London had sought a conventional view of how to protect Canada. Sir Isaac Brock's initiative and bold use of his Indian allies had delayed the American successful assault on Canada for nearly a year. Sheaffe also showed little reluctance to use his Indian allies to re-capture Queenston Heights.

With Brock lost to the cause, command of the forces around Detroit fell to Colonel Henry Procter. Two days before his death, Brock wrote to Procter to provide guidance on how to defend Detroit. He instructed Procter to remain active and not to wait for the inevitable American thrust to try to re-take Detroit. He instructed Procter to actively engage with Tecumseh and use the Indians to harass them. Even in death Brock's unequivocal orders were to use the Indians in the capacity that they were most useful. Procter would follow those instructions when he heard that an American force was moving north in January of 1813. [499] The lead American unit of Harrison's force was led by Brigadier General James Winchester. He occupied the village of Frenchtown on the river Raisin on 17 January 1813 and dispersed the British militia and Indians, but at a cost of several killed. Winchester kept his force at Frenchtown as he re-grouped to prepare for the continued

[498] Laxer, *Tecumseh & Brock*, 163-178
[499] Brock to Procter, through Prevost, 11 October 1812, Tupper, *Sir Isaac Brock*, 316-318

movement on Detroit. However, the delay would cost him. Procter advanced quickly and stealthily on Frenchtown and arrived on 22 January 1813 with a force of 1,200 of which nearly 600 were Indians, mainly Wyandot. In the bloody and confused battle that ensued, Procter lost over 200 killed or wounded, but Winchester lost over 400 killed and 500 captured. Procter had used his Indian allies effectively on the flanks of Winchester's force. However, it would be the aftermath of this battle where his use of Indians would cause the British the most trouble.[500]

With reports that Major General William Henry Harrison's main force was quickly closing on Frenchtown, Procter decided the prudent action was to retire to Detroit and secure a good defensive position. However, he had 500 ambulatory captives and his own wounded to transport. Procter made the fateful decision to leave approximately sixty-five American captives who were too wounded to transport under the care of a small group of medical staff and his allied Indians. Years of propaganda and personal reports have clouded what actually happened on the night of the 22nd and 23rd of January 1813. However, what is known is that a body of 200 warriors re-entered the town and took command of the American wounded. The most severely wounded were killed and scalped on the spot. Those able to walk were set out onto the road. Those that could not keep up were killed along the way. What would become known as the River Raisin Massacre was the worst atrocity of the war. Procter would become the object of American outrage and 'Remember the Raisin' the rallying cry of the subsequent American campaign on Upper Canada.[501] Although Procter showed no reluctance to use Indian allies, just had Brock had not, Procter was the one to take the strike against this honour. The American propaganda machine went into high gear with news of the River Raisin. Procter was concerned about the accusations, but it did not prevent him from using his Indian allies in the coming months. Procter was promoted to Brigadier General for his victory at Frenchtown, but was to continue to struggle with the fallout of the River Raisin massacre.

With Winchester's force decimated, Harrison decided to bring his force to a halt and build Fort Meigs near the falls of the Maumee River. Harrison wanted to build up his force and supplies before moving on Detroit. Procter had retired to Detroit to stabilize that area. Procter's Indian allies, who made up more than half of his force, were still dubious of the

[500] Antal, *Wampum*, 167-174
[501] Laxer, *Tecumseh & Brock*, 197 and Antal, *Wampum*, 180-183

British commitment to help them regain the Ohio area. Tecumseh pushed him to take the fight to Harrison as proof of British intentions. Once Procter got the Detroit area in a stable condition, he moved on Fort Meigs on 1 May 1813. Harrison had prepared well and the four-day siege did not go well for Procter. The Indians helped by attacking work parties, but had little they could do to support a European style siege. On 5 May, a large relief column from Kentucky came to Fort Meigs. Harrison had half the force fight its way in and the other half under a Major Dudley cross the river and take out a British artillery position. Dudley's militia force took out the batteries across the Maumee, but their ill-discipline found them following the dispersing British troops. Seeing an opportunity, Procter and Tecumseh set upon Dudley's force of nearly nine-hundred militiamen. Over four-hundred were killed or wounded and over five-hundred were taken prisoner back to the nearby British Fort Miamis. There the Indian force got out of control and began killing the prisoners. Tecumseh and Elliott eventually showed up and stopped the massacre. Reportedly, Tecumseh was angry for not stopping the massacre, but Procter pleaded helplessness at the slaughter. Fort Meigs had produced a huge force for plunder, but the fort had not fallen. Nor would it fall in a subsequent attack in July. Procter would also give in to Tecumseh's demands to attack nearby Fort Stevenson, but that would also fail. [502]

Throughout the summer, Tecumseh and Procter held each other at arm's length. Procter was fearful that the Indians might desert him, so he tried to do as the Indians wanted, but it just made him look weak to Tecumseh and to his superiors in Lower Canada. Tecumseh and his Indians doubted the British' resolve to do anything other than defend Upper Canada. However, on 10 September 1813, Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry took five vessels of the Royal Navy at the Battle of Lake Erie. Perry immediately repaired the British craft and provided transport for Harrison's troops. This action made Detroit and Amherstburg untenable. Procter feared that the Indians would turn on him if he retreated toward lower Canada, but he had no choice. In a tense confrontation, Tecumseh decided to stay with Procter's force as it fought a rear guard action up the River Thames. The retreating force lost its discipline. Harrison was in hot pursuit and the two forces met near Moravian town at the Battle of the Thames on 5 October. At this point, Tecumseh's force was acting like a British line force. Harrison's cavalry attacked and routed Procter and Tecumseh's force. Tecumseh was killed. Procter escaped, but was later court-martialed for

[502] Mahon, *War of 1812*, 159-165

the conduct of the retreat. The struggle to save the western portion of Upper Canada and help the Indians re-claim their Ohio homeland had come to an end. There would continue to be fighting around Niagara in 1814, but by 22 July Harrison had completed another Treaty of Greenville (1814) that secured peace with the Midwest Indians and ended their cooperation with the British in the north.[503]

Circumstances drove Brock and Procter to secure the Indians as allies in Upper Canada. Military Honour did not hinder either of them. Brock's death saved him from the problems associated with Indian massacres at the River Raisin and Fort Meigs, but did not spare Procter's reputation. What did hinder the senior British leadership was their defensive line of thinking that precluded aggressive action in Upper Canada. This line of thinking started and ended with preserving their strengths at all costs. Britain had to win in Europe. Therefore, preserving the strength of the Royal Navy through impressments and restricting the Atlantic flow of supplies to France were the first order. For this, Britain was willing to provoke a war that could have cost them Canada, but had hoped until the last moment to avoid through measured conciliations. Additionally, the Indians required a reasonably large show of material and troop support to believe that the British were serious about the defence of the area for the Indians' sake and not just their own. Therefore, a partial solution to this situation would not have worked either. In 1811 and early 1812, it was worth not actively using the Indians to avoid explicitly provoking the Americans. However, once the war was imminent, British weakness in Canada led them to conclude that it was worth losing Upper Canada to preserve Lower Canada and the maritime bases that supported the Royal Navy North American station's activities along the American eastern seaboard.

Consequently, the British strategic position was clear prior to the War of 1812 that they would not defend Upper Canada at the expense of the larger strategic requirements that were absolute necessities to winning in Europe. Many of the decisions and much of the deliberation may have included worry about the honour in using Indians as allies and the importance of restraining the Indian way of war, but the strategic calculations were always superior to such conversations. The British had so few options and the stakes were so high in Europe that the normal hand wringing on whether to use the Indians or not was not prevalent. One can argue whether Prevost or Brock was correct, but neither General seemed

[503] Jeremy Black, *Age of Napoleon*, 218

overly concerned with their honour in deploying the Indians when the circumstances were right.

In the southern midwest, the picture was more mixed. After years of destructive war with the British and the Americans, the Cherokee had decided battles with the Americans usually ended in their towns and crops being destroyed. The Chickamaugas were still not friendly to American settlers, but had managed to mostly stay out of their way during this period. Other Cherokee had managed to adapt somewhat and became allies of the Americans in the gulf coast operations from 1813-1815, mainly against the Creeks in the Creek War of 1813-1814. That war was the result of the 1811 call to arms by Tecumseh. It had ended in the Battle of Horseshoe Bend where Major General Andrew Jackson and allied Cherokee warriors crushed a band of 'Red Sticks' in one of history's most lop-sided victories.[504] It was followed by the harsh Treaty of Fort Jackson where the Creeks ended up ceding twenty-three million acres to the Americans. It was into this situation that the British Royal Navy and Marines entered in 1814. Since this part of the operation did not involve the British Army, it falls outside the purview of this paper. However, by late 1814, a British Army General would command the land forces and have to decide whether to use the Indians or not. Therefore, a brief examination of the naval and marine operations is in order to understand what was available later.

Royal Navy Admiral Alexander Cochrane had taken a plan that had floated around Whitehall for several years that encouraged the use of the Creeks, Seminoles (Indians residing in Spanish Florida), and possibly Choctaws to participate in a joint operation with British forces against the Gulf of Mexico ports of New Orleans, Mobile and Pensacola. The concept of the operation was to land Royal Marines and possibly British Army regiments at New Orleans and have the Indians under Royal Marine leadership descend on New Orleans from the North. The difficulty of the plan was in its implementation. The British had lost direct influence over the southern Indians in 1783. There were British traders and limited communication links, but, in the final scheme, a handful of Royal Marine officers were dropped unannounced on the beach at the Apalachicola River mouth to find the Creeks and Seminoles and convince them to join their plans for the gulf coast. What Major Edward Nicolls of the Royal Marines found were the remnants of the Red Stick Creeks who were

[504] John K. Mahon, 'British Strategy and the Southern Indian: War of 1812', *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, Volume XLIV, Number 4, (April, 1966): 285-302.

starving and on the run from the Americans after the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. Nicolls gathered these remnants at Prospect Bluff on the Apalachicola River and began feeding, clothing, arming, and training them in British warfare methods. This was a decisive departure in the way Indians were normally used by the British. Nicolls was acting on orders from Cochrane to restrain the Indians, but Nicolls also seemed to have a strong moral streak himself. The attempt was to try to keep the Indians from committing atrocities while serving as allies to the British. Nicolls conducted small operations around the gulf coast, including seizing Pensacola with his Indian force, but the question was whether they would be used as intended against New Orleans.[505]

In the meantime, the Peninsular War with Napoleon was coming to an end and the British government felt it could release more troops to help end the war with the Americans. In late 1814, London sent Major General Sir Edward Pakenham and British Army re-enforcements to New Orleans. He was the brother-in-law of the Duke of Wellington and had a highly regarded service record in Spain. Cochrane had already begun landing British troops near New Orleans in December 1814 when Sir Edward arrived. He was not happy with the landing area, but decided to attack anyway. The Indians that Nicolls had so painstakingly trained were not deployed, but were holding down an American force in the West Florida swamps. It is not in the records whether Sir Edward considered using the Indians, but his belief that the American forces were no match for his British veterans drove him to attack without waiting for them or a better position. Andrew Jackson, the American commander at New Orleans, did use his Cherokee and Choctaw Indian allies effectively on the picket line. Their active ranging from the American line denied the British the reconnaissance of Jackson's position. The details of the Battle of New Orleans are well known, but Sir Edward Pakenham's assault at New Orleans would fail and he would die on the battlefield.[506] The War of 1812 would end in the next few months with a return to the status quo ante. Even the Duke of Wellington thought it was best for Britain to end the War of 1812 to focus the peace in Europe. Napoleon would shatter that illusion in 1815, but the Duke's European concerns are instructional about British military attitudes towards North America in general and the Indians in particular. The strategic calculations

[505] TJ Linzy, 'Honour Hinder?' 19-37
[506] Ibid.

with the war against Napoleon could not justify further conflict in North America. In 1814 the British were tired of war in North America and war in general.[507]

Therefore, the War of 1812 formed a microcosm of the previous fifty-eight. When the British had the option to use regular troops and their superior naval abilities, Indian use was less prominent. When there was no choice, senior commanders dithered on the Indians active use, but the local commanders made great use of the Indians available to them. When the Indians were a small proportion compared to the whites and conducted in tight formations, atrocities were few. However, when large numbers of Indians began to dwarf British forces, the risk of losing control and experiencing atrocities soon followed. By the end of the war, several different Indian leaders were actively involved and even showed levels of restraint not seen previously in stopping atrocities.

[507] Black, *Age of Napoleon*, 113-122 & 209-211

'At this point our historical survey can end.... It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities'.
-- Carl von Clausewitz[508]

9. Analysis and Conclusion

The Sixty Years' War is an alluring formulation of the warfare in the North American midwest from 1754-1815, because it is simple. However, in examining the British Army's behaviour during this period, little is simple. The British Army was from a different mold and felt itself part of 'Military Europe' first and foremost. Almost all of its reasoning came from how a given action would affect its standing in Europe or how it would secure the British Isles. The warfare in North America from 1755-1815 was for the control of a specified piece of ground that involved active physical battle at times and political and diplomatic battle at other times. It was a primary objective for the Americans from the 1750s onwards. The Americans wanted it and were willing to fight, militarily and diplomatically, whoever controlled it in order to get it. The Indians controlled it, sometimes through alliances with the French, the Spanish, and the British. The Indians wanted to keep it and were willing to fight for it militarily, but largely lacked the diplomatic means to do so otherwise. The British government mainly wanted to keep other European powers from controlling it, but had no substantial plans, outside of the fur trade, to actively use it themselves during the period of 1754-1815. They much preferred to control it and deny control of it through diplomatic, commercial, and political means. The British knew after 1763 that the Indians were fighting for the midwest, but they may have not known the Americans were fighting for it until long after it was lost to them. This ambivalent view of the midwest by the British directly contributed to cold and hot wars for which the British Army was not well suited or prepared, either in numbers or capabilities. This led the British Army to consider American Indians as allies or auxiliaries.

However, due to terrain and custom, the Indians did not fight like 'Military Europe', of which the British Army was a long standing member. Military Europe conducted battle according to a code that was widely known to the participants. The code held in high regard many positive martial values like courage, loyalty, and discipline. Additionally, the code held certain prohibitions in warfare through law and custom like torture, mutilation, and murder of prisoners. Wherever possible, it also tried to avoid attacking civilians, especially

[508] Clausewitz, *On War*, 593

women and children. British Army leaders generally held their conduct up for inspection on their adherence to this code. They also tried to hold their enemies up to the same code. This adherence to the code was known as one's military honour. The Indian war customs were quite different. They also valued martial values like courage, loyalty, and discipline to follow their rules. However, the conduct of war to Indians was a cultural and spiritual event that did involve rituals of torture, mutilation, and murder of prisoners. They would at times try to avoid civilian casualties, but they were not averse to visiting warfare on civilians, if necessitated by their objectives. Indian military honour was judged on their adherence to these rituals. Therefore, during active warfare in North America, British Army leaders had to make decisions on the use Indians as allies or auxiliaries based on their adherence to the code of military honour. This paper has outlined the geo-political, tactical, and cultural landscape of 1754-1815 as a background. It has examined the operational history of battle during this time and analysed the time-localised effects of these decisions. In this final chapter, this paper will analyse the combined operational history to determine the answer to the central question of 'Did military honour hinder the British Army's effective use of Indians in the era?'

9.1 Analysis

Bruce Buchan described the Enlightenment's view of warfare in two ways: moral and rational. The moral meant the adherents would conduct warfare in a more humane and 'civilised' manner. The rational meant that they would use technology, science and administrative tools to be more efficient in warfare.[509] These two concepts are positive in nature. However, Paul Robinson states that Enlightenment views of warfare could be reduced to prohibited tactics, weapons, and targets.[510] If viewed together, these are not as incompatible as they may first seem. Tactics and weapons can be rational if they meet the Enlightenment's view of using them efficiently. However, some tactics and weapons could be considered immoral and inhumane, such as tactics to spread communicable diseases among an enemy population. Targets could be moral or immoral, depending on the rational definition of legitimate combatants. However, the definition of a legitimate combatant could be very hard to discern at certain times on a battlefield, such as a child bringing weapons to a legal combatant. Other than artillery, weapons were very similar between the

[509] Buchan, 'Pandours' , p.5
[510] Robinson, *Military Honour*, 6

Indians and British. Although Indians would very rarely use artillery, there is little evidence that they viewed artillery as immoral or inhumane. Their reluctance to use it seems to be only because they lacked sophisticated manufacturing and logistical systems to move and supply artillery. Both Indians and British used muskets and rifles. Both used blades as well, albeit different types and in different ways. Indians used knives and hatchets. The Indians primarily used their blades to strike or cut. The British would sometimes use knives and hatchets, but their preferred blades were the bayonet and the saber or sword. The British primarily used their blades to slash or impale. For the sake of this analysis, with a few notable exceptions, weapons will not be a primary differentiator when examining the British Army leaders' decision making process.

This analysis will use a combined version of Buchan's and Robinson's principles distilled to tactics and targets that then will be categorized according to each party's view of whether they were moral and rational. The British Army leaders' view of these principles will help quantify the reasons for their reluctance to use Indians. In addition to tactics and targets, where appropriate, I will use Dr. Wayne Lee's categories for analysing the decision making process: capacity, control, calculation, and culture. I will use these to quantify the British Army leaders' process for deciding whether a tactic or target that was outside of his moral and rational boundaries or rationale could still be used. Lee defines capacity as a force's ability to overwhelm the enemy by capability. In the late eighteenth century this normally meant the force's size, weaponry, tactics, or ability to stay in the field were greater than the enemy's. Control is defined as the ability to sustain and usefully control the force in the field. It also includes control over societal norms. Calculation is defined as the 'conscious calculation of the material and moral factors within a specific vision of success as they [the leader] perceived them'. Finally, culture is the moral and ethical connector between tactics and targets and calculation. Because calculations were so heavily influenced by military honour, British Army culture was often the deciding factor of the four categories.

In 1755, the campaigns of Major General Edward Braddock to expel the French form the midwest did not employ Indians well. Braddock did not seem bothered that he had only a few Indian scouts. His view that well-trained and disciplined regulars would defeat the rag-tag grouping of French provincial forces and Indians was unshakeable. The record does not show that Braddock was overly concerned about atrocities, but more so about keeping

discipline. In this, he viewed the Indians as a threat to his force from the inside more than he feared the threat of French allied Indians from the outside.[511] Furthermore, when his small group of Indian scouts did try to advise him on wilderness warfare, he dismissed their views out of hand. When he was not merely dismissing their value and their advice, Braddock was busy offending them by telling them the King of England would do what he liked with the land once Braddock had secured it for him. This was an astonishing lack of good sense. Not only had he offended those that might have helped him, he had managed to cause his potential allies to become enemies with knowledge of his plans. Braddock was a creature of Military Europe. His entire career had been built on the idea that the European model of warfare was superior to all others. A more intelligent officer might have understood that the new environment required new thinking or at least a comprehensive review of how European tactics would apply in such a situation. However, given his background, he was probably incapable of considering the Indians as worthy adversaries. He thought so little of them that he designed a series of campaigns that were to be led by military novices like Johnson and Shirley and he actually expected them to be carried out. Once again this showed an astonishing lack of good sense. This evaluation might seem harsh, because he was a product of his times and had no training to think differently. However, men with far less experience than Braddock managed to understand the difference between European and American warfare; just none of them were in command of the British Army in 1755. Since Shirley and Johnson were mere colonials and would employ militia with little to no help from regulars, Braddock assumed they would need Indians to fill out the numbers in their forces. However, with a force of regulars led by him, he felt he had no need to sully himself with a large body of Indians. Military honour very definitely kept Edward Braddock from using Indians effectively in his campaign.[512]

The campaign led, or rather pushed, by William Shirley was a disaster from the moment he was appointed to lead it. He had no quarrel with using Indians, nor did he mind their war customs. As a colonial Governor, he had employed forces that openly conformed to Indian tactics and choice of targets. Shirley is a much maligned figure and rightly so. His actions show that he did not possess the morals and ethics to care about targets, nor the rational decision making to carry on a military campaign efficiently. His inability to move

[511] Preston, 'Make Indians', 285
[512] Chet, *Conquering The American Wilderness,* 107-108

past Oswego in the autumn of 1755 was not because he did not use Indians effectively. Even though he used Indians, he did not use them effectively which led them to become disdainful of the British war effort. However, this had little to do with military honour. It was because he was incompetent at leading any kind of military campaign.

William Johnson too was not experienced at leading large military campaigns. However, he had experienced Indian warfare. He knew the advantages and limits of it, but realised that he knew little of the technicalities of siege warfare or the logistics of moving large bodies of troops. William Johnson's defence of Fort William Henry is the most complex to analyse during this early period. He had no worry of using Indians, but he insisted on using Indians in a much more conventional way than he had in the past. Hendrick was not comfortable with this, but did what he could to help his friend Johnson. The Mohawk nation's friendship with Johnson would be sorely tried over the next few years due to Johnson's decision to use them in the manner he did. Had he used Hendrick's forces in their traditional manner of raiding, reconnaissance in force and harrying the extremities of an approaching force, they may have been more effective, but they almost certainly would not have lost so many warriors in the process. Additionally, Johnson's concern and protection for a captive like Dieskau when Mohawk warriors captured him showed the Mohawk nation who he really cared about. Not only was he unwilling to let the Indians fight with their traditional tactics, he was unwilling to let them deploy their traditional customs on their prisoners. Unlike Edward Braddock, William Johnson was not a product of Military Europe, but he seems to have tried to ingratiate himself into it by his change of the way he had dealt with the Mohawks in the past. This change made him the hero of Fort William Henry to the British establishment and brought him a Baronetcy, but it cost him the unflinching support of the Mohawk nation. Therefore, a newly emerging sense of European-styled military honour did not cost Johnson a victory at Fort William Henry, but it did precipitate the withdrawal of Mohawk support and kept him for achieving more that season and over the next few years.[513]

In 1756 Lord Loudon became the Commander-in-Chief in North America and immediately began assembling the necessary logistical effort to support operations in such a large and undeveloped country. He also brought a new sense of practicality in dealing

[513] Eric Hinderaker, *The Two Hendricks: Unraveling a Mohawk Mystery* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 259-267

with the Indians. The record certainly does not show the same dismissiveness that Braddock had shown in 1755. His correspondence is filled with despondency over his inability to recruit Indians. The record shows that he truly understood how weak his reconnaissance capabilities were without Indians. The Duke of Cumberland also seemed to harbour no inhibitions on their use. However, Sir William Johnson had little luck in recruiting the Iroquois after the 1755 campaigns. In fact, some of them were actively working for the French. Cherokee and Catawba warriors had finally been coaxed into action by the southern Governors. They were being deployed with small militia units on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier, but these were controlled, when controlled at all, by the colonial leaders of the those colonies. The colonial Governors like Dinwiddie were not inhibited in using the Indians in conjunction with Rangers and incentivizing them with scalp bounties, but most Governors never had had a problem with using Indians against Indians. How Lord Loudon and his commanders would have used Indians or controlled their behaviour is largely a moot point, because they did not have any in any appreciable numbers. However, this did not mean they were not concerned about their military honour. Lord Loudon worried about the actions of Rangers on his honour, but acknowledged that he had no choice. With this acknowledgement, Lord Loudon went beyond tactics and targets. He had looked at his capacity to conduct war effectively and found it lacking. His calculation was that he would need to give up some control over the way the war would be fought in order to perform the basics of reconnaissance. This is significant as it is the first unequivocal and demonstrable point where a British Army officer is displaying the calculation that forced him to put his military honour at risk. Loudon's weak position and inability to know what the French were doing led to the French and Indian massacres at Fort Oswego and Fort William Henry in 1756 and 1757, respectively. The inability of the French commander Montcalm to control large bodies of Indians did not dampen the British desire to recruit them, but, until 1758, very few northern Indians were willing to serve the British.[514]

Lord Loudon was replaced by Major General James Abercromby for the 1758 campaigns. The new commander showed no reluctance to use Indians on his campaign to take Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) in 1758. A few Mohawks were brow beaten by sir William Johnson to join the expedition, but once again they would not be impressed by the

[514] Tootle, 'Anglo-Indian', 281-331

British effort. Despite having a much larger force, Abercromby failed against Montcalm at Carillon. Fear of being fired by the results driven Pitt, Abercromby sent a force under Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet to attempt to take Fort Frontenac on the north shore of Lake Ontario. Bradstreet was happy to have the seventy Iroquois that Sir William Johnson could convince to join him, including a young Mohawk warrior named Joseph Brant who will figure prominently in our analysis later.[515] Crucially, this small force in relation to the overall size of Bradstreet's force was easier to control than Montcalm's thousands. Bradstreet was able to take Frontenac and keep the Iroquois from committing an atrocity, but let them share handsomely in the generous plunder of the rich fort. In using the Iroquois Bradstreet had not feared their tactics in helping him move through hostile territory, but restricted their targets to forces in the field and prohibited an attack on the surrendered French fort's soldiers and civilians. In this action, Bradstreet became the rarest of things during this period, a British commander who used Indians as valuable auxiliaries, but restrained their activities.

Brigadier General John Forbes led an expedition to retake Fort Duquesne through Pennsylvania in 1758. The southern Governor's delivered to Forbes what they could not deliver to Braddock, 500 Cherokee warriors. However, Forbes tried to treat them as regular forces and refused to let them range in front of his plodding march. The methodical nature of his march plan was a success for the British, but totally inappropriate for impatient Indian warriors who were seeking glory and plunder. By the time Forbes arrived at Fort Duquesne almost all of this Indian allies had gone home. However, Forbes learned from his mistakes and actively engaged the Ohio Indians in diplomacy. The lack of French goods in the Ohio region was forcing the Indians to take a renewed view of their relationship with the French. Bradstreet did have qualms about how Indians were used in his force and he tried to control them to ensure no atrocities were committed. However, in doing so, he lost their use. In this respect he certainly did not use them effectively. However, in turning the Ohio Indians neutral, he did use them effectively. Forbes' hard won wisdom would follow him to the grave in early 1759. He tried to pass on to British commanders how the Ohio Indians felt and how strong they were in defending their own country, but Jeffrey Amherst and others could not see as clearly as Forbes what they were facing. Therefore, by the late

[515] Kelsay, *Brant*, 63

1750s the British, excepting Bradstreet and Forbes, had rarely used Indians at all, but had become much better at using Rangers to fill the gap in their skills.[516]

Jeffery Amherst took command in 1759 and began with an aggressive set of objectives of Fort Niagara, Fort Ticonderoga, and Quebec. Luckily for him, as the tide turned against the French, many Indians began to lean towards a British alliance. Nearly 1,000 Iroquois agreed to help the British take Fort Niagara. For the campaign, Brigadier John Prideaux had to make concessions with his large Iroquois force, almost a quarter of his force, to keep them on side. His promise of first plunder on the fort probably saved his campaign, but he ran the very real risk of a massacre. He may have had reservations, but at this point in the war, British Generals were willing to take chances. Luckily, another battle raged nearby at La Belle Famille that slaked the Iroquois's thirst for scalps. They still plundered, but did not abuse the French prisoners. Amherst himself led the Ticonderoga and needed only a few Iroquois for scouting. In the end, the French abandoned the fort without a fight. The same could not be said for James Wolfe at Quebec. He was not using Indians in his campaign, but he did allow many of his soldiers to fight like Indians in the vicious fighting around Quebec. Only a stunning victory at the Plains of Abraham saved Wolfe's reputation from the depravities committed around Quebec. At this point in the war, neither Prideaux, nor Amherst, nor Wolfe had any reservations in using Indians as allies. Excluding Niagara, the only problem they had was that the Indians were still reluctant to serve the British.[517]

The most interesting part of the 1759 campaign season in relation to this paper were the raids and campaigns against Indians at St. Francis and in the lower and middle towns of the Cherokee. Amherst's increasing frustration and anger at what he felt was perfidy on the part of the Cherokee led him to begin thinking of the Indians as inhuman. This seemed to have opened a gate for him to begin loosening his views of what was acceptable. The Indian and Ranger tactics were already accepted, but in 1759 Amherst begin unleashing these tactics on new and more vulnerable targets like the village of St. Francis. His fear that the Quebec campaign might not be going well forced him to change his calculation about his capacity to inflict a meaningful defeat on the French and Indians in 1759. Would Amherst have launched the St. Francis raid, if he had known that Quebec had capitulated? History will never know, but, for certain, the British Army was on new ground. When faced

[516] Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 99-100
[517] Fowler, *Empires at War*, 173-197

with a real chance of failure, the British Army was willing to do what was required to win regardless of the chance of atrocity. The two Cherokee campaigns in 1760 and 1761 were similar. His capacity calculation changed slightly since he had more available troops in 1761, but the only other considerable difference was that Amherst had become angrier. Amherst began sounding like a frontier politician. He wanted revenge and he wanted it to be so severe that the Indians would not consider crossing him again. There was certainly no discussion on whether the Catawbas, Stockbridge, Mohawk or Chickasaws should be used or not. Both Montgomery and Grant seemed glad to have them and used them effectively. Whether Grant's frustration with the Cherokee peace negotiations had led him to a more irreconcilable position is unknown, but his order to 'put every soul to death' in the Cherokee middle towns was reminiscent of the Duke of Cumberland's order of 'no quarter' in the Scottish rebellion of 1745.[518]

British forces did use a few Indians, mostly Mohawks, against the midwestern Indians during the 1763-1764 Indian rebellion, but by then it was no longer unusual. Pontiac's rebellion is noteworthy in this paper only because of the lengths Amherst was willing to go to deal with the Ohio Indians. Amherst had truly given up any notion of restraint when he issued the order to distribute Small Pox infected blankets. The fact that his subordinates had already done it without his orders is immaterial. By introducing biological warfare on the Indians, Amherst had opened up a new Pandora's Box of using immoral weapons and not just tactics and targets. Amherst was to be relieved shortly, but it was because he could not end the war, not because of his methods. There was little to prove that London minded the methods that were being used from 1759-1764.[519]

The British Army had begun the war with ideals that British regulars did not need help from the Indians to win and they would not stomach the Indian way of war to gain them as allies. This was due to their view that Indian warfare was not moral in its tactics or targets. Additionally, their high esteem for their own capabilities and their association with Military Europe led them to the calculation that their capacity and control of warfare was more than a match for the Indians and French provincials. They had to adapt these views dramatically to win the war. The break with those ideals was complete by 1764 due mainly to Wolfe's and Amherst's leadership, although the reasoning had been carefully constructed in turning

[518] Oliphant, *Anglo-Cherokee*, 162
[519] Fenn, 'Biological Warfare', 1552-1557, & Ward, 'The Microbes of War', 63-78

the Indians into 'inhuman barbarians' that deserved no better than they gave and sometimes worse. However, military honour, internal and external, did keep the British from using the Indians effectively early in the period. The time and prestige lost during the period between 1755 and 1759 meant that the Indians held the British capabilities in contempt. The Proclamation of 1763 only proved to the Indians, and probably the Americans, that the British were not nearly as strong as they thought they were. That contempt was instrumental in denying the British effective control over the midwest.

From 1764 to 1774, the British were far too concerned with the escalating crisis with the colonies to think much about the possibility of an alliance with the Indian tribes. The reporting in the British press of the Indian wars and the atrocities that were part of it had made the British establishment and the public very wary of ever getting involved with it again. As long as the fur trade was still working, few wanted to deal with the midwest at all. However, the Americans were lusting after the land in the midwest at every level of society. The British efforts to manage the midwest and pay for it were an underlying driver of the issues in the rebellion against British rule. As the crisis grew out of control in 1775, the question of using the Indians became very real.

The British Army leaders at the beginning of the American Revolution normally fell into two camps. Those that were looking for conciliation with the rebels certainly did not want to unleash the Indians on their American cousins. The hard liners felt that all means necessary should be used to bring the rebels into line, but even many of these did not feel that the Indians were needed to be part of the solution. The deciding factor seemed to be whether any particular leader in question thought that the British Army had the capacity to deal with the rebels. Capacity came in three forms; possession of superior troops and leadership, more troops, or help from other allies. Most British Army leaders, hardliners and conciliators, felt the British force was far superior to the American militia and the nascent Continental Army, but they needed to keep the Indians neutral in this scenario. Some, such as Lieutenant General Sir Jeffery Amherst felt that it was possible to put down the rebellion, but only with many more troops than were in North America. Finally, there was Thomas Gage, almost alone in wanting to use Indians almost immediately.[520]

Major General Thomas Gage had taken over from Major General Sir Jeffery Amherst as Commander-in Chief of North American forces in 1763. He served in this position until

[520] Conway, 'Subdue America', for a deeper discussion of the differences between hardliners and conciliators.

1775. When only acting as an administrator, he performed well, but as the American crisis gained momentum in the early 1770s, he made a series of miscalculations that led London to lose confidence in him. However, he was a man who knew American warfare better than any other senior leader and he felt that the Indians would be needed to win the war. Having seen the British process for dealing with the midwest during the French and Indian war, he had concluded that British allied Indians were needed to relieve pressure on the British Army on the coast. He would have achieved his wishes as well had he had not had two subordinates, Governor General Guy Carleton in Canada and Indian Superintendent John Stuart in the south, who ignored his orders to release the Indians onto the frontiers. Carleton was a conciliator who felt that the Americans would come around to reason if treated well. Therefore, he felt that using Indians on the frontier was unbecoming of his military honour when fighting against the Americans. John Stuart was more of a hardliner, but still felt the war could be won with British troops rather than Indians who might be indiscriminate of loyalists and rebels once released. In effect, both Carleton and Stuart had made the calculation that the British Army could defeat the rebels without help and did not want to be associated with releasing a scourge that was unneeded to win the war. No one can question their humanity. They had both seen Indian warfare and the results of it. They knew the killing would be upon friends as well as foes. However, each categorically misread the strength of the American opposition. Their refusal to follow Gage's orders lost the British Army two years of having the Indians draw off American strength to defend the frontiers. It is arguable that they never recovered. Military honour, both in terms of tactics and targets and the miscalculation of capacity certainly hindered the British war effort in the early years.[521]

After finding the American rebellion harder to defeat than expected, the British Army in 1777 calculated that help would be needed in the form of Hessian troops and Indians. There was still concern over targets and tactics, but the capability and control calculation had changed radically. The British hardliners were pulling the gloves off. The decision was not a popular one in Britain, but Lord Germain and the British Army leadership agreed they were needed. The Indians teamed with loyalists in the south and were supported by Stuart. In the north, the Indians operated mostly independently out of Detroit and were supported by Governor Henry Hamilton. Both groups were successful in drawing off American forces

[521] Sosin, 'Use of Indians', 121

from the coast. Their actions had a certain propaganda expense to them, but their overall effect was positive to the war effort. However, the Indians in campaigns led by Major General John Burgoyne and Lieutenant Colonel Barrimore St. Leger were much less effective and the propaganda war on the use of Indians was lost for good with the Jane McCrea affair. In the years of 1777-1778, military honour did not impede the British Army's use, but the leaders involved, excepting Henry Hamilton, did not use them effectively.

For the rest of the war, the British Army lived a double life in relation to Indian use. Senior British Army officers operated on the coast with knowledge of Indian operations on the frontier, but with little input or control. Using the Indians was incredibly unpopular in Britain. However, after the Saratoga disaster and the entry of France into the war, the calculation had been made that the war would be lost very soon if they were not used to draw off American forces from the coast. Lord Germain was hardly involved from that point forward, but the operations continued anyway. Indian use was a much more low-key affair for the British Army. It would be directed by lower level officers and Indian agents from the interior, such as Henry Hamilton, John Stuart, John and Walter Butler, John Johnson and Daniel Claus. Atrocities still appeared in the press, but none were directly attributable to senior British leaders as the Saratoga campaign had been with Burgoyne and Lord Germain. These operations in the midwest were some of the most effective of the war for the British Army. They drew off rebel militia in the south, Pennsylvania and Kentucky. In New York, they drew off a large contingent of regulars under Major General Sullivan. The military honour of senior officers might have been sullied by their use, but it continued unabated to the end of the war. The lower level officers and Indian agents directly responsible for their operations seemingly felt no stain against their honour in using them.[522]

Once again, the British Army, excepting Thomas Gage, began a war thinking that they could win it without sullying themselves with Indian allies. Their miscalculations were corrected, but the two year delay was arguably long enough for the Continental Army to find its feet and for state militias to form and prepare for a frontier war as well. Indian ally use in the Burgoyne era was a propaganda disaster, largely because of Burgoyne's bombastic behaviour and incompetent leadership. Adoption of frontier tactics and targets

[522] Calloway, *Indian Country*, 169-173

began to pay off for the British late in the war, but it was probably too late to change the course of the war. Military honour definitely hindered the British Army's effective use of Indians in the early part of the war. This was especially important to the outcome of the midwest becoming American in the Treaty of Paris 1783. The delay in attacking the upper midwest and Kentucky allowed leaders like George Rogers Clark to prepare and equip militia forces. Historians are split on the issue, but arguably Clark's operations in the area gave credence to the American claim that the midwest was to be included in the peace settlement. It is entirely feasible that Indian operations in this area earlier in the war could have led to the holding of this area to the end and after the war. British actions from 1784 to 1794 certainly indicated that they wished they had held onto it.[523]

From 1784 to 1794, a new British government in London and Canada tried to make sense of the new environment in the midwest. The British could not control it with troops, but the Americans were not really in control of it either. The fur trade was still incredibly lucrative to the British and American trade was not yet up to the task of manufacturing the items that the Indians desired. Therefore through delaying tactics and strategic calculations in 1786, the British decided that they would maintain the posts in the midwest to service the fur trade and supply the Indians. London might not have grasped the concept, but the newly returned Canadian Governor-General Lord Dorchester (formerly Sir Guy Carleton) and Upper Canada Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe understood that this support would still mean Indians attacks on the American frontier. Lord Dorchester had become much more cynical about the Americans since his days as a conciliator from 1775-1778. Simcoe had been a hardliner in the War of rebellion and believed that the Indians had been very badly treated by the Americans. Through their weak position, strategic interests in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, and their sympathy for the Indians, they calculated that support for the Indians was required to keep the American upstarts from holding too much power in the midwest. Lord Dorchester specifically seemed to have lost his concerns for humanity in supplying and encouraging the Indians on the frontier.[524]

In practical terms, the northwest and southern frontier wars from 1786-1794 were supported not at the British Army level, but by Indian Department agents in the north and south. Men like Alexander McKee, Simon Girty, and Matthew Elliott were supplying more

[523] Griffin, *Leviathan*, 273-277
[524] Sword, *Washington's Indian War*, 258-260

than just goods and trade. They were military and diplomatic advisors. Britain's support for these agents, whether they understood the full measure of their Indian support or not, alarmed the Americans and kept the frontiers alight with rumours of British perfidy. The situation could not continue and it came to a head at Fallen Timbers. However, the British Army's abandonment of the Indians in 1794 had less to do with military honour than diplomatic calculations. Although Lord Dorchester and Simcoe were vocal supporters of the Indians, that support had limits. When they were told to stand down to achieve a diplomatic solution with the Americans, they did. Although North America and the midwest in particular had seemed all important to the British from 1755 to 1794, the Indians learned the hard way that the most important issues for Britain still resided in Europe.[525]

After the Jay Treaty's implementation in 1796, the British Army in Canada took a backseat in Indian affairs. The Indians were incredibly skeptical of any official British promises anyway. The Indian department was still the real source of British connection to the Indians when the posts were moved to Canadian soil. The same families ran this department and, although there were some shake-ups of the old order, they still constituted the bulk of British diplomatic power in the midwest. In the south, the connections were more tenuous, but through the firm of Panton, Lesley and Company being supplied out of the Bahamas, the British did hold some influence. There was no question where the sympathies of these agents and traders stood. Military honour was not a question for these men who were thoroughly integrated into Indian society. They felt the Indians had been treated atrociously by the Americans and would take any opportunity to help the Indians strike back. The British Indian agents were hated in the frontier settlements anyway, so there was no loss of honour in their actions there.

The wars with France throughout this period meant that British Army power in the midwest was at its lowest level in fifty years. In the buildup to the next round of war in the midwest from 1807-1811, honour was much spoken of by the Americans. They felt their external honour was being disrespected by the British in their heavy-handedness in international trade and sailor impressment. However, military honour held little to stop the British Army using Indians as allies in this war, because there simply was no choice. The capacity calculations made the situation plain. The American population explosion in Ohio,

[525] Calloway, *Calumet*, 51-76

Kentucky and Tennessee meant that Britain would need an army of European proportions to save Canada if the Americans.[526]

When the War of 1812 began, The Governor General of Canada George Prevost and the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, Major General Isaac Brock displayed a level of understanding of the situation that had eluded British leaders in the past. Brock, especially, understood that there simply was no choice in the decision to use Indians as allies. Not only British influence in the midwest, which had been declining for a decade anyway, but Canada itself was at risk. Governor General Prevost, on the other hand, was using a different calculation. He was not necessarily against using the Indians, but assumed Upper Canada would eventually be lost, so he did not want to risk an Indian war that might turn against them when trying to defend the more strategically important Province of Quebec. A General of less confidence than Brock would have taken this as a stop sign to developing an Indian alliance. However, Brock was no ordinary officer. His close relationship with Matthew Elliott meant that he also held more authority with the Indians around Detroit than did other leaders. Brock was as concerned about this military honour as any European officer, but his years in Canada had led him to some very stark conclusions. He felt confident that if he moved on Detroit, Mackinac, and Niagara quickly, he could make a good defence of Upper Canada. This in turn would force the Americans to re-enforce the area and relieve pressure on Quebec. This confidence in his conclusions was a strong draw for warriors like Tecumseh. Brock's initiative worked and it did force the Americans to send much more force into the area. Therefore, unlike Britain's previous hot wars in North America, a strong decision to use the Indians as allies had put them in a better position than most of the British leaders thought was possible.[527]

Unfortunately for the Indians and for Upper Canada, Brock's death at Queenston Heights left them with Colonel Henry Procter. Procter was not a bad officer, but was not as strong and charismatic as Brock. Tecumseh and the Indians sensed this and began to demand demonstrable proof that the British were serious about holding Upper Canada and helping the pan-Indian movement to take back Ohio. In Brock they had seen a new kind of British leader who would stand by them. In Procter they saw more of the traditional British officer who equivocated on the nature of warfare in North America when the British need

[526] Horsman, *Causes*, 158-188
[527] Antal, *Wampum*, 383-394

faded. For Procter the situation was perilous. He needed the Indian's support, but feared the stain on his honour as news of the atrocities made the press. As he acceded to their demands in Ohio, the atrocities increased. As he began to lose his hold on Upper Canada, Tecumseh and the Indians realised that they were strapped to a sinking ship. With Tecumseh's death and Procter's loss of Upper Canada in late 1813, the British-Indian alliance largely failed for the final time. Neither had accomplished what they wanted, but Brock's early decisiveness probably saved Upper Canada for the British and it was clear that they had needed the Indian alliance to accomplish it.

In the south, the British had a late start on developing a fighting force with the Creeks. The plan to develop the Creek relationship had been around for a while, but had not been acted upon for the strategic calculation had assumed that British naval authority in the Gulf of Mexico would be enough to control the strategically important southern ports. The delay meant that the Red Stick Creeks fought the Americans alone in 1813-1814 with disastrous results. By the time the Royal Marines did arrive in 1814, it was too late to save the Creeks. Additionally, the British felt the need to try to use the Creeks as a conventional force and removed their unique capabilities to disrupt the rear of the American's long supply lines. In one final miscalculation, the arrival of European based re-enforcements and Major General Edward Pakenham led the British to assume that they could defeat the Americans at New Orleans. Without Indian help in the American rear and on incredibly difficult ground an amphibious assault was begun. The British influence in the midwest was extinguished with Pakenham's death in early 1815. Once again, the British Army were foiled as their external military honour about their superiority and their reluctance to use readily available Indian allies in a timely manner led them to make disastrous choices.[528]

9.2 Conclusion

To summarise, throughout the period of 1755-1815, the British Army's leadership made erroneous decisions on the use of Indian allies. The decisions were not always against using Indians, but coming to the decision was more often than not too late to gain the full advantage they needed. Their reasoning varied depending on circumstance, but was represented largely by the following line of reasoning. They did not want to use Indians as allies for fear of Indian tactics and choice of targets. They also feared loss of control of

[528] Linzy, TJ Linzy, 'Honour Hinder?' 46-50

their armies and battles which they viewed as very technical and rational affairs. They would consider using Indian allies if they felt they did not have the capacity to win without them. However, their contempt for most of their enemies' capabilities led them to poor calculations of their own capacity. To conclude, the British Army's leadership did allow their military honour to hinder their effective use of Indians from 1755-1815.

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